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Abstract: Corporate governance codes are an increasingly prominent feature of the regulatory 
landscape in many countries, yet remarkably little is known about the determinants of 
corporate governance reform. Potential determinants include: (1) the diffusion of an 
international benchmark model of good governance; (2) a country’s legal system; (3) the desire 
to attract foreign investors; and (4) the influence of interest groups. I construct a proxy for the 
investor-friendliness of 52 corporate governance codes of different jurisdictions and collect 
data on the code issuers. I find strong evidence that the drafters of codes emulate international 
benchmark models and that jurisdictions belonging to different legal traditions use different 
regulatory strategies, some evidence that portfolio equity inflows are associated with the 
investor-friendliness of codes, and no evidence that interest groups succeed in affecting rules. 
The article suggests a method for the modeling of legal evolution, convergence, and the 
political economy of corporate governance codes. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Corporate governance codes play an increasingly important role as a regulatory 
tool and part of a country’s corporate governance system. In many jurisdictions, 
listed companies are now required to publish a statement as part of their annual 
report indicating whether they comply with the corporate governance code in 
force in their jurisdiction and provide an explanation if they deviate from the 
code’s requirements.1 The effectiveness of this so-called ‘comply or explain’ 
principle, and generally of regulating by means of soft law, has been discussed 
extensively in the law and finance literature (see, for example, Andres and 
Theissen 2008; Arcot, Bruno, and Faure-Grimaud 2010; MacNeil and Li 2006). 
However, remarkably little is known about the drivers of corporate governance 
reform and the factors that determine the content of the codes. This is 
problematic, given that the regulatory goal of corporate governance codes to 
strengthen the accountability of managers depends not only on the compliance by 
companies with the code provisions, but also on the form and content of these 
provisions. Explanatory factors may or may not be conducive to the goal of 
investor protection, and understanding their influence on the drafting process is 
important in assessing how corporate governance codes evolve and whether they 
achieve their regulatory goal.  
This study examines the determinants of corporate governance reform and 
whether the affiliation of those who draft corporate governance codes with the 
investor or issuer community influences the content of the rules that they 
promulgate. I first collect data on the identity of the issuers of 52 corporate 
governance codes in 23 European countries covering 98.3 percent of the market 
capitalization of the EEA including Switzerland,2 as well as the members of the 
committees that drafted the codes and their affiliations.3 The data shows that there 
is significant variation across countries. In many countries, for example Belgium, 
Denmark, France, and Switzerland, codes are drafted by committees that consist 
overwhelmingly of issuer representatives, whereas in other countries, such as 
Norway and, recently, the United Kingdom, the investor community is more 
strongly represented. A third group of countries, including Poland, Portugal, and 
Spain, has set up corporate governance committees largely composed of 
technocrats. Second, I measure the development of the issuer countries’ capital 
markets and their attractiveness to foreign investors by using data from the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators on market capitalization, foreign direct 
                                                     
1 This requirement applies to all Member States of the EU, see Directive 2006/46/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006, OJ L 224 of 16.08.2006, p. 1, Art. 1(7) (now Directive 
2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the annual financial 
statements, consolidated financial statements and related reports of certain types of undertakings, OJ L 
182 of 29.06.2013, p. 19, Art. 20). 
2 Based on data from 2011. Source: World Bank World Development Indicators. 
3 The sample does not cover all Member States of the EU because data on the individuals who sit on 
corporate governance committees are not always available. 
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investment, and portfolio equity inflows. Third, I develop several indicators of the 
legal and political environment in the issuer country. In line with previous research 
(La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 1999, 2000), the countries in the 
sample are divided by legal tradition into common law as well as French, German, 
and Scandinavian-origin countries.4 Additional controls capture differences in 
statutory rules on board structure5 and the effectiveness of the political process. 
Finally, I assume that drafters take into account evolving international standards of 
good governance and the spread of corporate governance mechanisms developed 
in one country (‘benchmark’ codes of good governance) to other jurisdictions. 
This diffusion of regulatory mechanisms is modeled by including a time trend and 
quantifying the rules contained in the benchmark codes. 
I then assess the level of investor-friendliness of the codes in the sample. In 
order to do so, I develop a matrix that captures a central regulatory strategy of 
every corporate governance system: the composition of corporate boards, notably 
the requirement to have a specified number of independent non-executive 
directors on the board, separation of the roles of chairman and CEO, imposition 
of a cooling-off period before the CEO can go on to become chairman of the 
board, and the delegation of decisions that involve particularly sensitive issues to 
board committees. I analyze the relevant provisions of each code and quantify 
them according to whether they adopt solutions that tend to protect investors by 
establishing structures that control management effectively (for example, by 
requiring a high proportion of independent directors on the board or entrusting 
committees with the mitigation of conflicts of interests), or leave considerable 
discretion to the managers. In this way, I obtain an indicator of the ‘investor-
friendliness’ of the codes. 
The data enable me to test the following hypotheses. (1) If interest groups 
have a significant influence on the drafting process, we would expect committees 
dominated by issuer representatives to draft codes that provide for less stringent 
control structures than committees dominated by investor representatives. (2) If 
codes with strong investor protection mechanisms coincide with the presence of 
institutional investors, in particular international investors accustomed to strict 
Anglo-American standards of management accountability, we would expect the 
investor-friendliness of codes to be associated with the size of a country’s capital 
markets and inflows of foreign investment. The direction of the relationship, 
however, is somewhat ambivalent. It is plausible to argue that a high level of 
investor-friendliness is positively associated with market capitalization and capital 
inflows because foreign investors exert pressure on domestic policy-makers to 
improve their corporate governance regimes. On the other hand, weak capital 
markets and low capital inflows may prompt policy-makers to amend corporate 
governance rules proactively in order to attract foreign direct investment. In this 
                                                     
4 The appropriateness of this distinction, and deviations from prior research, will be discussed in Section 
3 below. 
5 This study focusses on the distinction between one-tier and two-tier board models and rules requiring 
employee representatives on corporate boards. 
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case we would expect to see a negative relationship. This ambivalence exemplifies 
a larger problem when the impact of legal rules on economic outcomes is 
examined. Realistically, the relationship is not unidirectional, but best described as 
one of mutual influence of legal, economic, and political factors (Coffee 2001). (3) 
Corporate governance codes are part of the wider regulatory landscape in the 
issuer countries. It is reasonable to assume that this regulatory landscape 
influences regulatory styles and techniques and that we can, therefore, identify 
differences between legal traditions. In particular, if it is correct, as claimed by 
parts of the literature (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 1999, 2000; 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2008), that jurisdictions in the common 
law tradition have a predisposition to stronger investor protection than those in 
the civil law tradition, we would expect this to be reflected in the codes.6 (4) If 
drafters are informed by, and receptive to, internationally accepted notions of 
what constitutes good governance, which are, for example, transmitted by codes 
regarded as benchmark models or by international or supranational initiatives, the 
content of the codes should change as such benchmark codes and initiatives 
spread and develop. 
I model the influence of these factors as a linear relationship, with the proxy 
for the investor-friendliness of corporate governance codes as dependent variable 
and the composition of the committees drafting corporate governance codes, 
indicators of the development of the capital markets, legal families and board 
model dummies, and the diffusion of benchmark codes as explanatory variables. I 
find that the diffusion of benchmark codes of good governance is positively 
correlated with the investor-friendliness of codes adopted in other countries. The 
correlation is statistically significant at the 1 percent level and of large magnitude. 
For example, if we regard the UK codes as a benchmark and ask what influence 
the level of investor-friendliness of the UK code has on the content of other 
codes adopted later, we find that a one-unit increase in the level of investor-
friendliness of the UK code translates into a 0.55-unit increase in the level of 
investor-friendliness of subsequent codes adopted by other countries.7 Expressed 
in standardized coefficients, a one standard-deviation increase in the investor-
friendliness of the UK code is associated with a 0.53-standard-deviation increase 
in subsequent codes. One interpretation could be that other countries react to 
regulatory innovations stemming from a country that is commonly regarded as a 
pioneer in the corporate governance movement. However, the reception of 
regulatory innovations is muted and not a one-to-one relationship. Countries 
adopt part of the foreign innovations, but they are also informed by their own 
                                                     
6 La Porta et al.’s claim is, of course, very controversial, see, e.g., Cools (2005), and it is important to take 
account of the opposing view in the interpretation of the results of this study. For a more detailed 
discussion see Section 3 below. 
7 In order to measure the effect of the benchmark code on corporate governance codes adopted by other 
countries, I use the UK code in force in the year before adoption of the response code. Therefore, the 
explanatory variable measures the level of investor-friendliness of the UK codes over time. 
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regulatory environment and legal traditions. If we model the dissemination of 
innovations in corporate governance as the time lag between the first 
comprehensive initiative in Europe, the UK Cadbury Report of 1992, and the 
adoption of the response code, we find that the level of investor-friendliness of 
codes tends to increase by 0.03 per year in absolute terms, where investor-
friendliness is measured on a scale from 0 to 1, or by 9.7 percent each year. 
The results also show that German and French legal origins are negatively 
correlated with the level of investor-friendliness. The results are statistically 
significant at the 1 or 5 percent level under most model specifications. The lower 
scores in the legal variables, and accordingly the negative coefficients, are often a 
function of a more open-ended and less prescriptive way of regulating the 
conflicts that corporate governance codes are intended to address. However, it is 
important not to draw conclusions regarding the general level of investor 
protection offered by these countries. I do not assess the general legal framework 
of the countries and do not attempt to account for substitutes for weak corporate 
governance mechanisms in a jurisdiction’s binding laws.8 
I furthermore find some evidence that the presence of foreign investors in a 
country, illustrated by high portfolio equity inflows, is positively correlated with a 
higher level of investor-friendliness, indicating that corporate governance 
committees are sensitive to the expectations of foreign investors. I do not, 
however, find consistent evidence that interest groups succeed in influencing the 
writing of codes in a significant way. I cannot reject the hypothesis that the 
coefficient on the variable measuring the committee members’ affiliation (as issuer 
or investor representatives) is zero under all except one model specification, which 
is, however, not the preferred specification as far as the model’s fit and underlying 
theory are concerned.9 These findings indicate that interest group politics are less 
important for the design of corporate governance mechanisms than anecdotal 
evidence reported in the literature (Schouten 2009) suggests. Policy-makers 
generally seem to be motivated by the desire to meet and incorporate 
internationally accepted standards of good governance, rather than to serve the 
interests of an affiliated group. 
I perform several robustness checks. Most importantly, I develop two 
alternative methods of computing the investor/issuer-orientation of corporate 
governance committees and introduce a simplified, binary coding of the legal 
variables in order to safeguard against potentially subjective interpretations of the 
code provisions. The results remain unchanged; in particular, benchmark codes 
and the diffusion of corporate governance initiatives measured as the time lag 
since the Cadbury Report continue to be positively correlated with outcomes and 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. German legal origin continues to be 
                                                     
8 See Cools (2005) for a discussion of potential substitutes. 
9 Economic magnitude of the author variable, calculated as the coefficient times standard deviation, is 
very small, between 0.04 and 0.00024 depending on the model specification (where both dependent and 
independent variable are continuous and measured on a scale from 0 to 1), and the standard error large 
(p-values are between 0.6 and 0.9 for the model with the best fit). 
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negatively correlated and statistically significant. The committees’ investor/issuer-
orientation is insignificant under all specifications. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the 
related literature; Section 3 discusses methodological challenges that arise when 
legal rules are coded to render them suitable for quantitative analysis; Sections 4 
and 5 describe the data and construction of the legal index measuring the level of 
investor protection achieved by corporate governance codes; Section 6 presents 
and interprets the results; Section 7 analyzes whether the data confirms the claim 
often advanced in the literature that corporate governance systems converge;10 and 
Section 8 concludes. The appendices contain a detailed description of the legal 
variables and the coding protocol. 
 
 
 
2. LITERATURE  
 
This study is related to two strands of the corporate governance literature, (1) the 
literature on corporate governance codes, and (2) the literature on interest group 
politics. 
Research on the issuers of codes has so far been limited in scope, focusing on 
whether codes are issued by, for example, governments or stock exchanges. A 
recent study observes that initially, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when 
corporate governance codes were issued for the first time in most European 
countries, governments played a crucial role (RiskMetrics 2009). Over time, 
private institutions, notably stock exchanges, have assumed the initiative. 
However, the identity of the code issuer is likely to be of limited relevance. This is 
because in practice we often see that the issuer of the code sets up a committee in 
charge of the actual drafting of the code. Such committees typically consist of 
issuer representatives, investor representatives, and third parties such as law 
professors and accountants. To obtain a better understanding of who actually 
writes corporate governance codes, we need to look at code issuers at a more 
granular level. 
Three studies have examined the identity of code issuers. An early report 
prepared by Weil, Gotshal, and Manges (2002) identifies the issuers of corporate 
governance codes published in the EU Member States between 1991 and 2001. 
The report distinguishes between several categories, including governmental 
entities, committees organized by governments, stock-exchange relates bodies, 
business associations, and investor groups. The study finds that almost one-third 
of the number of codes has been issued by institutional investor associations. 
Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004) collect data on the issuers of codes 
                                                     
10 The claim by Hansmann and Kraakman (2000) that we witness “the end of history for corporate law” 
has become very famous. 
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worldwide and distinguish between similar categories. They find that issuer types 
have shifted over time, and observe that the claim that institutional investors were 
the primary triggers of good governance is not supported by their data, which 
indicates that managers’ and directors’ associations have played an active role. 
Finally, the 2009 study by RiskMetrics mentioned earlier looks at the origin of the 
initial corporate governance code initiatives. This study distinguishes between 
public initiatives, public/private initiatives and private initiatives (comprising stock 
exchanges and representative organizations), and finds that most codes, 
particularly recent codes, stem from private initiatives. 
Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2009) review the literature on corporate 
governance codes and observe that to date it has not been studied systematically 
how the nature of the code issuer affects the content of codes. Such an 
examination is also warranted in light of a call by Bebchuk and Weisbach (2010) to 
study how corporate governance arrangements are influenced by interest group 
politics. Their call is motivated by a theoretical study by Bebchuk and Neeman 
(2010) who have modeled the competition among interest groups for influence 
over policymakers setting the level of investor protection. In their model, a low 
level of investor protection enables firm insiders to extract rents (in the form of 
private benefits of control), which gives them a powerful incentive to lobby 
against legal reforms enhancing investor protection. Several empirical studies have 
examined the role of interest groups in corporate law making further. Roe (2005) 
has shown that the political economy is a major factor in US corporate law 
making; Armour and Skeel (2006) have shown that the divergence between US 
and UK takeover regulation can be explained in terms of what they refer to as the 
‘mode’ of regulation, i.e. by taking into account who writes the rules for hostile 
takeovers. Schouten (2010) has analyzed the legislative process surrounding recent 
European legislation aimed at facilitating cross-border voting and found that 
financial intermediaries have had a particularly strong voice throughout the 
legislative process, which may in part explain the outcome of this process. 
Similarly, Ferran (2011) has documented the influence of interest groups on the 
legislative process leading to the EU Alternative Investment Fund Managers 
Directive. 
 
 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
Although the quantitative analysis of legal rules is not a novel development in law 
and finance scholarship, the best research design to ensure reliable results 
continues to be controversial. The pioneering work of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (LLSV), who constructed legal indices by assigning the value 
of 1 if a particular legal mechanism was present in a country’s legal system and 0 if 
it was absent (see, for example, LLSV 1997, 1998, for their anti-director and 
creditor rights indices or La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2006, for several 
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securities law indices), was heavily criticized for mistakes in the definition and 
coding of the legal variables that they developed (for only a few contributions 
from the voluminous literature, see Armour, Deakin, Mollica, and Siems 2010, 
Armour, Deakin, Sarkar, Siems, and Singh 2009, Armour, Deakin, Lele, and Siems 
2009, Cheffins 2001, Coffee 2001, Siems 2005a, Spamann 2006, 2009c). More 
specifically, it was argued that the definitions did not take account of the existence 
of functional substitutes, interactions between norms, and difficulties in the 
comparison of norms that were structured and conceptualized against the 
background of different jurisdictions and legal traditions. The critics also claimed 
that the binary coding failed to appreciate nuances in the operation of the legal 
rules and that some rules simply had been misunderstood or coded inconsistently 
between countries. Furthermore, the classification of the analyzed jurisdictions 
into four legal families, common law as well as the French, German, and 
Scandinavian legal families, was criticized as not being in line with modern 
comparative legal scholarship. LLSV answered their critics in a paper that 
summarized their prior research and reinforced their conclusions (La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2008). The controversy, therefore, remains 
somewhat unresolved. 
Since this study is in the tradition of LLSV in that it quantifies legal rules in 
order to render them amenable to statistical analysis, it needs to address the 
methodological challenges raised in the ‘legal origins’ debate. However, I will not 
engage in a comprehensive, critical review of the arguments advanced in this 
context. A considerable number of scholarly contributions have been devoted to 
this question.11 In the following paragraphs, I merely set out how the challenges 
affect this study. Where necessary, I propose modifications in order to develop the 
methodology further and make allowance for the problems identified in the 
literature. 
It is helpful to distinguish between three main methodological problems in 
quantitative legal research assessing two or more jurisdictions:12 (1) the functional 
character of comparative law; (2) the complexity of legal rules, which is a 
consequence both of their often ambivalent nature, giving rise to interpretive 
                                                     
11 It should be noted, though, that the ideal methodology for empirical legal research is far from settled 
and universally accepted. When Zweigert and Kötz observed 15 years ago that comparative legal 
methodology was ‘still at the experimental stage’ (Zweigert and Kötz 1998, p. 33), then this assessment 
must apply even more so to the fledgling discipline of quantitative (comparative) legal research, and more 
work is required to erect a sound methodological foundation for this type of research (for a step in this 
direction see Spamann 2009b). 
12 One additional issue, LLSV’s claim that legal origins have an effect on various economic outcomes, for 
example the development of a country’s capital markets, in the sense of economic causality, seems to be 
of less importance for present purposes. This claim was challenged because legal origins cannot 
necessarily be assumed to be exogenous. Rather, it is plausible to argue that the relationship between law 
and the economic environment is characterized by interdependence and mutual feedbacks, a relationship 
that has been described as ‘coevolution’ (Armour, Deakin, Mollica, and Siems 2010, pp. 1448-1453). The 
present study, on the other hand, does not make any causal claims regarding the evolution of legal and 
economic systems, but examines whether and how the chronologically fixed event of the adoption of a 
code of good governance was influenced by pre-existing economic, political, and legal conditions. 
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questions, and the multi-layered technique of drafting, where a legal outcome 
depends on a number of preconditions and exceptions as well as the interaction 
between rules from the same or different legal areas; and (3) the difficulty to derive 
general conclusions that go beyond the particularities of an individual legal system 
and hold for groups of countries, for example, legal families. I will discuss the 
three problems in turn. 
It is well established that the comparative analysis of legal rules cannot take 
legal concepts or regulatory solutions from one jurisdiction as its starting point.13 
Since legal systems may address the same social conflict, and achieve similar 
results in solving the conflict, with different legal techniques, comparative analysis 
must start from the social problem under investigation and search for functionally 
comparable rules, i.e. those rules that are designed to address the same social 
conflict, notwithstanding their provenance in the legal systems or the regulatory 
strategy employed (Michaels 2006; Zweigert and Kötz 1998, pp. 33-36). However, 
a purely non-legal formulation of the social problem is unrealistic. In practice, the 
majority of comparative researchers go back and forth between the investigated 
social phenomenon and possible legal responses in order to define and delimit the 
research question (Tschentscher 200714). For our purposes, a certain legally 
qualified understanding of corporate governance and approaches to regulating 
corporate boards is necessary to develop legal variables suitable to quantify the 
content of corporate governance codes. But the task at hand is, arguably, less 
problematic than that of the comparative researcher who wishes to assess a 
company’s legal system. This study does not intend to measure the actual level of 
investor protection in a given jurisdiction, but the comparative strength of the 
signal that a corporate governance code sends to the investment community by 
providing for specified legal mechanisms. To this end, the study deals with a fairly 
small number of provisions laid down in the code, rather than the whole corpus of 
rules that constitute a country’s legal system and that can potentially be utilized to 
protect investors. Thus, the risk of overlooking functional substitutes classified or 
conceptualized differently from one jurisdiction to another does not apply to the 
issue at hand.15 Furthermore, the arsenal of legal strategies used in corporate 
governance codes is limited and can be mapped onto well-established principles of 
what constitutes good governance stemming from international initiatives and 
                                                     
13 This problem has also been referred to as ‘home country bias’: Researchers tend to phrase the research 
question in terms of the legal system most familiar to them (see Siems, 2007, p. 79 n. 98; Armour, 
Deakin, Lele, and Siems 2009, p. 586; Armour, Deakin, Sarkar, Siems, and Singh 2009, pp. 349, 355-357). 
14 See also Michaels 2006, pp. 368-369, arguing that the identification of the relevant social phenomenon 
is a ‘constructive move’. Comparatists work in a ‘hermeneutic circle’; they analyse legal institutions that 
potentially qualify as functional equivalents and, in doing so, ‘construct the underlying problem and 
thereby […] recognize the functions of a legal institution’. 
15 However, a problem is the potential overlap between a country’s corporate governance code and its 
binding laws. The fact that a particular provision is not contained in the code may either indicate a 
regulatory gap or that the country’s binding company law deals with the matter. I discuss this issue below 
in Section 4. 
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scholarly contributions.16 I describe in detail below how I frame the social conflict 
underlying the legal variables and draw on international corporate governance 
initiatives in defining the variables. 
The second issue, the complexity and often open-ended or ambiguous 
formulation of legal rules, poses greater problems and is of central importance for 
all quantitative legal research. It has prompted some commentators to question the 
usefulness of quantitative legal research altogether (Siems 2005b) and others to 
emphasize the risks associated with a reductionist approach to comparative law 
that condenses legal rules into numbers (Michaels 2009). Inevitably, the 
quantification of social phenomena that are open to interpretation and rational 
disagreement as to their meaning involves a tradeoff between accuracy on the one 
hand and transparency and objectivity on the other hand (Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick 2003). A binary coding of legal rules must fail to capture the nuances that 
will often be decisive in real-life legal proceedings. It is, therefore, prone to 
measurement errors and will in any case lead to a loss of information. A more 
gradual quantification, on the other hand, necessarily requires value judgments that 
are only partly susceptible to objective verification.  
I propose a dual approach to coding in order to capture both the nuances and 
gradual differences in the code provisions and provide for a mechanism that 
restricts the coder’s discretion and allows for an easy replication of the coding 
exercise. The first approach, nuanced coding, is based on a detailed matrix 
containing six elements that determine the composition of corporate boards and 
the constraints within which executive directors are required to act.17 The coding 
is generally not binary, but includes intermediate scores that reflect the relative 
importance of incremental differences. The legal variables are, therefore, metric 
and the interval between two scores has a quantitative interpretation. The nuanced 
approach comprises, furthermore, a two-step analysis of the code provisions. In 
the first step, the provisions are assigned to the relevant grade of the legal matrix. 
Since no matrix, however detailed, is able to measure all variations that have an 
impact on the operation and effectiveness of the legal rule, I apply, in a second 
step, a qualitative adjustment if the quantification performed in the first step does 
not accurately reflect the true import of the rule. Several measures are taken to 
ensure transparency and consistency in the coding. First, detailed explanations for 
coding decisions and each adjustment that deviates from a mechanical application 
of the legal matrix are given in the coding protocol.18 Second, consistency is 
achieved by entrusting one person with the coding of all jurisdictions, rather than 
                                                     
16 Influential international initiatives include the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, first issued 
in 1999, and in the EU Commission Recommendation 2005/162/EC of 15 February 2005 on the role of 
non-executive or supervisory directors of listed companies and on the committees of the (supervisory) 
board, OJ L 52 of 25.02.2005, p. 51. For scholarly contributions see, for example, Monks and Minow 
(2011). 
17 The matrix is reproduced in full in Appendix A. 
18 The coding protocol is contained in Appendix B. 
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a multitude of country experts injecting idiosyncratic value judgments into the data 
gathering process.19 This is possible because this study is confined to the 
assessment of corporate governance codes, which are available in translation and 
contain, as mentioned, a limited number of regulatory tools that are well 
understood internationally and generally not dependent on functional 
complements from other areas of the legal system. In this sense, corporate 
governance codes are an ideal ‘case study’ for the political economy of rule-making 
because they are relatively insulated from the rest of the legal system and are also 
not a product of the whole institutional architecture devoted to legislating and 
enforcing law, but of a small group of known stakeholders and experts. In 
addition, detailed information about the corporate governance systems of the 
countries in the sample is nowadays easily accessible and allows for thorough 
comparative legal research.20 Where ambiguities remained, I consulted local 
lawyers for clarification and asked them to verify the coding. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that a nuanced grading, in particular if performed by 
one researcher, may give rise to bias due to the subjective quality that is part of 
legal interpretation. For this reason, I also employ a simplified, mechanistic 
approach to coding. The mechanistic method largely excludes discretion by using a 
simple binary matrix, assigning 1 if the regulatory strategy is used in the code and 0 
if it is not. No further adjustments are made.21 The simplified approach functions 
as a control mechanism. If the coefficients on the dependent variables do not 
switch signs and are, on the whole, similar to those under the nuanced approach, 
the nuanced coding can be taken not to add bias, and if the fit of the nuanced 
model is better than the binary model, the nuanced approach adds information 
and precision. 
The third issue, the identification of common characteristics of two or more 
jurisdictions in order to derive general conclusions for particular regulatory styles, 
relates to the well-known ‘legal origins’ debate. LLSV concluded that common law 
was superior compared to civil law jurisdictions with respect to various economic 
outcomes based on their distinction between four major legal families: common 
law, French, German, and Scandinavian-origin jurisdictions (La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer 2008). However, critics argued that LLSV overstated the 
differences between legal families, neglected the hybrid nature of many 
jurisdictions and did not consider that legal systems had converged significantly 
over the last decades (Armour, Deakin, Mollica, and Siems 2010). 
Notwithstanding these important points, for purposes of this article it is 
appropriate to distinguish between the four legal traditions and use legal origins as 
an explanatory variable. The reasons are as follows. It is correct that many (or 
most22) jurisdictions are influenced by more than one legal tradition. Some have 
                                                     
19 In large samples, the idiosyncratic deviations from an ideal (objective) interpretation may be said to 
cancel out if they are random, but this is not necessarily the case in samples of the size used here. 
20 See, for example, Gerner-Beuerle, Paech, and Schuster 2013. 
21 See Appendix B, Table B.7, for a description of the simplified matrix and the coding protocol. 
22 See Michaels 2009, pp. 780-781. 
                           5/2014 
 
 12
always been mixed systems. Increased international trade and the initiatives of 
international institutions transmit legal ideas or give impetus to legal reform. 
Furthermore, in the EU, the laws of the Member States are, of course, partly 
harmonized. However, if we do not attempt to classify legal systems as a whole, 
but analyze individual areas, it is often possible to recognize distinct regulatory 
strategies and interdependencies between jurisdictions. This is certainly true for 
the field of corporate governance and, more specifically, board structure 
regulation, at least if we restrict the comparative analysis to Europe.23 Comparative 
studies have shown that the four legal traditions can be distinguished quite clearly 
in their approaches to many issues of corporate governance (Gerner-Beuerle and 
Schuster 2013). In addition, in this article, legal origins are not linked with a 
general regulatory ideology. More narrowly, I argue that legal traditions may differ 
in the regulatory techniques that they employ, thus engendering differences in the 
content of corporate governance codes. The differences may be of a stylistic 
nature, reflect a different binding corporate law background or express genuine 
differences in the level of investor protection. Either way, including legal origins as 
an explanatory variable is useful. 
The allocation of jurisdictions to legal traditions, however, differs from that 
of LLSV. In particular, I consider Greece and Portugal to belong to the German 
tradition, whereas LLSV classify these countries as French-origin.24 Both countries 
are mixed systems, influenced mainly by the French and German traditions. In 
Portugal, legal reforms of the 20th century have shifted the focus from France to 
Germany (Zweigert and Kötz 1998, pp. 108-109). In corporate law and more 
specifically board structure regulation, strategies stemming from German law now 
feature more prominently, and especially the regulation of listed companies is 
informed predominantly by German corporate law.25 Greece has always been 
closer to the German tradition (Zweigert and Kötz 1998, pp. 155-156). This also 
holds for corporate law, even though influences from other legal traditions can be 
noticed, for example the one-tier board structure.26 
 
 
 
4. CONSTRUCTION OF THE LEGAL INDEX 
 
Various measures of investor friendliness have been developed in the literature, 
beginning with the widely-discussed research of LLSV in the late 1990s. These 
                                                     
23 The criticism of succumbing to ‘Eurocentrism’ in classifying the world according to common law, 
French, German, and Scandinavian legal origins (Glenn 2010) is then, of course, avoided. 
24 See below notes 97-100 for my allocation and LLSV 2008, pp. 1130-1131 for theirs. 
25 For an analysis of Portuguese company law and corporate governance see the Portugal country report 
in Gerner-Beuerle, Paech and Schuster 2013, pp. A783-A824, in particular pp. A786, 788. 
26 For a general analysis of Greek company law see the Greece country report in Gerner-Beuerle, Paech, 
and Schuster 2013, pp. A439-A474, and for the similarities with German law see Gerner-Beuerle and 
Schuster 2013. 
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measures, however, are of limited use for purposes of this study because they seek 
to develop a comprehensive proxy for investor protection, taking into account 
both the statutory framework, the ‘law on the books’, and questions of 
enforcement, i.e. the law in practice. In contrast, this study does not assess the 
actual quality of investor protection in a legal system, and not even the level of 
investor protection engendered by the corporate governance codes, based on an 
evaluation of the effectiveness of the code provisions and compliance rates. Rather, 
since my aim is an examination of the political economy of corporate governance 
codes, it is sufficient to develop a proxy that captures the meaning of the code’s 
text.  
Therefore, the task is, on the one hand, easier than that of studies 
investigating the effect of the law on economic outcomes. On the other hand, 
corporate governance codes, as all regulatory measures, have to be seen against the 
backdrop of the whole regulatory architecture. Their content is influenced by what 
is and is not regulated in other parts of a country’s legal system. Merely analyzing 
the codes would lead to incomplete observations and potential distortions. For 
example, if a particular legal mechanism is also (or exclusively) contained in the 
binding corporate law, we can expect the corporate governance code to be silent 
on the matter or address the issue imperfectly. However, the incompleteness of 
the code would not be indicative of a low level of investor protection.27 On the 
other hand, analyzing not only the codes, but also the statutory framework in a 
broad cross-section of jurisdictions creates formidable practical difficulties. For 
these reasons, I seek to develop a proxy for the level of investor protection that is 
imparted in a largely insulated manner by the codes themselves, instead of being a 
function of the interaction of statutory mechanisms and soft law. Such a proxy 
needs to satisfy the following conditions in order to be useful: (1) It must relate to 
a legal instrument that can be found in all corporate governance codes under 
investigation; (2) it must relate to an instrument that is sufficiently important to be 
representative of the degree of investor friendliness of the whole code; and (3) it 
must be sufficiently insulated from the codified corporate law to be, in itself, an 
accurate proxy for intended investor protection. 
It is submitted that board structure regulation, for example the rules regarding 
the number of independent directors, separation of chairman and CEO, and the 
establishment of board committees, satisfies these requirements. Board structure 
regulation has been of central concern for policy-makers since the beginning of 
the corporate governance movement. It has been addressed by landmark 
initiatives in corporate governance and can indeed be found, in one way or 
another, in all codes in the sample. At the same time, functioning boards are an 
essential tool to protect investors against expropriation by managers. Directors’ 
duties, the other main instrument employed by most jurisdictions, give rise to 
difficulties because they protect shareholders mainly ex post and require 
                                                     
27 Therefore, in contrast to existing research, for example Zanetti and Cuomo (2008), it is not useful to 
provide for an assessment of the full code. This is likely to result in an inaccurate proxy, unless the whole 
legal system is analyzed at the same time. 
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enforcement (for an overview see Kraakman et al. 2009).28 A board that 
incorporates effective control mechanisms, on the other hand, makes self-serving 
behavior by managers more difficult and, therefore, protects investors ex ante, 
without the need to take recourse to enforcement. In addition, a well-functioning, 
balanced board ensures that the company is run successfully and profitably. 
Consequently, board structure regulation is an essential element of every investor 
protection regime. Finally, while the basic structure of boards is laid down in 
binding company legislation, we are interested in the more detailed aspects of 
board structure. How an effective board should be structured depends largely on 
the specificities of the company: industry, size of the company, and ownership 
structure. Therefore, in most jurisdictions, the issues examined here are not 
codified, but left to private ordering in the company’s constitution, supplemented 
by the comply-or-explain precepts of corporate governance codes. 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to be conscious that board structure regulation is 
embedded in the corporate governance model that the jurisdiction adopts. Most 
importantly, the definitions of the legal variables have to take account of the 
fundamental distinction between one-tier (unitary) board models consisting only 
of a board of directors and two-tier (dual) board models consisting of a 
management or executive board and a supervisory board. Both models can be 
found in European jurisdictions. In other respects, it may also be necessary to 
refer to the statutory rules. For example, in some countries, such as Denmark,29 
the number of non-executive directors on the board is laid down in the companies 
legislation, whereas in others, such as the UK, the incorporators’ contractual 
freedom how to structure the board is not constrained by binding legislation. 
Where necessary, I have, consequently, made allowance for statutory rules, but for 
the most part the relevant legal data for the proxy is confined to the corporate 
governance codes. The coding protocol contains references to statutory sources 
where appropriate. 
I measure board structure on the basis of six specific issues, or elements, that 
have the potential to jeopardize the effectiveness of board control over 
management if not regulated appropriately: (1) the proportion of non-executive to 
executive directors on the board; (2) the number of independent directors; (3) the 
definition of independence; (4) the separation of the two central roles on the 
board, that of chairman and CEO; (5) the period of time the CEO has to wait 
after the end of his or her tenure before becoming chairman of the board 
(‘cooling-off period’); and (6) the delegation of sensitive issues that involve 
particularly pronounced conflicts of interest to independent committees, namely 
succession planning, responsibility for the review of internal control procedures 
and the appointment of the external auditor, and remuneration decisions. I define 
                                                     
28 Directors’ duties are, in any case, laid down in statutory law and not dealt with by corporate governance 
codes. 
29 See Appendix B, n 23. 
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these six elements so that the variables capture different board structure 
arrangements and assign a value between 0 and 1 to them, depending on how 
conducive the rule is to investor protection. A higher value indicates better 
investor protection.30 
It is clear that the elements are not equally applicable to one-tier and two-tier 
boards. In jurisdictions with a two-tier board structure, executive and non-
executive directors are by definition separated and the board ultimately responsible 
for monitoring, the supervisory board, consists entirely of non-executive directors, 
who may or may not be independent. Similarly, the positions of chairman of the 
supervisory board and chairman of the executive board (CEO in Anglo-American 
parlance) cannot be exercised by the same individual. Thus, elements (1) and (4) 
are not used in the calculation of the board structure index for jurisdictions that 
employ the two-tier board model.31 The difference between the one-tier and two-
tier board model requires additional modifications in the definition of the 
remaining four elements, which are, however, mostly of a terminological nature. 
For purposes of clarity separate definitions of the index elements are given for the 
two board models.32 
Where the expectations of good corporate governance are somewhat open-
ended, Commission Recommendation 2005/162/EC on the role of non-executive 
or supervisory directors of listed companies and on the committees of the 
(supervisory) board33 is used as a benchmark. This is particularly useful for 
elements (3) and (6), the definition of independence and the establishment of 
board committees to mitigate conflicts of interest. The Commission 
Recommendation provides for a definition of independence that is adopted with 
minor modifications.34 Codes that conform to the Recommendation’s 
understanding of independence receive the value 1 for that element of the board 
structure index. The Commission Recommendation also expects corporations to 
establish three committees –  nomination, remuneration, and audit committee – 
and requires the committees to be composed of a majority, or exclusively, of non-
executive directors, a majority of them being independent.35 The requirement 
applies to unitary as well as dual board models. Again, the variable is based on this 
benchmark with slight modifications. 
The elements have been chosen because they constitute integral aspects of 
the control of management through a working corporate board. It is difficult to 
point to one or more of them as being more important than the others. Therefore, 
they receive equal weight. The total value of the variable measuring the investor-
friendliness of codes (board structure variable) is the mean of the six or four 
                                                     
30 See Appendix A for the definitions. 
31 Many jurisdictions offer their corporations a choice between one-tier and two-tier boards. However, in 
practice one model is always clearly preferred by corporations, often for historical reasons. I classify the 
jurisdiction as one-tier or two-tier based on these preferences. For details see Appendix B, Table B.1. 
32 See Appendix A, Tables A.1 and A.2, for the one-tier and two-tier model, respectively. 
33 See n 16 above. 
34 Commission Recommendation 2005/162/EC, Annex II. 
35 Commission Recommendation 2005/162/EC, Annex I. 
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elements. Table 1 shows the scores received by the codes in the sample and the 
total value of the board structure variable.36 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
As discussed, code provisions are quantified in a two-step analysis. The first step 
(content-stage of the analysis) consists in a largely mechanical application of the 
definitions to the code provisions. The code provision receives the value 
corresponding to the applicable alternative of the definition. Since legal rules often 
contain exemptions, qualifications, or are phrased ambivalently, in a second step 
the provision is assessed qualitatively in light of the text of the section, its 
interaction with other provisions, and its strictness (or, conversely, the ease with 
which it may be circumvented). If appropriate, the value derived in the first step is 
then adjusted accordingly. 
It may be useful to explain the operation of this two-step analysis with the 
help of an example. We take element (4), separation of CEO and chairman of the 
board, and analyze how the UK Corporate Governance Code of 2010 and the 
Italian Corporate Governance Code of 2011 correspond to the matrix developed 
here. The matrix and the two code provisions are as follows: 
 
Element (4): Separation of chairman and CEO 
 
Measured on a scale from 0 to 1 and shall be: 
(a) 1 if the CEO and chairman are separated; the roles should not be exercised by 
the same individual; 
(b) 0 if the same individual can be chairman of the board and CEO. 
 
UK Corporate Governance Code 2010, A.2: 
 
MAIN PRINCIPLE 
 
There should be a clear division of responsibilities at the head of the company 
between the running of the board and the executive responsibility for the running 
of the company’s business. No one individual should have unfettered powers of 
decision. 
 
CODE PROVISION 
 
A.2.1. The roles of chairman and chief executive should not be exercised by the 
same individual. The division of responsibilities between the chairman and chief 
executive should be clearly established, set out in writing and agreed by the board. 
                                                     
36 The abbreviations for the codes are explained below in Table 2. 
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Italian Corporate Governance Code 2011, Article 2: 
 
PRINCIPLES 
2.P.4. It is appropriate to avoid the concentration of corporate offices in one 
single individual.  
2.P.5. Where the Board of Directors has delegated management powers to the 
chairman, it shall disclose adequate information in the Corporate Governance 
Report on the reasons for such organisational choice. 
 
CRITERIA 
2.C.3. The Board shall designate an independent director as lead independent 
director, in the following circumstances: (i) in the event that the chairman of the 
Board of Directors is the chief executive officer of the company; (ii) in the event 
that the office of chairman is held by the person controlling the issuer. 
 
COMMENT 
The international best practice recommends to avoid the concentration of offices 
in one single individual without adequate counterbalances; in particular, the 
separation is often recommended of the roles of chairman and chief executive 
officer, the latter meant as a director who, by virtue of the delegations of powers 
received and the concrete exercise of these, is the main responsible officer for the 
management of the issuer (CEO). The Committee is of the opinion that, also in 
Italy, the separation of the above-mentioned roles may strengthen the 
characteristics of impartiality and balance that are required from the chairman of 
the Board of Directors. The Committee, in acknowledging that the existence of 
situations of accumulation of the two roles may satisfy, in particular in issuers of 
smaller size, valuable organizational requirements, recommends that, should this 
be the case, the figure of the lead independent director be created. 
 
The UK code provides that there should be a clear division of responsibilities at 
the head of the company and the roles of chairman and chief executive should not 
be exercised by the same individual. This falls squarely within paragraph (a) of the 
definition of element (4). The provision is unambiguous and does not contain any 
qualifications or exceptions. Therefore, the UK Corporate Governance Code 
receives the value 1 for element (4) of the board structure variable. 
The Italian code is different in several respects. First, it is phrased in more 
ambiguous terms. The concentration of the roles of chairman and CEO is not 
prohibited, but the code holds that it is ‘appropriate’ to avoid it. Code Principle 
2.P.5 and Criteria 2.C.3 envisage that the company decides not to separate the two 
offices, but intends to ensure transparency and the existence of an appropriate 
counterweight in the form of a ‘lead independent director’ in case the same person 
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acts as CEO and chairman.37 Finally, the comments, which are included in the 
code to clarify the principles and criteria, explicitly acknowledge that the 
accumulation of the roles of chairman and CEO may be beneficial and satisfy 
‘valuable organizational requirements’. Is this a prohibition of the concentration of 
corporate offices that warrants quantifying the Italian code pursuant to paragraph 
(a) of the definition of element (4)? Arguably, it is a prohibition because 
companies must give reasons in the corporate governance report if they 
concentrate the offices, which is in line with the essence of corporate governance 
codes. However, the quality of the prohibition is different from that of the UK 
code. Clearly, this is a difference that cannot be captured by a simple binary matrix 
and mechanical coding. At this point, the second, qualitative stage of coding 
becomes relevant. 
At the second stage of coding, two aspects are of importance. First, is the 
code ambivalent, does it regulate by means of general guidelines that are open to 
interpretation and that can, accordingly, be evaded relatively easily, or does it give 
specific instructions and use clear prohibitions? Second, does the provision allow 
for exceptions?38 Since not all rules provide for exceptions and it is difficult to 
classify the precision of a legal rule as a free-standing variable, it is suggested that it 
is most accurate to adjust the value generated in the first step above (content) in 
light of the provision’s precision and strictness. If the provision is unambiguous 
and does not allow for deviations (unless the company decides to deviate from the 
corporate governance code as such), the value generated in step 1 remains 
unaltered. If the rules contain exceptions that allow the company to disapply the 
best practice requirements without having to satisfy the basic transparency 
objective of corporate governance codes, the score received in step 1 is reduced by 
one-half. Code provisions that are phrased ambivalently and qualify the 
prohibition, but generally adhere to the comply-or-explain rationale of codes, 
stand between unequivocal prohibitions and rules allowing for exceptions. Such a 
case should, accordingly, generally lead to a reduction by 25 percent.39 
The Italian code is an example for an ambivalent rule. It acknowledges the 
usefulness of the concentration of the roles of chairman and CEO and makes 
                                                     
37 The general regulatory goals are laid down in ‘principles’; ‘criteria’ specify ‘the recommended conduct 
typically necessary in order to reach the objectives set out in the principles’. See the Italian code, p. 6. 
38 Corporate governance codes are, of course, by nature subject to an exemption in the sense that the 
corporation can decide not to comply (if it provides an explanation for the deviation from the code). 
However, what is meant here with ‘exception’ is the possibility granted by the code provision to avoid the 
governance requirements without formal deviation from the code. 
39 Codes are often similar in the way how they allow for exceptions or include ambiguous provisions. For 
example, several codes allow the board of directors to determine the independence of directors and, in 
doing so, deviate from the independence criteria laid down in the code. The wide discretion of the board 
is sometimes combined with the requirement of the directors to give reasons in the corporate governance 
report. Thus, it is possible to apply the adjustment of 25 percent consistently to all codes that grant the 
directors discretion but preserve transparency and the adjustment of 50 percent to all codes that do not 
ensure transparency, which is tantamount to incorporating an exception into the code. For individual 
explanations see the coding protocol, Appendix B. 
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provision for the delegation of executive powers to the chairman within the 
framework of the code, i.e. the company is technically in compliance with the code if 
the offices are combined, even though transparency is required by virtue of the 
code.40 Therefore, it would be inappropriate to give the Italian code the same 
value that a code receives that prohibits the accumulation of the roles strictly and 
unambiguously, such as the UK code. This example shows that coding involves 
difficult questions of interpretation. 
 
 
 
5. OTHER DATA 
 
I construct data measuring the composition of corporate governance committees, 
the spread of benchmarks of good governance, the attractiveness of the code 
country for foreign investment and the development of the country’s capital 
markets, and general characteristics of the issuer country’s legal and political 
system. 
In order to assess the composition of corporate governance committees, I 
have compiled information on the background and biographies of the individuals 
who sit on the committees. The data was hand-collected from open-access 
resources and in conversations with the code issuers. The individual committee 
members are allocated to three categories: issuer representative, investor 
representative, and neutral. Issuer representatives are individuals who serve, or 
have served, in an executive function on the board of public companies or who 
are affiliated with an association representing issuers, such as MEDEF 
(Mouvement des Entreprises de France), the French union of employers, 
representing a large number of French enterprises, or Confindustria, the 
organization representing Italian manufacturing and services companies. Investor 
representatives are individuals who work in the investment and asset management 
industry or are affiliated with associations representing investors, for example the 
Belgian Association of Pension Institutions (BAPI), Deutsche Schutzvereinigung 
für Wertpapierbesitz, the largest German private investors association, or the 
Dutch Association of Stockholders (VEB). Finally, committee members are 
classified as neutral if they cannot be seen as representing either of the two sides. 
This is in particular the case for independent professionals (for example, lawyers) 
or academics, or members of the public regulator. Representatives of financial 
institutions are somewhat ambivalent since financial institutions participate in the 
capital markets often both as issuers and investors. High-level representatives of 
such institutions, such as board members, however, will generally be concerned 
                                                     
40 Code Provision 2.P.5. 
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with the institution’s role as an issuer, and they are classified accordingly as issuer 
representatives, unless evidence to the contrary can be found.41 
Three alternative calculations of the composition of the drafting committee 
are provided to ensure that the results are not driven by computational issues. 
First, for each member who is an investor representative I assign the value 1, for a 
neutral member the value 0.5, and for an issuer representative the value 0. The 
score for each code is the sum of the values assigned to the individual members 
divided by the number of members. Second, the values 1 and 0 are assigned as 
before, but neutral members are excluded, except where all members of the 
committee are neutral, in which case the committee receives the value 0.5. In other 
cases, the variable equals the ratio of investor representatives to the sum of 
investor-affiliated and issuer-affiliated members. Third, the variable receives the 
value 1 if investor representatives have a majority on the drafting committee, the 
value 0 if issuer representatives have a majority, and the value 0.5 if issuers and 
investors are equally represented on the committee. Again, neutral members are 
not taken into consideration, except where the whole committee is neutral. 
Consequently, under all three methods of calculation, a higher value indicates that 
the committee should be investor-friendly. The author-variable should be 
positively correlated with the degree of investor-friendliness of the code if the 
committee members are successful in promoting the adoption of code provisions 
that favour their respective constituencies. The values for all corporate governance 
committees of the sample are given in Table 2. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Two variables measure the spread of benchmarks of good governance and the 
evolution of the international debate on how firms should be governed (this is 
called ‘sophistication’ of the corporate governance debate). The underlying idea is 
that policy-makers may not only be influenced by their own convictions of what 
constitutes good corporate governance, but also by an emerging international 
consensus regarding governance principles or legal innovations. These innovations 
may be pioneered by a national policy-maker or an international organization and 
are then absorbed in other jurisdictions. Regulatory instruments, i.e. rules that 
address a real-life conflict, such as the managerial agency conflict, are disseminated 
through publications or discussions in international forums. They are considered 
by other policy-makers and, if accepted as suitable, may exert an influence on 
amendments of existing or the drafting of new regulation in jurisdictions other 
than the one from which they originated. In this way, regulatory instruments (or, 
                                                     
41 The issuer/investor-orientation of the corporate governance committee, accordingly, also functions as 
a proxy for the influence of blockholders. In economies with concentrated ownership structure the 
interests of blockholders and issuers are aligned, which may explain the strong representation of issuer-
interests on committees in countries such as Italy and France (AFEP/MEDEF-code), as opposed to the 
UK. 
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more generally speaking, ideas or approaches to regulation) may be replicated and 
diffuse internationally. 
Corporate governance codes are a good example for such a diffusion of 
regulatory ideas. First initiatives to improve corporate governance not by means of 
binding laws, but voluntary codes and the comply-or-explain principle stem from 
the United States and go as far back as the end of the 1970s (Business Roundtable 
1978). They became practically important when large institutional investors, for 
example the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association-College Retirement 
Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF) and the California Public Employees’ Retirement 
System (CalPERS), started to issue principles of corporate governance and 
exercised their voting powers to change the governance structure of investee 
companies in line with their principles. In Europe, the corporate governance 
movement began in the early 1990s with the setting up of the Cadbury 
Committee, which was established by the UK Financial Reporting Council, the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE) and the accounting profession in response to a 
series of financial scandals. The committee published its report on ‘the Financial 
Aspects of Corporate Governance’ in December 1992, including a Code of Best 
Practice, the Cadbury Code. This was the first European corporate governance 
code and the first initiative to propose such essential reforms as, for example, the 
separation of the roles of chief executive and chairman of the board, the 
establishment of independence criteria, and the use of board committees. 
Successively, other European jurisdictions followed suit, and by the beginning of 
the new millennium most countries had corporate governance codes in place. 
The processes of evolution and diffusion of legal ideas have been addressed 
in the literature, for example by Spamann (2009a), but this line of research is still 
in its early stages. I propose two alternative ways of modelling the development of 
the corporate governance movement and the understanding of what constitutes 
good governance. For the first method, the UK codes are taken as the European 
benchmark, given that this is how they are perceived in many European 
countries.42 Sophistication is measured as the level of investor-friendliness 
achieved by the UK code in force at the relevant time (the year before adoption of 
the code in question).43 The second method assumes that the corporate 
governance debate becomes more sophisticated as time passes after a major 
regulatory initiative and the initiative is absorbed in other jurisdictions. I consider 
                                                     
42 See, e.g., Belgian Corporate Governance Recommendations, published by the Federation of Belgian 
Enterprises (1998), p. 3 (‘The VBO/FEB has used, as the basis for its activities, the “Code of best 
practice” which has been recommended by the Cadbury Committee in the United Kingdom. These 
recommendations are very authoritative on an international level, and they are the result of activities 
which have been carried out at the initiative of Europe’s leading stock exchange.’); Norwegian Code of 
Practice for Corporate Governance (2004), p. 6; Swiss Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance 
(2008), p. 6. 
43In 2005, EU Commission Recommendation 2005/162/EC was adopted (see n 16 above). Accordingly, 
for codes published thereafter, it can be assumed that both the UK code and the Commission 
Recommendation were seen internationally as important benchmarks. Therefore, beginning in 2006, I 
combine both sets of rules and take for each element of board structure the higher value as derived from 
the UK code or the Recommendation. See n 80 below for the coding. 
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the Cadbury Report of 1992 to be the main influence on the initial development of 
European corporate governance codes. The sophistication of the corporate 
governance debate is therefore also modeled as the time lag between publication 
of the Cadbury report and adoption of the respective code. This should give an 
approximate indication of the role played by the dissemination of major regulatory 
initiatives in the field. 
In addition, I collect macro-economic data as indicators of the development 
of the issuer country’s financial markets and the attractiveness of the country for 
foreign investors. Stock market capitalization is used as a proxy for the 
development of the capital markets. It is calculated as the product of the share 
price of listed companies (not considering investment companies, mutual funds, 
and other collective investment vehicles) and the number of shares outstanding. 
Net inflows of foreign direct investment, i.e. investments with the objective to 
acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an 
enterprise operating in the issuer country, and net inflows of portfolio equity 
investment, i.e. investments in equity securities by foreign investors below the 
threshold of direct investment, are used as proxies for the perception of the issuer 
country as an attractive destination for foreign investment and the relevance of the 
attitudes and expectations of foreign investors for policy-makers. The data comes 
from the World Bank World Development Indicators. Stock market capitalization 
and the equity flows are measured as a percentage of GDP. The three indicators 
exhibit significant variation from one year to the next caused by macro-economic 
shocks. In addition, it is unrealistic to assume that the code issuers were only 
influenced by the economic situation at the time of drafting and did not consider 
the financial development over several years. For these reasons, the average of the 
indicator in the year when the code was adopted and the previous four years is 
calculated for each variable. Another problem is posed by a number of outliers 
with high leverage that influence the results significantly.44 In order to address the 
problem, I perform robustness checks including and excluding the outliers. 
Finally, I include several variables measuring relevant aspects of the country’s 
legal and political system. As explained above, I classify the issuer countries’ legal 
system according to the four main European legal families: common law and the 
French, German, and Scandinavian legal traditions. The classification is informed 
by the comparative legal literature, but I also deviate from this literature in some 
cases to take account of the main influence specifically on the countries’ corporate 
law.45 I code dummy variables for each legal tradition. In addition, I include a 
dummy that is 1 if large public companies (the main addressees of corporate 
governance codes) are governed by a one-tier, unitary board and 0 if the law 
                                                     
44 For example, portfolio equity investment in Luxembourg as a percentage of GDP is by several orders 
of magnitude larger than in the other countries. As a result, Luxembourg shifts the coefficient on 
portfolio equity investment up to 56 standard errors. 
45 See above text to notes 22-26 and below Table 3 and notes 97-100 for the classification of legal 
families. 
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provides for a dual, two-tier board structure. Where the legal system allows for a 
choice between one-tier and two-tier boards, which is the case in many 
jurisdictions in the French legal tradition, the country is coded according to which 
board model is preferred by the majority of companies in practice.46 While a dual 
board structure is particularly common in the German legal tradition and is 
mandatory in Austria, Germany, and Slovakia, the one-tier/two-tier distinction 
does not correspond to the dividing line between legal families. For example, in 
some German-origin jurisdictions it is possible to choose between the two models, 
whereas in the Netherlands, a French-origin country, the two-tier board is 
mandatory for large companies (so-called structuur vennootschappen).47 Since the legal 
variables have to be responsive to board structure,48 the unitary board dummy is a 
necessary control in the model. A second dummy receives the value 1 if the 
country’s laws require one or more employee representatives on corporate 
boards.49 I treat this variable as a proxy for the jurisdiction’s responsiveness to the 
interests of employees. It would not be surprising if policy makers in a jurisdiction 
where the protection of employees has a long tradition were influenced by 
different considerations than policy makers in jurisdictions where this tradition is 
less pronounced. More specifically, the drafters of corporate governance codes 
may be less favorably disposed to strengthening the rights of investors if this 
means restricting the influence of the employees’ voice on the board.50 Legal data 
for the unitary board and employee participation dummies is compiled from 
Adams and Kirchmaier (2013), Gerner-Beuerle, Paech, and Schuster (2013), and 
the website www.worker-participation.eu. 
Three variables measure the political and policy-making climate in the issuer 
country. I include two political governance indicators from the World Bank 
Worldwide Governance Indicators: regulatory quality, defined as ‘the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that 
permit and promote private sector development’, and government effectiveness, 
defined as ‘the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the 
degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s 
commitment to such policies’ (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010). Corporate 
governance committees generally include representatives from government bodies, 
for example the financial market regulators, and failure of the government to 
provide for an effective regulatory environment may accordingly jeopardize the 
regulatory goals of the drafting process. I also construct a dummy variable 
                                                     
46 For further discussion and a list of countries with one-tier and two-tier board models see Table 3 and 
Appendix B, Table B.1. 
47 The correlation coefficients for the unitary board dummy and the four legal traditions, common law, 
French, German, and Scandinavian, are 0.23, 0.28, -0.63, and 0.27, respectively. 
48 See the discussion above, text to n 29. 
49 See Table 3 below. 
50 Again, the requirement to have employee representatives on the board is not simply a function of legal 
origins. The correlation coefficients for the employee representation dummy and common law, French, 
German, and Scandinavian legal origins are -0.27, -0.47, 0.22, and 0.56, respectively. 
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recording the political orientation of the issuer country’s government, since the 
political agenda of the government may have an impact on the codes’ content. The 
dummy is 1 if the main governing party is social democratic and 0 if it is 
conservative (or advocating market liberalism). The three political variables are 
based on the situation in the year before publication of the code, which is assumed 
to be the time when a potential influence should have become relevant. The 
coding of the political dummy and the two legal dummies (unitary/dual board 
model and employee board representation) as well as the allocation of the 
countries in the sample to legal families are reported in Table 3. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
 
 
6. RESULTS 
 
Sample-level summary statistics of all variables in the dataset are provided in Table 
4 (excluding the legal origins dummies but including the dummies for unitary/dual 
board model, employee board representation, and political orientation of the 
government). Table 5 compares the dependant variable measuring board structure 
regulation and the composition of corporate governance committees for selected 
observations. The individual legal elements of the board structure variable are 
analyzed in more detail in Table 6, Panels A and B. Panels C and D of Table 6 
report summary statistics of the elements of board structure by legal tradition and 
compare the two methods of coding the legal variables, qualitative, interpretive 
assessment and simplified coding on the basis of a binary matrix. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
We see large variation both in the legal variables and the three methods of 
calculating the affiliation of corporate governance committees. The measure of 
investor-friendliness of codes (‘board structure’) covers nearly the whole range of 
values that the variable can take, with a minimum of 0.013 (for the code 
promulgated by the Federation of Belgian Enterprises in 1998), a maximum of 
0.925 (for the Dutch Code Tabaksblat of 2003 and subsequent codes), and a mean 
of 0.47. Of the codes in the sample, 8 receive a score of 0.75 or more for board 
structure, 16 a score of 0.5 or more but less than 0.75, 17 a score of 0.25 or more 
but less than 0.5, and 11 a score of less than 0.25. 
As far as the composition and affiliation of corporate governance committees 
are concerned, we find that three are exclusively composed of investor 
representatives (codes promulgated by the Association Française de la Gestion 
Financière – AFG and the Swedish Shareholders’ Association) and three 
exclusively of issuer representatives (codes drafted by the Hellenic Federation of 
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Enterprises and the Spanish Institute of Directors-Administrators). The other 
codes are a mix of issuer and investor representatives or are drafted by 
technocrats, for example stock exchanges. On average over the whole sample, 43 
percent of committee members are issuer-affiliated, 39 percent are neutral, and 
only 18 percent investor-affiliated.51 If we exclude neutral members and 
concentrate on the ratio of issuer/investor representatives, we find that, over the 
whole sample, 71 percent of members are issuer-affiliated and 29 percent investor-
affiliated. The same calculation at code-level and including the codes where all 
members of the committee are neutral (in which case the committee receives the 
value 0.5) results in a sample mean of 32 percent, which is the mean of the 
variable Authors2. The mean is lower compared to the first method of calculating 
committee composition (mean of 0.38 for Authors1) because the effect of neutral 
members is effectively removed. 
A cursory examination of the data shows that at least in some cases the 
affiliation of the corporate governance committee does not seem to exhibit a 
strong correlation with the character of the code as investor-friendly or issuer-
friendly. Table 5 reproduces a selection of observations underlining this point. The 
clearest example is probably France. The sample contains codes from two 
organizations, AFG, the French Asset Management Association, and 
AFEP/MEDEF, who represent the interests of French industry.52 Not 
surprisingly, the composition of the AFG drafting committees is exclusively 
investor-oriented, while the AFEP/MEDEF committees are issuer-dominated. 
Nevertheless, the level of investor-friendliness achieved by the codes of different 
provenance is roughly comparable for the 1990s on the one hand (the MEDEF 
predecessor, the first Viénot report, is from 1995, the first AFG code is from 
1998) and the first decade of the new millennium on the other hand (I use the 
MEDEF codes from 2003 and 2010 and the latest AFG code from 2011). It is 
also noteworthy that the scores for board structure received by the more recent 
codes are consistently higher. We can see this pattern in other countries as well, 
for example Belgium, Greece and Poland. In Italy and Sweden, some early 
corporate governance committees had a more balanced or investor-oriented 
composition than later committees. In Italy, the first corporate governance 
initiative, the report and code of conduct of 1999 (‘Preda Code’),53 was prepared 
by a committee composed mostly of representatives of the industry, large public 
corporations and banks, but it was chaired by the chairman of the Italian Stock 
Exchange, Borsa Italiana, and included several academics and institutional 
investors.54 In contrast, the second Italian code in the sample, the corporate 
                                                     
51 These figures are almost identical if we calculate the proportion of issuer/investor representatives and 
neutral members on code-level, not sample-level. Now 42 percent of members are issuer-affiliated, 41 
percent neutral, and 17 percent investor-affiliated. 
52 Association Française des Entreprises Privées/Mouvement des Entreprises de France. 
53 Comitato per la Corporate Governance delle Società Quotate, Report & Code of Conduct, published 
October 1999. 
54 Of the 26 members in total, 15 are assigned to the issuer category, 3 to the investor category, and 8 are 
classified as neutral (members of the stock exchange, public accountants and lawyers, and academics). 
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governance code of 2011, while also drafted under the auspices of the stock 
exchange, was chaired by the chairman of the board of Telecom Italia and had a 
clearer majority of issuer-affiliated members.55 In Sweden, the first comprehensive 
corporate governance guidelines were promulgated by the Swedish Shareholders’ 
Association. Accordingly, this committee is coded as investor-affiliated.56 Later 
codes were prepared by a working group with members appointed fairly evenly by 
the government and different organizations in the business community 
representing both issuers and investors. Thus, in both countries later committees 
receive a lower score than the earlier drafting bodies, reflecting the shift towards a 
more issuer-oriented composition. In spite of this shift, the investor-friendliness 
of the codes has risen in both countries over the same time. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
The development of both variables over time is shown in Figure 1. I calculate the 
values for the composition of corporate governance committees (‘Authors’) and 
the investor-friendliness of codes (‘Board structure’) by taking the mean of all 
codes in force at any given year. Thus, for each year I consider the scores received 
by codes adopted in earlier years in that country, but replace earlier codes if a new 
code is adopted by the same issuer in the relevant year. The graph shows clearly 
that the average investor-friendliness of codes has increased monotonically since 
2000, when the corporate governance movement gathered momentum, with one 
exception in 2006. The drop from 2006 to 2007 is due to the adoption of the 
Bulgarian code of 2007, the first code in that country, which had a board structure 
score of 0.2, well below the average of 0.45 in 2006. The composition of corporate 
governance committees, on the other hand, has remained largely constant. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Table 6 presents summary statistics of the individual legal elements of the board 
structure variable and differences between legal traditions. Panel A reports the 
scores of the six elements of board structure. ‘Cooling-off period’ receives the 
lowest score on average over the sample. A possible explanation is that the 
requirement for the CEO not to become chairman of the board within a specified 
period of time constitutes a more recent legal innovation than the other elements. 
It was introduced in its strict form by the UK Combined Code of 2003 and the 
Dutch Tabaksblat Code of the same year, after the Higgs Report of January 2003 
highlighted the dangers of a former chief executive serving as chairman of the 
                                                     
55 Of the 27 members, 19 are assigned to the issuer category, 3 to the investor category, and 5 are 
classified as neutral. 
56 Sveriges Aktiesparares Riksförbund, Guidelines for better control and transparency for owners of 
companies quoted on the Swedish stock market, published 26 October 2001. 
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board.57 However, even in the UK it has remained a controversial and not 
universally accepted principle (Davies and Worthington 2012, para. 14-75). Given 
the UK’s leadership role in the field, it is maybe not surprising that the 
requirement is equally contentious in other countries and has not featured in their 
corporate governance codes until recently and even then only in some jurisdictions 
and in attenuated form.58 The distinction between executive and non-executive 
directors, on the other hand, is well established and receives high scores in the 
majority of jurisdictions, with the highest sample mean and median of the six 
elements of board structure. It has been one of the central mechanisms to 
constrain the influence of executive directors and in particular the CEO ever since 
the Cadbury Report identified ineffective boards as one of the causes of a spate of 
financial scandals in the beginning of the 1990s (Davies and Worthington 2012, 
para. 14-71). It is instrumental in ensuring that boards function effectively and ‘can 
both lead and control the business’ (Committee on the Financial Aspects of 
Corporate Governance 1992, para. 4.2). This is reflected in the score for the 
“executive/non-executive” element received by the sample codes and the 
difference to the other elements. 
The correlation table reported in Panel B shows that the six legal variables 
capture different aspects of board structure regulation. They are all positively 
correlated with each other, as we would expect, but the correlation is not so strong 
as to suggest that the elements are not meaningful individually. The statistically 
significant positive correlation between the number of independent directors and 
the definition of independence, separation of chairman and CEO, and committee 
structure is also not surprising. It is natural to regulate these issues together, not 
only the definition and number of independent directors, but also the other two 
variables, because the separation of chairman and CEO and the establishment of 
committees are more effective if the chairman and committee members are 
independent directors. We would, therefore, expect one variable to increase if the 
other increases as well. In general, the correlations indicate that if corporate 
governance reforms take place, they tend to tackle not only one or two of the 
issues measured by the six variables, but most of them together. 
Panels C and D of Table 6 compare the six elements of the board structure 
variable by legal traditions. Panel C summarizes the scores of the six elements and 
reports significance levels for the differences in the means of total board structure 
between common law and the other three legal traditions. In line with theory (for 
example, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2008; La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2008), we find that the means of French and 
German law are lower than common law. The difference is greater for the latter 
(0.35 for German origins vs. 0.47 for French origins and 0.6 for common law), 
and the German legal tradition has lower means in all of the six elements except 
                                                     
57 Higgs 2003, p. 24. 
58 Table 1 above shows that most countries started out with a score of 0 for ‘cooling-off period’ and 
some (but by no means all) then adopted some form of waiting period in the most recent code in the 
sample. 
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the executive/non-executive distinction, which is only applicable to a subset of 
German origin countries.59 Notably, we can reject the hypothesis that the German 
and Common law means are equal with 95 percent confidence. The results are, 
however, less unequivocal than those of the aforementioned studies that found 
that the difference between French legal origins and common law was also 
significant. In addition, the data show that the Scandinavian legal tradition has 
higher means than common law in several of the indicators of investor-
friendliness, which is not what we would expect in light of prior research. 
Panel D contrasts the means of the elements of board structure after 
comprehensive, qualitative assessment of the code provisions with those obtained 
after simplified, binary coding as described above.60 The means after binary coding 
are higher for the full sample and the subsamples of all legal traditions than the 
means after qualitative coding, which is a result of the design of the binary matrix 
that conflates alternatives defined separately and, accordingly, receiving 
differentiated scores in the nuanced matrix into one category receiving the value 
1.61 The positive difference does not, however, allow us to draw conclusions 
regarding the superiority of one coding method over the other. Rather, the fact 
that we can reject the hypothesis that the means of total board structure under 
both coding methods are equal with 99 percent and 95 percent confidence for the 
full sample and two of the subsamples, respectively (German and Scandinavian 
legal origins), shows that the two methods are not interchangeable, but the more 
nuanced approach captures additional information. Below I will discuss further 
whether the regression results are robust to the alternative coding methods and 
which model has the better fit. 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
Tables 7-11 examine empirically the determinants of corporate governance codes. 
Tables 7 and 8 contain the main regressions with two different measures of the 
diffusion of corporate governance innovations. Tables 9-11 report robustness 
checks using variations of the proxy for investor/issuer-orientation of corporate 
governance committees (the variable ‘Authors’) and the coding of the legal 
variables (qualitative assessment vs. binary coding). Furthermore, in Table 11 
aggregate board structure is treated as a latent dependent variable and the elements 
of board structure are used as indicator variables in a structural equation model 
                                                     
59 The executive/non-executive element is applicable to jurisdictions with a unitary board structure, 
namely Switzerland, Greece, and Portugal. In particular, Switzerland with a score of 1 for the two codes 
of 2002 and 2007 ensures that the mean is fairly high. 
60 See above Section 3. 
61 For definitions of the nuanced matrix see Appendix A, Tables A.1 and A.2, and for the binary matrix 
Appendix B, Table B.7. Compare in particular the definitions below in Appendix B, notes 146-147 with 
those in Table A.1, elements (5) and (6). 
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with a measurement part. All models are estimated by OLS with robust standard 
errors clustered at country level. 
In Table 7, I regress the investor-friendliness of corporate governance codes 
on several sets of explanatory variables to examine the four hypotheses from 
above. First, investor-friendliness is regressed only on ‘Authors1’, the first method 
of computing the orientation of corporate governance committees. Second, I add 
a variable measuring the ‘sophistication’ of the corporate governance debate, 
which is here the score of investor-friendliness received by the UK benchmark 
code in force at the relevant time. Third, as economic controls I use (the logarithm 
of) the ratios of market capitalization and GDP, foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and GDP, and portfolio equity inflows and GDP. Fourth, I add successively the 
dummies for legal origins (omitting the dummy for common law), unitary vs. dual 
board, and employee representation at board level. Finally, I include three political 
variables, a dummy reflecting the political orientation of the governing party and 
variables measuring government effectiveness and regulatory quality. The sample 
includes all codes except the UK codes, since the latter are used as a regressor on 
the right hand side. For reasons explained below, I also exclude the Luxembourg 
code of 2006 for all regressions except (7). Therefore, in regressions (1)-(6) the 
sample contains a total of 47 corporate governance codes, stemming from all legal 
families and following both the one-tier and two-tier board model. 
 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
As already suggested by the graphical representation in Figure 1 above, we do not 
find a statistically significant relationship between investor-friendliness and the 
investor/issuer-orientation of the drafting committees under most model 
specifications. The coefficients on ‘Authors1’ are generally of low magnitude and 
with a low t statistic.62 The only exception is equation (3) of Table 7, where we can 
reject the hypothesis that the coefficient is 0 with 95 percent confidence.63 The 
coefficient is positive, which is in line with the first hypothesis. A committee that 
is investor-oriented is associated with a higher level of investor-friendliness of the 
code. This is furthermore corroborated by anecdotal evidence. Members of 
corporate governance committees confirm that interest groups on drafting 
committees have regulatory preferences that they seek to promote. However, it is 
necessary to treat these estimates with caution. First, the same specification with 
the three economic controls, but the alternative definition of ‘sophistication’ or 
the binary version of the dependent variable, does not show a statistically 
significant influence of the composition of corporate governance committees. 
Second, theory suggests that the general legal environment is relevant for the 
                                                     
62 In the model with the best fit, equation (5) of Table 7, the t statistic is 0.2 and the p-value 0.843. 
63 The result holds for the other two calculations of the investor/issuer-orientation of committees, 
variables ‘Authors2’ and ‘Authors3’. In each case, the composition of the committee is statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level. Regression estimates are reproduced below in Table 9, columns (7) and 
(8). 
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content of corporate governance codes, since the drafters, who are often legal 
experts, develop the code provisions against the backdrop of the country’s legal 
system. A model that does not take account of the legal environment gives rise to 
omitted variable concerns. Third, a model with the legal variables added as 
regressors has indeed a considerably better fit than regression (3).64 Figure 2 plots 
the residuals from a partial regression of board structure against the residuals from 
regressing committee composition, including as controls the three economic 
variables and the five legal variables (regression (5) of Table 7). Under this 
specification, committee composition is clearly not associated with board structure 
(i.e. the level of investor-friendliness of the code). 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
On the other hand, the UK benchmark codes in force at the relevant time, used as 
a proxy for the sophistication of internationally recognized corporate governance 
initiatives, are positively associated with the level of investor-friendliness of the 
codes issued by other countries. The relationship is statistically significant at the 1 
percent level under all model specifications, including different calculations of the 
investor/issuer-orientation of the drafting committees and the binary coding of 
the response variable. The coefficient is economically large; a one-unit increase in 
the level of investor-friendliness of the UK code translates into a 0.54 to 0.62-unit 
increase in the level of investor-friendliness of subsequent codes from other 
countries. Expressed in standardized coefficients, the investor-friendliness of UK 
codes has the largest coefficient. For example, in specification (3), a one standard 
deviation increase in ‘Sophistication’ is associated with a 0.53 standard deviation 
increase in the predicted level of investor-friendliness of subsequent codes, which 
is a stronger effect than that of any other variable. In specification (5), the 
dependent variable increases by 0.49 standard deviations and in specification (7) 
by 0.54 standard deviations if ‘Sophistication’ increases by one standard deviation, 
which is again larger than the effect of any of the other quantitative explanatory 
variables (not considering the dummies). Figure 3 shows the influence of 
individual observations on the coefficient estimates (based on equation (5) in 
Table 7). The observation in the upper right-hand corner is the Greek code of 
2011, the observation in the lower right-hand corner the Bulgarian code of 2007, 
and the observation at the bottom to the left the Belgian code of 1998 issued by 
the Federation of Belgian Enterprises.65 If we exclude these three observations, 
                                                     
64 Both the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) indicate a 
significantly better fit of regression (5) with an AIC of -29.92 and a BIC of -9.57, compared with -18.34 
and -7.24, respectively, for regression (3). 
65 Not identical with the 1998 code issued by the Belgian Corporate Governance Committee, which is 
also in the sample. 
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which have the largest influence on the estimate,66 the coefficient on 
‘Sophistication’ remains statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
The economic controls are not statistically significant, with the exception of 
portfolio equity net inflows, which is positively associated with the investor-
friendliness of the response code. This is intuitive; we would expect investors who 
do not intend to acquire a major stake, but only a minority holding giving them 
limited or no influence on the management of the company,67 to be particularly 
anxious to promote legal devices strengthening the control of management, such 
as those captured by the board structure variable. The effect of portfolio equity 
net inflows is, however, relatively small compared to that of the UK benchmark 
codes. A one standard deviation increase in portfolio equity net inflows is 
associated with a 0.16 standard deviation increase in the level of investor-
friendliness of corporate governance codes.68 In addition, the estimates are 
sensitive to the inclusion of individual observations. The regressions in columns 
(1) to (6) of Table 7 do not include the Luxembourg code of 2006. Inclusion of 
the Luxembourg code does not have an effect on the significance levels of 
‘Sophistication’, German legal origins, and unitary boards. It does, however, 
change the sign of the coefficient on portfolio equity inflows and render the 
coefficient insignificant. The reason is that in the case of Luxembourg, because of 
its attractiveness to foreign investors and the small size of its economy, portfolio 
equity inflows as a percentage of GDP are by several orders of magnitude larger 
than for any other country in the sample.69 Since the influence of the Luxembourg 
code on the estimates is very significant,70 I exclude the code from the main 
regressions and the robustness checks. Without Luxembourg, the relationship 
between portfolio equity inflows and the investor-friendliness of codes is 
significant for most specifications, as shown by Figure 4. 
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
Of the legal and political variables, only the German legal origins dummy and the 
unitary board dummy are statistically significant, at least as long as ‘Sophistication’ 
is measured as the level of investor-friendliness of the UK benchmark codes. 
German legal origin is significant at the 1 percent level for all model specifications. 
                                                     
66 The Belgian code of 1998 shifts the coefficient on ‘Sophistication’ 0.50 standard errors, the Bulgarian 
code of 2007 0.51 standard errors, and the Greek code of 2011 0.44 standard errors. 
67 The investment would therefore not qualify as foreign direct investment as defined by the World Bank. 
For a description of the economic variables see above Section 5. 
68 The raw data is on a different scale than that of the other two economic variables because the log 
transformation required a preceding transformation to eliminate negative values (i.e. net outflows of 
portfolio investments). 
69 See above n 44. 
70 If we regress board structure on portfolio equity inflows and the other controls as specified in equation 
(5), the Luxembourg code shifts the coefficient on portfolio equity inflows 37 standard errors. 
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Codes from common law jurisdictions can be expected to have a level of investor-
friendliness that is between 0.22 and 0.33 (on a scale from 0 to 1) higher than 
codes from countries belonging to the German legal tradition, everything else held 
constant. We should, however, be careful with the conclusions that we draw from 
this observation. The coefficient estimates merely highlight that codes in the 
German legal tradition tend to be less concerned than common law codes with the 
strategies for the protection of investors embodied in the definitions of the six 
legal variables used to assess investor-friendliness. For example, codes in the 
German legal tradition tend to define ‘independence’ in general terms, rather than 
drawing up a list of criteria as in Commission Recommendation 2005/162/EC, 
and consequently receive a relatively low score. The estimates do not allow us to 
assess the level of investor protection on the whole in the respective jurisdiction. 
In particular, if it is correct, as has been pointed out in the literature (Cools 2005), 
that substitute mechanisms exist in civil law countries, for example strong decision 
rights of shareholders, the comparatively low level of investor-friendliness of 
German legal origin codes may simply be an expression of the fact that investor 
protection is achieved through different channels. 
As far as the coefficient on ‘unitary board’ is concerned, the estimates are 
mainly driven by one country: the Netherlands (see Figure 5).71 This explains the 
possibly surprising result that jurisdictions providing for a unitary board model 
tend to produce codes with a lower level of investor-friendliness than dual board 
jurisdictions. In general (but not always72), countries in the German legal tradition 
follow the two-tier board model and the other legal traditions the one-tier model, 
which would lead us to expect that the coefficient on ‘unitary board’ should be 
positive. However, the Netherlands, a jurisdiction that has traditionally placed 
great emphasis on investor protection and whose codes receive the highest score 
for investor-friendliness of the whole sample, requires large companies to form a 
two-tier board. Without the two Dutch codes, the coefficient is still negative, but 
no longer significant. 
 
[Figure 5 about here] 
 
How should these results be interpreted? The clearest finding is that corporate 
governance codes that are internationally recognized as establishing benchmark 
rules of good governance are highly influential on the content of new codes or the 
reform of existing codes in other jurisdictions. The investor/issuer-orientation of 
drafting committees, on the other hand, is on balance not statistically significantly 
associated with the level of investor-friendliness of codes. Rather than attempting 
to engage in regulatory arbitrage by offering advantageous conditions to their 
constituencies, policy-makers seem to be motivated by the desire to emulate 
                                                     
71 The Dutch code of 2003 shifts the coefficient nearly by one standard error. 
72 See above text to n 47. 
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internationally accepted standards of good governance. Differences in a 
jurisdiction’s legal environment also engender different approaches to designing 
principles of good governance, with codes belonging to the French and German 
legal traditions being less investor-friendly than common law codes. The statistical 
significance of the relationship between some of the legal traditions and the 
investor-friendliness of corporate governance codes is not surprising, given that 
codes are developed within a broader legislative framework and code provisions 
interact with this framework, for example where they reflect the one-tier/two-tier 
board structure distinction.73 But the findings do not allow us to draw any 
conclusions regarding the overall disposition of a jurisdiction towards issuer or 
investor interests. Furthermore, the insignificant coefficients on French legal 
origins show that we cannot confirm the claim that inherent differences between 
common law and civil law have an effect on the level of investor-friendliness of a 
jurisdiction (see La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2008). The scores for 
individual codes and summary statistics from above illustrate this.74 While the 
scores received by the German codes, compared with the UK codes, ostensibly 
corroborate the claim that the common law is favourably inclined towards investor 
protection, the Scandinavian countries, but also the Belgian, French, and Spanish 
codes, show that civil law countries are perfectly capable of producing investor-
friendly rules. 
I modify the calculation of some variables and the model specifications to 
check the robustness of these findings. Table 8 reports estimates of the same 
regressions as Table 7, but now the international diffusion of corporate 
governance innovations is modeled as the time lag between the first 
comprehensive corporate governance initiative in Europe, the Cadbury Report of 
1992, and the adoption of the response code.75 The results by and large confirm 
the findings from above. In particular, the coefficient on ‘Sophistication’ continues 
to be positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level throughout. Again, 
exclusion of the codes with the highest leverage as shown in Figure 6 does not 
change the significance level. The level of investor-friendliness increases per year 
by around 0.03 in absolute terms or by 9.7 percent. Portfolio equity inflows are 
also significant but sensitive to the inclusion of the Luxembourg code (regression 
(7) of Table 8). Now both French and German legal origins are statistically 
significant at the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively, with a higher negative 
coefficient, i.e. a lower level of investor-friendliness compared with common law 
codes, for German origin codes. However, the same caveat applies as above. The 
negative coefficient reflects differences in the approach to regulating by means of 
                                                     
73 Notably, the variables measuring the distinction between executive and non-executive directors and the 
separation of chairman and CEO are not applicable to two-tier board model jurisdictions, which are most 
jurisdictions in the German legal tradition. This can be expected to influence the results. 
74 Tables 1 and 4. 
75 Luxembourg is again excluded (except for regression (7)), but the four UK codes included so that we 
have 51 observations. 
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(non-binding) corporate governance codes, but not necessarily deficiencies in the 
level of investor protection in the legal system as a whole. 
 
[Table 8 and Figure 6 about here] 
 
In Tables 7 and 8 the model with the best fit is regression (5).76 I therefore take 
this model and vary the calculation of the investor/issuer-orientation of corporate 
governance committees as described above.77 Table 9 reports the estimates. All 
results are robust to the different calculations of the investor/issuer-orientation of 
the committee (‘Authors’) as regards both economic magnitude and significance 
levels. I also use specification (5) from Tables 7 and 8 to check robustness of the 
findings to a binary, as opposed to nuanced, coding of the legal variables. The 
coefficient estimates are reported in Table 10. The magnitude of the coefficients 
changes and the investor/issuer-orientation of committees is not significant under 
any specification, but the two variations of ‘Sophistication’ and German and 
French legal origins remain significant. Importantly, the model fit is consistently 
not as good as in Tables 7-9, suggesting that nuanced coding captures the variation 
in the content of the codes better than binary coding. 
Finally, I use a structural equation model to test whether the aggregate board 
structure variable is a good proxy for the investor-friendliness of codes. I treat 
investor-friendliness as a latent variable and the four elements of board structure 
that apply to all jurisdictions as indicator variables.78 Panel A of Table 11 reports 
estimates for a single-factor confirmatory model. The factor loadings are all 
statistically significant at the 1 or 5 percent level79 and the common factor explains 
the variance in the indicators reasonably well (with some reservations concerning 
‘cooling-off period’). Panel B shows that the model fit is very good. The 
differences between the fitted correlation matrix and the correlations calculated 
from the sample are small. In a second step, I run regressions (5) from Tables 7 
and 8, i.e. the first version of measuring the investor/issuer-orientation of the 
drafting committees and the two methods of calculating ‘Sophistication’ with the 
four elements of board structure used in the confirmatory factor analysis as 
endogenous indicators of the investor-friendliness of codes and economic and 
legal controls.80 The structural model confirms all results. The investor/issuer-
                                                     
76 Model fit is judged by means of the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information 
criterion. 
77 Section 5. 
78 These are: number of in-dependent directors; definition of independence; cooling-off period for the 
CEO; and committee structure. 
79 The p-value for “cooling-off period” is 0.11. 
80 The measurement part is therefore of the form: 
      	 
where  ,   1,… ,4 are the endogenous observed variables (the four elements of board structure as 
discussed in the text),  is the endogenous latent variable “investor-friendliness”, , are the intercepts 
and coefficients, and 	 the error terms. The structural part is of the form of a general regression 
equation: 
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orientation of committees is not significant, but the diffusion of corporate 
governance initiatives, portfolio equity inflows from abroad, and French and 
German legal origins are. 
 
[Tables 9-11 about here] 
 
 
 
7. CONVERGENCE 
 
It has been a longstanding claim that corporate governance systems, and corporate 
law in general, converge. Famously, Hansmann, and Kraakman (2000) have argued 
that corporate law systems exhibit a tendency towards ‘a single, standard model’ of 
corporate governance informed by Anglo-American legal solutions. This claim has 
not remained unchallenged (see, for example, Kershaw 2002), and it has been 
suggested alternatively that the social forces that shape legal rules, for example 
corporate ownership structures, impede convergence because they depend in part 
on the structures that an economy had at earlier times (Bebchuk and Roe 1999). 
On this view, legal systems are path-dependent and legal differences are likely to 
persist. 
It is clear that jurisdictions learn from each other in the sense that policy-
makers interact in various informal or institutionalized ways, exchange 
information, and are aware of regulatory initiatives stemming from other 
jurisdictions.81 The realization that such an international flow of legal ideas takes 
place is, of course, an essential feature of the theoretical framework proposed 
here, since I argue that certain regulatory initiatives can be seen as benchmark 
rules (here the UK codes) that influence the process of rule-making in other 
countries. If the convergence claim is understood to mean that legal systems move 
towards a particular level of regulation, for example the level of investor 
protection achieved by Anglo-American law, the findings of this study confirm the 
claim. As shown, the average level of investor-friendliness of codes increases over 
the sample period, and this increase is associated with a high level of investor-
friendliness of the UK benchmark codes. Such convergence may be termed 
‘outcome convergence’ since the outcome of a set of legal rules (here quantified as 
‘level of investor-friendliness’) approaches, on average, that of benchmark rules. 
                                                                                                                                       
     
where  is a matrix that contains the regressors and  and  vectors containing the coefficients and error 
terms. 
81 This is true at the international level and even more so within the EU. See, for example, Commission 
Decision 2004/706/EC of 15 October 2004 establishing the European Corporate Governance Forum, 
OJ L 321 of 22.10.2004, p. 53, noting explicitly that the Forum “should serve as a body for exchange of 
information and best practices existing in Member States in order to enhance the convergence of national 
codes of corporate governance as well as a body for reflection, debate and advice to the Commission in 
the field of corporate governance.” Ibid., recital 6. 
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However, convergence may also be defined more ambitiously as the 
evolution of legal systems towards a standard set of rules. Defined this way, 
convergence requires not only that legal systems achieve regulatory effects 
approaching a benchmark. It is also not sufficient to show that particular legal 
innovations are transmitted across borders and absorbed by foreign jurisdictions.82 
Rather, convergence in the strict sense occurs if the regulatory techniques 
employed by different jurisdictions across a whole legal area become increasingly 
similar. In order to assess this claim, it is useful to develop a formal measure of 
convergence. If legal rules have been quantified and a cross-section of legal indices 
computed, a natural candidate to measure convergence is the variance of the legal 
variable. In Table 12, mean and variance of the board structure variable are 
analysed in different ways to examine whether corporate governance models 
converge in the strict sense. 
 
[Table 12 about here] 
 
I first divide the sample into two subsamples, the first one comprising codes 
adopted between 1998 and 2004 and the second one codes adopted between 2005 
and 2011. Panel A reports the mean and median of ‘Board structure’ and the 
investor/issuer-orientation of the drafting committees for the two subsamples and 
the estimates of a paired mean equality test. As we would expect, the mean and 
median of the board structure variable are statistically significantly higher in the 
second subsample, but not those of investor/issuer-orientation. In Panel B, I 
compare the standard deviation of both variables for the two subsamples. The 
standard deviations are slightly smaller, but the difference is not significant. Next, 
I compute the standard deviation of codes in force in any given year, i.e. I discard 
codes that have been superseded by a newer code from the same issuer. If 
convergence in the strict sense occurs, and the convergence claim also holds for 
the legal mechanisms analyzed here, we would expect the standard deviation to 
decrease over time. However, Panel C shows that while mean and median of the 
board structure variable increase (as we already saw in Figure 1 above), the 
variance remains fairly constant. This means that codes influence each other by 
reinforcing a trend towards a higher level of investor-friendliness, but they do so 
with mechanisms that differed as much in the beginning of the sample period as 
they do today. Finally, in Panel D I calculate on a rolling basis mean and variance 
of codes newly adopted in the last three years. I then contrast the means of the 
new codes with those of the codes in force in the relevant year. The intuition is 
the same as before. If corporate governance models converge, the variance of the 
new codes and difference in means should decrease. However, again the data does 
not substantiate the strict convergence hypothesis. The variance and difference 
                                                     
82 This phenomenon has been discussed widely in the literature on convergence and path dependence. 
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fluctuate over time, but there is no clear trend towards smaller variance or 
difference. 
A possible explanation is that the benchmark system, the UK, is an outlier in 
the sample. European jurisdictions are dominated by the French and German legal 
traditions and traditionally only the laws of Cyprus and Malta were closely aligned 
with English law. Therefore, it is not surprising that the reception of legal 
innovations stemming initially from the UK does not lead to a decrease in the 
variation of legal techniques or even results in greater variance, at least in the short 
run. Diversity within a legal family increases as jurisdictions move away from their 
‘old’ standard model of corporate governance. They do so at different times and 
with different speeds and often do not implement the foreign legal innovation 
faithfully, but modify it to reconcile it with their own legal tradition. Thus, the 
transmission of legal ideas from other traditions does not immediately give rise to 
a new standard model, and it is unclear whether and when it will do so in the 
context examined here. For now, a standard model of corporate governance 
characterized by largely similar rules has not emerged in Europe. Considerable 
differences remain in the techniques of board structure regulation, even though a 
trend towards more investor-friendly codes is discernible. 
In summary, the lesson to be taken away from the analysis is that the 
transmission of legal concepts across borders and the evolution of regulatory 
outcomes towards a benchmark do not necessarily result in convergence in the 
strict sense, i.e. the use of increasingly similar regulatory techniques across a whole 
set of rules (a legal system or subsystem). Jurisdictions influence and learn from 
each other, but convergence, modelled formally as the lower variance of a legal 
variable over time, may nevertheless not occur. 
 
 
 
8. CONCLUSION 
 
In this article, I model the political economy of corporate governance codes as a 
linear relationship between the level of investor-friendliness of corporate 
governance codes, the composition of the committees that draft the codes, the 
international spread of corporate governance initiatives and benchmark codes, and 
economic and legal conditions in the issuer country. The approach taken here is in 
several respects different from existing studies. First, I construct a detailed proxy 
for the investor-friendliness of the 52 codes in the sample by analysing and 
quantifying representative code provisions. In order to ensure the robustness of 
the coding process, I use two approaches to quantification, a nuanced, 
comprehensive interpretation of the legal provisions and simplified, binary coding. 
Second, the drafting committees are not simply classified according to the identity 
of code issuers, but the affiliation of each individual on the committee is recorded 
and hereby the political orientation of the drafting committee (as investor or 
issuer-oriented) computed. Third, it is generally accepted that certain countries are 
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at the forefront of corporate governance reform and policy-makers in other 
jurisdictions are well aware of the initiatives emanating from the innovating 
country. In Europe, the most influential jurisdiction in this respect is the United 
Kingdom. I therefore suggest two methods of modeling the dissemination of legal 
ideas in the field of corporate governance. The first is to quantify the legal 
innovations in the same way as the response codes (the legal proxy used as 
dependent variable) and assess empirically how the former are associated with the 
latter. The second is to include a time trend starting with the legal innovation to 
capture the development of codes over time. 
I hypothesize that the main determinants of corporate governance reform 
include: (1) the diffusion of an international benchmark model of corporate 
governance; (2) approaches to corporate governance and the protection of 
different stakeholders embodied in a country’s legal system; (3) the desire to attract 
foreign investors and strengthen the domestic capital market; and (4) the influence 
of interest groups on the drafting process. I find strong evidence that the 
international diffusion of principles of good governance (defined as the investor-
friendliness of the UK codes and the distance in years between the first 
comprehensive UK corporate governance initiative, the Cadbury Report of 1992, 
and the adoption of the response code) is positively correlated with the level of 
investor-friendliness of the response codes. The drafters of codes seem to emulate 
internationally accepted standards of good governance. As regulatory initiatives (in 
the form of complete codes or specific provisions that embody novel approaches 
to addressing corporate governance conflicts) become publicly available, they are 
studied and, if found convincing, replicated. In this way, an above-average level of 
investor-friendliness of some foreign codes exerts pressure on the national policy-
maker to meet the international standard, thus creating a self-enforcing trend 
towards higher average levels.  
I also find strong evidence that codes belonging to the German legal tradition 
(and, to a lesser extent, those belonging to the French legal tradition) tend to 
exhibit statistically significantly lower levels of investor-friendliness than common 
law codes. However, these findings do not allow us to draw any conclusions 
regarding the level of investor protection in the respective jurisdiction as a whole. 
Legal mechanisms contained in the binding company laws of German or French 
origin jurisdictions may operate as functional substitutes for less investor-friendly 
rules in the non-binding codes. On this view, the statistically significant 
relationship is an expression of different regulatory techniques, rather than 
different levels of investor protection. Binding rules may substitute for non-
binding ones and mechanisms not related to board structure (such as direct 
decision rights of shareholders) may substitute for board structure regulation. 
I find some evidence that portfolio equity inflows are an indicator of the 
investor-friendliness of codes, but the estimates are sensitive to which countries 
are included in the sample. The intuition, in any case, is clear. A strong presence of 
international investors in the country may induce corporate governance 
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committees to be more sensitive to the expectations of these investors and, thus, 
receptive to widely accepted principles of good governance and investor 
protection. 
Under most model specifications, the investor/issuer-orientation of corporate 
governance committees is not statistically significantly associated with the level of 
investor-friendliness. While anecdotal evidence indicates that interest groups 
attempt to promote the interests of their constituencies, in a multiple linear 
regression model the influence of the affiliation of committee members is 
insignificant next to other explanatory factors. The findings, therefore, add a 
(formal) dimension to the literature on interest group politics. As the international 
diffusion of corporate governance best practices evolves, committee members 
base their policy-making decisions predominantly on these initiatives as a 
benchmark, irrespective of their affiliation. 
Finally, I test the claim that corporate governance systems converge towards a 
single, standard governance model. Modelling convergence/divergence formally as 
the development of the variance of a legal variable over time, I do not find any 
evidence supporting the convergence hypothesis. This means that the international 
diffusion and transplantation of legal ideas, which is a well-documented 
phenomenon, and the convergence of sets of legal rules should be distinguished, 
at least if convergence is understood formally. 
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Table 1. Investor-friendliness of corporate governance codes 
 
Table 1 reports the legal scores of the six elements of board structure for each corporate governance code, 
as well as the total score, which is treated as a proxy for the investor-friendliness of the code and used in 
the regression analysis as dependant variable. A higher value indicates a higher level of investor protection 
achieved by the relevant code provisions. The detailed legal definitions are contained in Appendix A and 
the coding protocol in Appendix B. 
 
 
Country Individual measures of investor-friendliness Total 
board 
structure 
Executive/ 
non-exec. 
No. ind. 
directors 
Definition 
of indep. 
Separation 
chair/CEO 
Cooling- 
off period 
Committee 
structure 
Austria 
2009 
2002 
 
n/a 
n/a 
 
1 
0.5 
 
0.3 
0.2 
 
n/a 
n/a 
 
0.4 
0 
 
1 
0.5 
0.675 
0.3 
Belgium 
2009 
2004 
1998E 
1998C 
 
1 
1 
0 
1 
 
0.5 
0.5 
0 
0 
 
1 
0.9 
0 
0.3 
 
1 
1 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
1 
1 
0.08 
0.5 
0.75 
0.73 
0.01 
0.3 
Bulgaria 
2007 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0.05 
 
1 
 
0 
 
0.17 0.2 
Cyprus 
2002 
 
0.5 
 
1 
 
0.3 
 
0.75 
 
0 
 
0.67 0.54 
Denmark 
2010 
2003 
 
1 
1 
 
1 
1 
 
1 
0.4 
 
1 
0.5 
 
0 
0 
 
1 
0 
0.83 
0.48 
Finland 
2008 
2003 
 
1 
1 
 
1 
1 
 
0.8 
0.55 
 
1 
1 
 
0 
0 
 
1 
0.67 
0.8 
0.7 
France 
2011 
2010 
2003 
1998 
1995 
 
0.5 
0.75 
0.75 
0.5 
0.5 
 
0.5 
0.75 
0.75 
0.5 
0.5 
 
0.65 
0.45 
0.45 
0.45 
0.4 
 
0.75 
0 
0 
0.5 
0 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
0.67 
1 
1 
0.58 
0.5 
0.51 
0.49 
0.49 
0.42 
0.32 
Germany 
2010 
2002 
2000B 
2000 
 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
0.3 
0.3 
0 
0.3 
 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
 
0.2 
0 
0 
0 
 
0.33 
0.17 
0.42 
0.25 
0.21 
0.12 
0.11 
0.14 
Greece 
2011 
2001 
1999 
 
0.75 
0 
1 
 
1 
0 
0 
 
0.8 
0.1 
0.3 
 
0.25 
0 
0.5 
 
0.175 
0 
0 
 
0.83 
0.25 
0.25 
0.63 
0.06 
0.34 
Hungary 
2004 
 
n/a 
 
1 
 
0.3 
 
n/a 
 
0 
 
1 0.58 
Italy 
2011 
1999 
 
0 
0 
 
0.5 
0 
 
0.4 
0.2 
 
0.75 
0 
 
0 
0 
 
0.75 
0.42 
0.4 
0.1 
Luxemb. 
2006 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0.3 
 
1 
 
0 
 
0.5 0.3 
Malta 
2001 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0.3 
 
0.75 
 
0 
 
0.67 0.45 
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Netherl. 
2008 
2003 
 
n/a 
n/a 
 
1 
1 
 
0.7 
0.7 
 
n/a 
n/a 
 
1 
1 
 
1 
1 
 
0.925 
0.925 
Norway 
2010 
2004 
 
1 
1 
 
1 
0.5 
 
0.7 
0.7 
 
1 
1 
 
0 
0 
 
1 
0.67 
0.78 
0.645 
Poland 
2010 
2002G 
2002C 
 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
 
1 
0.3 
0.3 
 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
 
0 
0 
0 
 
1 
0.08 
0.17 
0.625 
0.22 
0.24 
Portugal 
2010 
1999 
 
0.5 
0 
 
0.5 
0.125 
 
0.5 
0.1 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
 
0.5 
0.25 
0.33 
0.08 
Slovakia 
2008 
 
n/a 
 
0.5 
 
0.4 
 
n/a 
 
0.5 
 
0.75 0.54 
Slovenia 
2009 
2004 
 
n/a 
n/a 
 
0.5 
1 
 
1 
0.3 
 
n/a 
n/a 
 
0.4 
0 
 
0.67 
0.33 
0.64 
0.41 
Spain 
2006 
2004 
2003 
 
1 
0.5 
1 
 
0.5 
0.75 
0.5 
 
0.9 
1 
0.3 
 
0.25 
1 
0 
 
0 
0 
0 
 
0.67 
0.83 
0.5 
0.55 
0.68 
0.38 
Sweden 
2010 
2001 
 
1 
1 
 
1 
1 
 
0.8 
0 
 
1 
1 
 
0 
0.5 
 
0.67 
0.5 
0.745 
0.67 
Switzerl. 
2007 
2002 
 
1 
1 
 
0 
0 
 
0.3 
0.3 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
 
0.75 
0.75 
0.34 
0.34 
UK83 
2010 
2003 
1998 
1992 
 
0.75 
0.75 
0.5 
0 
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
0.675 
0.675 
0.3 
0.3 
 
1 
1 
0.75 
0 
 
1 
1 
0 
0 
 
1 
1 
0.83 
0.33 
0.9 
0.9 
0.56 
0.27 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
83 For purposes of developing a benchmark to be used as explanatory variable in the regressions below in Table 7, I 
take the value for board structure of the UK codes of 1992-2003. Beginning in 2006, after adoption of Commission 
Recommendation 2005/162/EC, I combine the Recommendation and the UK code and quantify the elements of 
board structure according to the more investor-friendly rule. The score of the combined UK Corporate Governance 
Code 2010 and the Commission Recommendation is as follows: executive/non-executive 0.75 (UK code); number of 
independent directors 1 (UK code); definition of independence 1 (Commission Recommendation); separation 
chairman and CEO 1 (UK code); cooling-off period 1 (UK code); committee structure 1 (UK code); total board 
structure 0.96. 
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Table 2. Composition of corporate governance committees 
 
The Table reports the composition of corporate governance committees in the sample jurisdictions by 
affiliation of the committee member as issuer representative, investor representative, or neutral (technocrat, 
academic, government body, stock exchange etc.). Authors1 is the sum of 1 times the number of investor 
representatives and 0.5 times the number of neutral members divided by the total number of committee 
members. Authors2 equals the ratio of investor representatives to the sum of investor and issuer 
representatives, i.e. not counting the neutral members. Authors3 equals 1 if a majority of committee 
members are investor representatives, 0.5 if the same number of issuer and investor representatives are on 
the committee, and 0 otherwise, again excluding the neutral members. 
 
Country Committee Issuer Inv. Neutral Authors
1 
Authors
2 
Authors
3 
Austria 
2009 
2002 
 
Working Group Corp. Gov. 
Working Group Corp. Gov. 
 
8 
8 
 
5 
5 
 
12 
12 
 
0.44 
0.44 
 
0.38 
0.38 
 
0 
0 
Belgium 
2009 
2004 
1998E 
1998C 
 
Belg. Corp. Gov. Committee 
Belg. Corp. Gov. Committee 
Federation Belg. Enterprises 
Corp. Gov. Committee84 
 
11 
11 
9 
5 
 
5 
1 
1 
3 
 
7 
3 
0 
6 
 
0.37 
0.17 
0.1 
0.43 
 
0.3 
0.08 
0.1 
0.38 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Bulgaria 
2007 
 
Bulgarian Stock Exchange 
 
5 
 
3 
 
9 
 
0.44 
 
0.38 
 
0 
Cyprus 
2002 
 
Cyprus Stock Exchange 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0.5 
 
0.5 
 
0.5 
Denmark 
2010 
2003 
 
Copenhagen Stock Exch.85 
Copenhagen Stock Exch. 
 
4 
4 
 
1 
1 
 
3 
2 
 
0.31 
0.29 
 
0.2 
0.2 
 
0 
0 
Finland 
2008 
2003 
 
Securities Market Assoc. 
Various organisations86 
 
6 
6 
 
1 
0 
 
1 
3 
 
0.19 
0.17 
 
0.14 
0 
 
0 
0 
France 
2011 
2010 
2003 
1998 
1995 
 
AFG87 
AFEP/MEDEF88 
AFEP/MEDEF89 
AFG 
Vienot I (AFEP) 
 
 
 
13 
0 
13 
 
 
 
0 
13 
1 
 
 
 
1 
0 
0 
 
1 
0.04 
0.04 
1 
0.07 
 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0.07 
 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
Germany 
2010 
2002 
2000B 
2000 
 
Government Commission 
Government Commission 
Berliner Initiativkreis 
Panel on Corp. Governance 
 
3 
6 
5 
4 
 
2 
2 
0 
2 
 
8 
5 
5 
4 
 
0.46 
0.35 
0.25 
0.4 
 
0.4 
0.25 
0 
0.33 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Greece 
2011 
2001 
1999 
 
SEV90 
Federation Greek Industries 
Capital Market Commission 
 
1 
1 
5 
 
0 
0 
2 
 
0 
0 
10 
 
0 
0 
0.41 
 
0 
0 
0.29 
 
0 
0 
0 
                                                     
84 Cardon Report, prepared by the Belgian Corporate Governance Committee – Commission Bancaire et Financiere. 
85 The Stock Exchange has appointed a Corporate Governance Committee (Komité for god Selskabsledelse), which 
drafts the code. 
86 HEX Plc; Central Chamber of Commerce of Finland; Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers. 
87 Classification of committee composition is based on the AFG code of 1998. 
88 Classification of committee composition is based on the AFEP/MEDEF code of 2003. 
89 The Code is based on ‘Promoting Better Corporate Governance In Listed Companies’, Report of a working group 
chaired by Daniel Bouton. Our classification is based on the composition of this working group. 
90 Hellenic Federation of Enterprises. 
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Hungary 
2004 
 
Budapest Stock Exchange 
 
1 
 
1 
 
14 
 
0.5 
 
0.5 
 
0.5 
Italy 
2011 
1999 
 
Borsa Italiana 
Borsa Italiana (Preda Code) 
 
19 
15 
 
3 
3 
 
5 
8 
 
0.2 
0.27 
 
0.14 
0.17 
 
0 
0 
Luxemb. 
2006 
 
Luxemb. Stock Exchange 
 
9 
 
5 
 
2 
 
0.375 
 
0.36 
 
0 
Malta 
2001 
 
Malta Stock Exchange 
 
1 
 
2 
 
4 
 
0.57 
 
0.67 
 
1 
Netherl. 
2008 
2003 
 
Monitoring Committee 
Tabaksblat Committee 
 
2 
4 
 
2 
3 
 
4 
6 
 
0.50 
0.46 
 
0.5 
0.43 
 
0.5 
0 
Norway 
2010 
2004 
 
Corp. Governance Board 
Various organisations 
 
2 
2 
 
5 
5 
 
2 
2 
 
0.67 
0.67 
 
0.71 
0.71 
 
1 
1 
Poland 
2010 
2002G 
2002C 
 
Warsaw Stock Exchange 
Gdańsk Institute 
Corp. Governance Forum 
 
0 
0 
0 
 
0 
5 
0 
 
1 
2 
6 
 
0.5 
0.86 
0.5 
 
0.5 
1 
0.5 
 
0.5 
1 
0.5 
Portugal 
2010 
1999 
 
CMVM91 
CMVM92 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
 
1 
1 
 
0.5 
0.5 
 
0.5 
0.5 
 
0.5 
0.5 
Slovakia 
2008 
 
Corp. Gov. Association93 
 
1 
 
1 
 
3 
 
0.5 
 
0.5 
 
0.5 
Slovenia 
2009 
2004 
 
Various organisations94 
Various organisations95 
 
2 
2 
 
0 
0 
 
1 
1 
 
0.17 
0.17 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
Spain 
2006 
2004 
2003 
 
CNMV96 
IC-A97 
Aldama Commission98 
 
3 
1 
3 
 
0 
0 
0 
 
11 
0 
12 
 
0.39 
0 
0.4 
 
0 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
0 
Sweden 
2010 
2001 
 
Corp. Governance Board 
Shareholders’ Association 
 
6 
0 
 
3 
1 
 
5 
0 
 
0.39 
1 
 
0.33 
1 
 
0 
1 
Switzerl. 
2007 
2002 
 
Economiesuisse 
Economiesuisse 
 
6 
4 
 
0 
0 
 
3 
2 
 
0.17 
0.17 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
UK 
2010 
200399 
1998 
1992 
 
FRC 
FRC/Higgs/Smith 
Hampel 
Cadbury 
 
2 
3 
6 
3 
 
3 
1 
2 
1 
 
3 
4 
3 
8 
 
0.56 
0.375 
0.32 
0.42 
 
0.6 
0.25 
0.25 
0.25 
 
1 
0 
0 
0 
 
                                                     
91 Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários. The code was drafted exclusively by employees of CMVM without 
outside involvement. The committee is therefore classified as ‘neutral’. 
92 See n 91 above. 
93 Stredoeurópska asociácia správy a riadenia spoločností (Central European Corporate Governance Association). 
94 Ljubljana Stock Exchange; Association of Supervisory Board Members of Slovenia; Managers’ Association of 
Slovenia. 
95 Ljubljana Stock Exchange; Association of Supervisory Board Members of Slovenia; Managers’ Association of 
Slovenia. 
96 Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores. 
97 Instituto de Consejeros-Administradores (Institute of Directors-Administrators). 
98 Special Commission to foster transparency and security in the markets and in listed companies. 
99 The Combined Code of 2003 was published by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) and derived from the Higgs 
Report (2003) and a review of audit committees by a group led by Sir Robert Smith (Smith Report, 2003). Our 
classification of the composition of the corporate governance committee is based on both the background of Sir Derek 
Higgs and the composition of the Smith group. 
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Table 3. Country dummies 
 
The Table reports the allocation of countries to legal families and the coding of the legal and political dummies. 
Unitary board is 1 if the country’s company law provides for a unitary, one-tier board model; Employee representation 
is 1 if the country’s company law requires at least one employee representative at board level. Both variables represent 
the legal situation as of the time of adoption of the respective corporate governance code. Political orientation of the 
governing party is 1 if the party in power in the year before publication of the code was social democratic. 
 
Country Legal family Unitary board Employee 
representation 
Political orientation of the 
governing party 
Austria German 0 1 2009 
2002 
1 
0 
Belgium 
 
French 1 0 2009 
2004 
1998 
0 
0 
0 
Bulgaria French 1 0 2007 1 
Cyprus Common law 1 0 2002 0 
Denmark 
 
Scandinavian 1 1 2010 
2003 
0 
0 
Finland 
 
Scandinavian 1 1 2008 
2003 
0 
1 
France 
 
French 1 0 2011 
2010 
2003 
1998 
1995 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Germany 
 
German 0 1 2010 
2002 
2000 
0 
1 
1 
Greece 
 
German 1 0 2011 
2001 
1999 
1 
1 
1 
Hungary German 0 1 2004 1 
Italy 
 
French 1 0 2011 
1999 
0 
1 
Luxembourg French 1 1 2006 0 
Malta Common law 1 0 2001 0 
Netherlands 
 
French 0 0 2008 
2003 
1 
0 
Norway 
 
Scandinavian 1 1 2010 
2004 
1 
0 
Poland 
 
German 0 0 2010 
2002 
0 
1 
Portugal 
 
German 1 0 2010 
1999 
1 
1 
Slovakia German 0 1 2008 1 
Slovenia 
 
German 0 1 2009 
2004 
1 
0 
Spain 
 
French 1 0 2006 
2004 
2003 
1 
0 
0 
Sweden 
 
Scandinavian 1 1 2010 
2001 
0 
1 
Switzerland 
 
German 1 0 2007 
2002 
0 
0 
UK 
 
Common law 1 0 2010 
2003 
1998 
1992 
1 
1 
1 
0 
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Table 4. Summary statistics 
 
The table reports summary statistics for the variables in the dataset with the exception of the legal origins 
dummies. Board structure is the mean of the six legal elements reported in Table 1 and is used as a proxy 
for investor-friendliness of corporate governance codes. The variable is continuous on a scale from 0 to 1. 
Authors1-3 are based on the three methods of calculating the investor/issuer orientation of corporate 
governance committees, also measured on a scale from 0 to 1. A higher score indicates a greater 
proportion of investor-affiliated persons on the committee. Country-level scores of the author variables are 
reported in Table 2. Sophistication I measures the international dissemination of corporate governance 
initiatives (“sophistication” of the corporate governance debate) by using the UK corporate governance 
code in force at the relevant time as a benchmark. Sophistication II measures the dissemination of 
corporate governance initiatives as the time lag between the publication of the first European initiative, the 
Cadbury Report of 1992, and the adoption of the respective code. Market cap/GDP is the ratio of market 
capitalization and GDP, measured as a five-year average counting back from the adoption of the code in 
order to limit fluctuations. FDI is the ratio of foreign direct investment net inflows and GDP, and 
Portfolio equity the ratio of portfolio equity net inflows and GDP. These two variables are also measured 
as a five-year average. Government effectiveness measures perceptions of the quality of public services and 
the civil service on a scale from 0 to 5 (transcribed from the original World Bank data on a scale from -2.5 
to 2.5). Regulatory quality measures perceptions of the government’s ability to promote private sector 
development on the same scale as Government effectiveness. The three dummy variables Political (political 
orientation of the governing party), Unitary board (one-tier vs. two-tier board model), and Employee rep. 
(employee representative at board level) are described in Table 3. 
 
                                                     
100 Because the four UK codes are used as a benchmark. 
 Obs. Mean Median Min. Max. Std. Dev. 
Board structure 52 0.48 0.49 0.01 0.93 0.25 
Authors1 52 0.38 0.39 0 1 0.24 
Authors2 52 0.32 0.3 0 1 0.29 
Authors3 52 0.23 0 0 1 0.38 
Sophistication I 48100 0.74 0.9 0.27 0.96 0.23 
Sophistication II 52 12.27 11.5 0 17 4.58 
Market cap/GDP 52 0.72 0.54 0.07 2.53 0.53 
FDI 52 0.06 0.04 0 0.54 0.09 
Portfolio equity 52 0.09 0.01 -0.01 4.02 0.56 
Gov. effectiveness 52 3.98 4.20 2.48 4.79 0.56 
Regulatory quality 52 3.79 3.79 3.05 4.54 0.39 
Political 52 0.46 0 0 1 0.503 
Unitary board 52 0.71 1 0 1 0.46 
Employee rep. 52 0.37 0 0 1 0.49 
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Table 5. Comparison of board structure and composition of corporate governance committees 
 
This table compares board structure and the composition of corporate governance committees for selected 
observations. The selection focuses on countries with several codes in the sample and/or different code 
issuers. 
 
Country Code issuer Board 
structure 
Authors1 Authors2 Authors3 
Belgium 2009 
Belgium 2004 
Belgium 1998 
Belgium 1998 
Corp. Gov. Committee 
Corp. Gov. Committee 
Federation Enterprises 
Corp. Gov. Committee 
0.75 
0.73 
0.01 
0.3 
0.37 
0.17 
0.1 
0.43 
0.3 
0.08 
0.1 
0.38 
0 
0 
0 
0 
France 2011 
France 2010 
France 2003 
France 1998 
France 1995 
AFG  
AFEP/MEDEF  
AFEP/MEDEF  
AFG 
Vienot I (AFEP) 
0.51 
0.49 
0.49 
0.42 
0.32 
1 
0.04 
0.04 
1 
0.07 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0.07 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
Greece 2011 
Greece 2001 
Greece 1999 
Industry 
Industry 
Capital Market Comm. 
0.63 
0.06 
0.34 
0 
0 
0.41 
0 
0 
0.29 
0 
0 
0 
Italy 2011 
Italy 1999 
Borsa Italiana 
Borsa Italiana (Preda) 
0.4 
0.1 
0.2 
0.27 
0.14 
0.17 
0 
0 
Poland 2010 
Poland 2002 
Poland 2002 
Stock Exchange 
Gdańsk Institute 
Corp. Gov. Forum 
0.625 
0.22 
0.24 
0.5 
0.86 
0.5 
0.5 
1 
0.5 
0.5 
1 
0.5 
Sweden 2010 
Sweden 2001 
Corp. Gov. Board 
Shareholders’ Assoc. 
0.745 
0.67 
0.39 
1 
0.33 
1 
0 
1 
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Table 6. Analysis of investor-friendliness  
 
Panel A. Elements of board structure regulation 
 
The table reports summary statistics for the six elements of the board structure variable as described in 
Appendix A. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B. Pairwise correlation of the elements of board structure regulation (significance at the 10, 5 and 1 
percent levels are indicated by *, ** and ***, respectively) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Obs. Mean Median Max. Min. Std. Dev. 
Executive/non-
executive 
37 0.628 
 
0.75 1 0 0.407 
Number of in-
dependent directors 
52 0.565 
 
0.5 1 0 0.399 
Definition of 
independence 
52 0.463 
 
0.35 1 0 0.288 
Separation of 
chairman/CEO 
37 0.534 
 
0.75 1 0 0.446 
Cooling-off period 
for CEO 
52 0.119 0 1 0 0.286 
Committee 
structure 
52 0.624 
 
0.67 
 
1 0 0.307 
 
Total board 
structure 
52 0.475 0.488 0.925 0.013 0.251 
 Exec. Number 
ind. dir. 
Def. ind. 
dir. 
Sep. Cooling-
off 
Comm. 
Executive/non-
executive 
1      
Number of in-
dependent directors 
0.308* 1     
Definition of 
independence 
0.528*** 0.418*** 1    
Separation of 
chairman/CEO 
0.215 0.459*** 0.47*** 1   
Cooling-off period 
for CEO 
0.128 0.351** 0.194 0.289* 1  
Committee 
structure 
0.454** 0.535*** 0.645*** 0.392** 0.37*** 1 
                                                                                                                                         5-2014                               
52 
 
Panel C. Investor-friendliness by legal tradition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Differences and mean equality tests, t-statistics in parenthesis, * denotes significance at the 5%-level: 
Common law vs. French: 0.13 (1.06)  
Common law vs. German: 0.25 (2.49*) 
Common law vs. Scandinavian: -0.11 (-1.08) 
German vs. French legal origins: -0.12 (-1.62) 
                                                     
101 The English legal family includes Cyprus, Malta, and the UK. 
102 The French legal family includes Belgium, Bulgaria, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. 
103 The German legal family includes Austria, Switzerland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, and the Slovak Republic. 
104 The Scandinavian legal family includes Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. 
105 For the variables “Executive/non-executive” and “Separation of chairman/CEO”, the number of observations is 16 because the coding of the two Dutch codes is based on the two-tier board 
structure (see Appendix B, Table B.1), for which the two variables are not applicable. 
106 For the variables “Executive/non-executive” and “Separation of chairman/CEO”, the number of observations is 7 because the two variables are not applicable to jurisdictions providing for a two-
tier board structure (which are most jurisdictions belonging to the German legal family, with the exception of Switzerland, Greece, and Portugal; these cases are discussed in Appendix B, Table B.1). 
 English101 French102 German103 Scandinavian104 
Observations 6 18105 20106 8 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Executive/non-
executive 
0.42 0.5 0.34 0.53 0.5 0.42 0.61 0.75 0.45 1 1 0 
Number of in-
dependent directors 
1 1 0 0.46 0.5 0.33 0.38 0.5 0.39 0.94 1 0.18 
Definition of 
independence 
0.43 0.3 0.19 0.51 0.45 0.31 0.37 0.3 0.27 0.62 0.7 0.31 
Separation of 
chairman/CEO 
0.71 0.75 0.37 0.45 0.38 0.46 0.11 0 0.2 0.94 1 0.18 
Cooling-off period 
for CEO 
0.33 0 0.52 0.11 0 0.32 0.08 0 0.16 0.06 0 0.18 
Committee 
structure 
0.75 0.75 0.25 0.68 0.67 0.29 0.51 0.46 0.31 0.69 0.67 0.34 
Total board 
structure 
0.61 0.55 0.25 0.47 0.46 0.26 0.35 0.34 0.21 0.71 0.72 0.11 
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Panel D. Investor-friendliness: qualitative vs. binary coding of board structure 
                                                     
107 37 Observations for the variables “Executive/non-executive” and “Separation of chairman/CEO”. 
108 See n 105 above. 
109 See n 106 above. 
110 Paired mean equality test. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** denotes significance at the 5 percent level. 
 Full sample English French German Scandinavian 
Observations 52107 6 18108 20109 8 
 Mean 
qualitative 
Mean binary Mean  
qualitative 
Mean  binary Mean  
qualitative 
Mean  binary Mean  
qualitative 
Mean  binary Mean  
qualitative 
Mean  binary 
Executive/non-
executive 
0.628 
 
0.568 0.42 0.33 0.53 0.44 0.61 0.57 1 1 
Number of in-
dependent 
directors 
0.565 
 
0.462 1 1 0.46 0.28 0.38 0.3 0.94 0.88 
Definition of 
independence 
0.463 
 
0.442 0.43 0.33 0.51 0.56 0.37 0.25 0.62 0.75 
Separation of 
chairman/CEO 
0.53 
 
0.649 0.71 0.83 0.45 0.56 0.11 0.29 0.94 1 
Cooling-off 
period for CEO 
0.119 0.192 0.33 0.33 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.25 0.06 0.13 
Committee 
structure 
0.624 
 
0.888 0.75 0.95 0.68 0.93 0.51 0.84 0.69 0.88 
Total board 
structure 
0.475 0.525 0.61 0.63 0.47 0.5 0.35 0.42 0.71 0.77 
Diff. of means 
(total board 
structure)110 
0.05***  0.024  0.025  0.074**  0.061**  
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Table 7. Sophistication I 
 
The table reports OLS estimates with robust standard errors clustered on country level. Dependent variable is the investor-friendliness of corporate governance codes, measured on 
the basis of the board structure proxy. The composition of the corporate governance committee follows the first method of computation as explained in the article. A higher value 
indicates a higher level of investor-friendliness of the code and a greater disposition of the committee members towards investor protection, respectively. Sophistication is measured 
by using the UK corporate governance codes and Commission Recommendation 2005/162/EC as a benchmark (level of investor protection based on the rules in force in the year 
before adoption of the response code). Columns (1)-(6) include the full sample except Luxembourg and the UK, (7) is a robustness check with Luxembourg included. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
Independent variables Dependent variable: Investor-friendliness 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Authors1 0.086 
(0.112) 
0.115 
(0.106) 
0.161** 
(0.076) 
0.085 
(0.077) 
0.010 
(0.060) 
0.016 
(0.076) 
-0.016 
(0.074) 
Sophistication  0.542*** 
(0.119) 
0.559*** 
(0.133) 
0.57*** 
(0.129) 
0.554*** 
(0.132) 
0.617*** 
(0.142) 
0.564*** 
(0.157) 
Log market capitalisation / GDP   0.067 
(0.056) 
0.013 
(0.045) 
0.041 
(0.061) 
-0.003 
(0.068) 
0.011 
(0.064) 
Log foreign direct investment / GDP   0.049 
(0.031) 
0.035 
(0.035) 
0.018 
(0.040) 
0.013 
(0.039) 
0.016 
(0.037) 
Log portfolio equity, net inflows / GDP   6.761** 
(3.231) 
6.487* 
(3.259) 
4.595** 
(2.037) 
4.815** 
(2.210) 
-0.102 
(0.145) 
Legal origins French    -0.108 
(0.067) 
-0.156* 
(0.080) 
-0.190* 
(0.101) 
-0.146 
(0.110) 
Legal origins German    -0.247*** 
(0.062) 
-0.349*** 
(0.099) 
-0.353*** 
(0.100) 
-0.315** 
(0.098) 
Legal origins Scandinavian    0.011 
(0.076) 
0.143 
(0.166) 
0.142 
(0.174) 
0.208 
(0.180) 
Unitary board     -0.242** 
(0.107) 
-0.242** 
(0.113) 
-0.255** 
(0.106) 
Employee representation     -0.143 
(0.137) 
-0.212 
(0.176) 
-0.219 
(0.172) 
Political orientation      -0.004 
(0.041) 
0.005 
(0.041) 
Government effectiveness      0.106 
(0.127) 
0.082 
(0.128) 
Regulatory quality      -0.043 
(0.147) 
0.025 
(0.163) 
R² 0.008 0.277 0.472 0.608 0.672 0.684 0.671 
Observations 47 47 47 47 47 47 48 
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Table 8. Sophistication II 
 
The table reports OLS estimates with robust standard errors clustered on country level. Dependent variable is the investor-friendliness of corporate governance codes, 
measured on the basis of the board structure proxy. The composition of the corporate governance committee follows the first method of computation as explained in the 
article. Sophistication of the corporate governance debate is measured as the time lag between the first comprehensive corporate governance initiative in Europe (Cadbury 
report) and the adoption of the respective code. Columns (1)-(6) include the full sample except Luxembourg, (7) is a robustness check with Luxembourg included. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
Independent variables Dependent variable:  Investor-friendliness 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Authors1 0.105 
(0.113) 
0.109 
(0.115) 
0.151* 
(0.083) 
0.059 
(0.076) 
-0.004 
(0.065) 
-0.012 
(0.072) 
-0.039 
(0.070) 
Sophistication  0.028*** 
(0.005) 
0.028*** 
(0.005) 
0.030*** 
(0.005) 
0.029*** 
(0.005) 
0.032*** 
(0.006) 
0.031*** 
(0.006) 
Log market capitalisation / GDP   0.076 
(0.054) 
0.017 
(0.043) 
0.044 
(0.055) 
0.012 
(0.067) 
0.024 
(0.065) 
Log foreign direct investment / GDP   0.055* 
(0.030) 
0.043 
(0.032) 
0.026 
(0.037) 
0.024 
(0.036) 
0.023 
(0.034) 
Log portfolio equity, net inflows / GDP   6.90*** 
(2.304) 
5.93*** 
(2.019) 
4.404** 
(1.767) 
4.026** 
(1.718) 
-0.068 
(0.149) 
Legal origins French    -0.159** 
(0.067) 
-0.191*** 
(0.043) 
-0.225** 
(0.082) 
-0.232** 
(0.087) 
Legal origins German    -0.274*** 
(0.076) 
-0.366*** 
(0.071) 
-0.391*** 
(0.078) 
-0.405*** 
(0.079) 
Legal origins Scandinavian    -0.034 
(0.039) 
0.070 
(0.152) 
0.065 
(0.164) 
0.082 
(0.166) 
Unitary board     -0.218* 
(0.109) 
-0.224* 
(0.116) 
-0.244** 
(0.108) 
Employee representation     -0.105 
(0.145) 
-0.164 
(0.187) 
-0.185 
(0.181) 
Political orientation      0.034 
(0.032) 
0.055 
(0.034) 
Government effectiveness      0.110 
(0.131) 
0.121 
(0.129) 
Regulatory quality      -0.071 
(0.127) 
-0.043 
(0.140) 
R² 0.01 0.265 0.513 0.636 0.684 0.691 0.679 
Observations 51 51 51 51 51 51 52 
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Table 9. Authors 
 
The table reports in columns (1)-(6) OLS estimates with clustered standard errors based on the model with the best fit derived from Tables 7 and 8 
(equation (5) of each table), but varies the calculation of the composition of the corporate governance committee as explained in the article (Authors1, 
Authors2, and Authors3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
Independent variables Dependent variable: Investor-friendliness 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Authors1 0.010 
(0.060) 
  -0.004 
(0.065) 
  
Authors2  0.021 
(0.053) 
  0.002 
(0.059) 
 
Authors3   0.029 
(0.058) 
  0.030 
(0.051) 
Sophistication I  0.554*** 
(0.132) 
0.556*** 
(0.132) 
0.554*** 
(0.133) 
   
Sophistication II    0.029*** 
(0.005) 
0.029*** 
(0.005) 
0.029*** 
(0.005) 
Log market capitalisation / GDP 0.041 
(0.061) 
0.043 
(0.062) 
0.045 
(0.063) 
0.044 
(0.055) 
0.045 
(0.057) 
0.049 
(0.058) 
Log foreign direct investment / GDP 0.018 
(0.040) 
0.017 
(0.040) 
0.017 
(0.040) 
0.026 
(0.037) 
0.026 
(0.037) 
0.025 
(0.037) 
Log portfolio equity, net inflows / GDP 4.595** 
(2.037) 
4.648** 
(2.007) 
4.679** 
(1.936) 
4.404** 
(1.767) 
4.426* 
(1.737) 
4.608** 
(1.746) 
Legal origins French -0.156* 
(0.080) 
-0.153 
(0.076) 
-0.142 
(0.074) 
-0.191*** 
(0.043) 
-0.190*** 
(0.044) 
-0.178*** 
(0.041) 
Legal origins German -0.349*** 
(0.099) 
-0.345*** 
(0.099) 
-0.337*** 
(0.096) 
-0.366*** 
(0.071) 
-0.365*** 
(0.070) 
-0.356*** 
(0.066) 
Legal origins Scandinavian 0.143 
(0.166) 
0.138 
(0.169) 
0.137 
(0.165) 
0.070 
(0.152) 
0.069 
(0.155) 
0.057 
(0.153) 
Unitary board -0.242** 
(0.107) 
-0.238** 
(0.105) 
-0.236** 
(0.102) 
-0.218* 
(0.109) 
-0.217* 
(0.107) 
-0.210* 
(0.104) 
Employee representation -0.143 
(0.137) 
-0.137 
(0.140) 
-0.131 
(0.140) 
-0.105 
(0.145) 
-0.103 
(0.149) 
-0.089 
(0.148) 
R² 0.672 0.673 0.674 0.684 0.684 0.681 
Observations 47 47 47 51 51 51 
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Table 10. Binary coding of the board structure variable 
 
The table reports OLS estimates with clustered standard errors based on the model with the best fit derived from Tables 7 and 8 (equation (5) of each table). The 
dependant variable (board structure) is calculated in a binary way as explained in Appendix B.7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
Independent variables Dependent variable: Investor-friendliness 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Authors1 -0.058 
(0.092) 
  -0.065 
(0.097) 
  
Authors2  -0.032 
(0.084) 
  -0.048 
(0.091) 
 
Authors3   -0.014 
(0.087) 
  0.000 
(0.082) 
Sophistication I  0.638*** 
(0.121) 
0.641*** 
(0.122) 
0.645*** 
(0.126) 
   
Sophistication II    0.035*** 
(0.005) 
0.035*** 
(0.005) 
0.035*** 
(0.006) 
Log market capitalisation / GDP 0.027 
(0.087) 
0.027 
(0.090) 
0.029 
(0.090) 
0.027 
(0.080) 
0.025 
(0.083) 
0.032 
(0.083) 
Log foreign direct investment / GDP -0.009 
(0.044) 
-0.009 
(0.045) 
-0.010 
(0.045) 
0.002 
(0.039) 
0.002 
(0.040) 
0.000 
(0.040) 
Log portfolio equity, net inflows / GDP 5.548* 
(3.055) 
5.712* 
(3.066) 
5.802* 
(3.045) 
5.548** 
(2.354) 
5.604** 
(2.305) 
5.769** 
(2.365) 
Legal origins French -0.183** 
(0.080) 
-0.184** 
(0.083) 
-0.185* 
(0.092) 
-0.215*** 
(0.056) 
-0.216*** 
(0.060) 
-0.204*** 
(0.061) 
Legal origins German -0.391*** 
(0.137) 
-0.391*** 
(0.137) 
-0.390*** 
(0.136) 
-0.402*** 
(0.101) 
-0.401*** 
(0.101) 
-0.389*** 
(0.095) 
Legal origins Scandinavian 0.006 
(0.224) 
0.000 
(0.227) 
-0.008 
(0.225) 
-0.077 
(0.209) 
-0.075 
(0.213) 
-0.091 
(0.212) 
Unitary board -0.198 
(0.178) 
-0.194 
(0.177) 
-0.189 
(0.177) 
-0.165 
(0.186) 
-0.164 
(0.185) 
-0.150 
(0.184) 
Employee representation -0.002 
(0.198) 
-0.002 
(0.203) 
0.002 
(0.206) 
0.043 
(0.204) 
0.040 
(0.210) 
0.056 
(0.212) 
R² 0.555 0.554 0.553 0.591 0.59 0.588 
Observations 47 47 47 51 51 51 
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Table 11. Structural equation model 
 
Panel A. Factor analysis of investor friendliness of corporate governance codes 
 
The table reports estimates for a single-factor confirmatory model, including the elements of the board 
structure variable that are applicable to all codes (i.e. excluding “Distinction between executive and non-
executive directors” and “Separation of chairman and CEO”). The column “R²” reports the squared 
correlations between the indicator and the latent variable (investor-friendliness of corporate governance 
codes) for each measurement equation (communality). The estimates are based on all observations, 
including the UK codes. 
 
Element Parameter estimate R² 
Number of independent directors 1 
 
0.354 
 
Definition of independence 0.845*** 
(0.22) 
0.484 
 
Cooling-off period 0.483** 
(0.19) 
0.161 
 
Committee structure 1.186*** 
(0.624) 
0.841 
 
 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent 
level. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
 
 
 
Panel B. Residuals of the fitted values and the sample 
 
The table reports the differences (residuals) between the fitted correlation matrix and the matrix computed 
from the sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Number 
ind. dir. 
Def. ind. 
dir. 
Cooling-
off 
Comm. 
Number of in-
dependent directors 
-0.000    
Definition of 
independence 
0.001 0.000   
Cooling-off period 
for CEO 
0.013 -0.007 0.000  
Committee 
structure 
-0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Carsten Gerner-Beuerle                                         Determinants of Corporate Governance Codes: Tables and Figures 
59 
 
Panel C. Structural model with measurement part 
 
The table reports estimates for a structural equation model with a measurement part as discussed above in 
Panel A, i.e. investor-friendliness of corporate governance codes is latent dependant variable and the four 
variables “Number of independent directors”, “Definition of independence”, “Cooling-off period”, and 
“Committee structure” are indicator variables. “Sophistication I” refers to the UK corporate governance 
codes as benchmarks and “Sophistication II” to the time lag between the first comprehensive corporate 
governance initiative in Europe (Cadbury report) and the adoption of the respective code. The sample for 
(1) excludes the UK codes and Luxembourg, (2) excludes only Luxembourg. Standard errors are clustered 
by country. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent 
level.  
*Significant at the 10 percent level. Robust standard errors are shown 
in parentheses. 
 
The other measures of author (Author2 and Author3) are not significant at the 10 percent level under 
model specifications both with Sophistication I and Sophistication II (results here omitted).  
Independent variables  
(1) (2) 
Authors1 -0.085 
(0.067) 
-0.109 
(0.077) 
Sophistication I  0.771*** 
(0.186) 
 
Sophistication II  0.039*** 
(0.007) 
Ratio market capitalisation / GDP 0.041 
(0.071) 
0.048 
(0.065) 
Foreign direct investment -0.016 
(0.048) 
-0.001 
(0.044) 
Portfolio equity, net inflows 7.301** 
(2.910) 
5.549** 
(2.326) 
Legal origins French -0.236** 
(0.120) 
-0.252*** 
(0.088) 
Legal origins German -0.469*** 
(0.135) 
-0.476*** 
(0.115) 
Legal origins Scandinavian -0.053 
(0.166) 
-0.094 
(0.153) 
Unitary board -0.264** 
(0.116) 
-0.267** 
(0.131) 
Employee representation -0.165 
(0.137) 
-0.121 
(0.154) 
Observations 47 51 
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Table 12. Evolution and convergence 
 
Panel A. Comparison of means 
 
We calculate mean and median for two subsamples. The first one comprises the first code adopted in each 
country between 1998 and 2004, the second one the most recent code from the interval 2005-2011. We 
omit countries with only one code. In countries with more than one code issuer, we pair the codes that 
influenced each other. For Belgium, these are 1998C and 2009 (omitting 1998E), for France 1995 (Vienot 
I) and 2010 (AFEP/MEDEF) as well as 1998 (AFG) and 2010 (AFG), for Germany 2000 and 2010 
(omitting 2000B), for Greece we pair both 1999 and 2001 with 2011 since the latter code draws on both 
prior codes (see p. 4 of the 2011 code), for Poland 2002C and 2010 (see p. 2 of the 2010 code), for Spain 
2003 and 2006 (omitting 2004; see p. 3 of the 2006 code), and for the UK 1998 and 2010. The table reports 
estimates of a paired mean equality test with t-statistics in parentheses. 
 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
 
 
 
Panel B. Convergence by comparison of variance 
 
We pair codes as described above in Panel A and compare the variances of the two subsamples 1998-2004 
and 2005-2011 (only p-values are reported). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1998-2004 2005-2011  
 Mean Median Mean Median Diff. 
Board structure 0.39 0.34 0.62 0.63 -0.228*** 
(-6.28) 
Authors1 0.4 0.4 0.36 0.39 0.044 
(1.07) 
Observations 19  19   
 1998-2004 2005-2011 P-values 
 Std. Dev. Std. Dev. F-test  Brown-
Forsythe 
Brown-F. 
(median) 
Board structure 0.23 0.2 0.59 0.84 0.86 
Authors1 0.27 0.25 0.78 0.89 0.88 
Observations 19 19    
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Panel C. Convergence by variance of codes in force 1998-2011 
 
For each year in the sample, we calculate mean, median, and standard deviation of all codes in force in that 
year. Codes are regarded as being “in force” if they have not been superseded by a newer code from the 
same issuer. Therefore, in some countries more than code may be in force in any given year (see, for 
example, France, where codes from two issuers, AFEP/MEDEF and AFG, are regularly updated). 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel D. Convergence by difference between codes adopted on a rolling basis in the last three years 
(measured for 2000-2012) and all codes in force 
 
Year Board structure 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Obs. 
1998 0.32 0.32 0.2 5 
1999 0.27 0.31 0.19 8 
2000 0.24 0.22 0.18 10 
2001 0.27 0.3 0.21 13 
2002 0.3 0.3 0.19 17 
2003 0.38 0.34 0.26 21 
2004 0.45 0.42 0.25 24 
2006 0.45 0.42 0.25 25 
2007 0.44 0.42 0.24 26 
2008 0.45 0.42 0.25 27 
2009 0.47 0.49 0.25 27 
2010 0.53 0.55 0.24 26 
2011 0.57 0.57 0.21 25 
Year Board structure 
 Mean of 
codes in 
force 
Number of 
codes  newly 
adopted 
Mean of 
codes  newly 
adopted 
Difference 
between 
means 
Std. Dev. of 
codes newly 
adopted 
2000 0.24 7 0.26 -0.02 0.2 
2001 0.27 9 0.23 0.04 0.19 
2002 0.3 8 0.24 0.06 0.22 
2003 0.38 11 0.29 0.09 0.19 
2004 0.45 15 0.45 0 0.26 
2006 0.45 17 0.51 -0.06 0.23 
2007 0.44 13 0.6 -0.16 0.19 
2008 0.45 9 0.49 -0.04 0.19 
2009 0.47 7 0.52 -0.05 0.27 
2010 0.53 8 0.61 -0.08 0.24 
2011 0.57 14 0.66 -0.09 0.21 
2012 0.57 14 0.61 -0.04 0.2 
                                                                                                  5-2014 
62 
 
Figures 
 
Figure 1. Corporate governance codes and composition of corporate governance committees 
over time (averages for board structure and authors1 of codes in force in any given year). 
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Figure 2. Partial-regression plot of the relationship between the regulation of board structure 
and the composition of corporate governance committees based on model specification (5) in 
Table 7. 
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Figure 3. Partial-regression plot of the relationship between the regulation of board structure 
and the benchmark UK codes as a proxy for the diffusion of corporate governance 
innovations, based on model specification (5) in Table 7. 
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Figure 4. Partial-regression plot of the relationship between the regulation of board structure 
and portfolio equity net inflows, based on model specification (5) in Table 7. 
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Figure 5. Partial-regression plot of the relationship between the regulation of board structure 
and unitary (one-tier) vs. dual (two-tier) board models, based on model specification (5) in 
Table 7. 
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Figure 6. Partial-regression plot of the relationship between the regulation of board structure 
and the evolution of the corporate governance movement (measured as the number of years 
since the first major initiative in Europe, i.e. the Cadbury Report), based on model 
specification (5) in Table 8. 
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Appendix A: Definition of the board structure variable (STRUC) 
 
Table A.1. Unitary boards 
 
Elements Quantification 
(1) Distinction between 
executive and non-executive 
directors (EXD) 
Measured on a scale from 0 to 1 and shall be: 
(a) 1 if the code requires a minimum proportion of non-
executive directors that should be at least one half; 
(b) 0.5 if the code does not require half (or more) of the 
board members to be non-executive directors, but specifies 
a number or proportion of members that should be non-
executive directors (e.g., two members or one third); 
(c) 0 if the code contains only general statements, such as 
that the balance between executive and non-executive 
directors should be ‘appropriate’.1 
 
(2) Quantitative measure of 
independence of non-
executive directors (NO_IND) 
Measured on a scale from 0 to 1 and shall be: 
(a) 1 if the code requires that a majority of the non-
executive directors should be independent; 
(b) 0.5 if the code does not require a majority of the non-
executive directors to be independent, but specifies a 
number or proportion of members that should satisfy the 
independence requirements (e.g., two members or one 
third); 
(c) 0 if the code contains only general statements, such as 
that a ‘sufficient number’ of non-executive directors should 
be independent.2 
 
(3) Qualitative measure of 
independence of non-
executive directors 
(DEF_IND) 
EITHER measured on a scale from 0 to 1 by adding 0.1 
for each of the following criteria that the definition of 
independence in the code contains:3 
(a) the director was not an executive director of the 
company or an associated company for a period of time 
not shorter than five years preceding his/her appointment;4 
(b) the director was not an executive director of the 
company or an associated company for a period of time 
not shorter than three years (or one year, in which case the 
value to be added is 0.05) preceding his/her appointment 
(if the code provides for a minimum period of five years or 
                                                     
1 See e.g. UK Corporate Governance Code 2010, B.1, Supporting Principle: ‘The board should include an appropriate 
combination of executive and non-executive directors (and, in particular, independent non-executive directors) such 
that no individual or small group of individuals can dominate the board’s decision taking.’ 
2 See e.g. Commission Recommendation 2005/162/EC, Sec. 4: ‘A sufficient number of independent non-executive or 
supervisory directors should be elected to the (supervisory) board of companies to ensure that any material conflict of 
interest involving directors will be properly dealt with.’ 
3 The criteria listed in Annex II of Commission Recommendation 2005/162/EC are used, with some alterations, as a 
benchmark. 
4 Commission Recommendation 2005/162/EC, Annex II(1)(a). 
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more, both (a) and (b) are satisfied and the cumulative 
value to be added is, accordingly, 0.2);5 
(c) the director was not an employee of the company or an 
associated company in a senior management position for a 
period of time not shorter than three years preceding 
his/her appointment;6 
(d) the director does not receive significant additional 
remuneration from the company or an associated company 
(apart from the fee received as non-executive director) and 
did not receive such remuneration for a period of time not 
shorter than three years preceding his/her appointment;7 
(e) the director is not, and does not represent, a major 
shareholder, defined, inter alia, as a shareholder holding at 
least 20 percent (or a smaller percentage as determined by 
the code) of the company’s voting rights or having 
significant influence on the appointment of a majority of 
the board’s members, notwithstanding the percentage of 
voting rights held (if the code provides that the director 
should not be, and should not represent, a shareholder 
holding a majority of the company’s voting rights, the value 
to be added is 0.05);8 
(f) the director does not have, or did not have within the 
last year, a significant business relationship with the 
company or an associated company, either directly or as a 
partner, shareholder, director or senior employee of a body 
having such a relationship;9 
(g) the director is not, and has not been within the last 
three years, partner or employee of the present or former 
external auditor of the company or an associated 
company;10 
(h) the director is not an executive director of another 
company in which an executive director of the company is 
a non-executive director;11 
(i) the director has not served for more than 12 years (or a 
shorter period) as a non-executive director;12 
(j) the director is not a close family member of an executive 
director;13 
 
OR the value 0.3 if the code contains only general 
                                                     
5 Not contained in Commission Recommendation 2005/162/EC. 
6 Commission Recommendation 2005/162/EC, Annex II(1)(b). 
7  Commission Recommendation 2005/162/EC defines ‘additional remuneration’ as follows: ‘Such additional 
remuneration covers in particular any participation in a share option or any other performance-related pay scheme; it 
does not cover the receipt of fixed amounts of compensation under a retirement plan (including deferred 
compensation) for prior service with the company (provided that such compensation is not contingent in any way on 
continued service)’, see Annex II(1)(c). 
8 Commission Recommendation 2005/162/EC requires that the director should not be, and should not represent, a 
‘controlling shareholder’ and refers to Art 1(1) of council Directive 83/349/EEC for the determination of control, see 
Annex II(1)(d). 
9 Commission Recommendation 2005/162/EC, Annex II(1)(e). 
10 Commission Recommendation 2005/162/EC, Annex II(1)(f). 
11 Commission Recommendation 2005/162/EC, Annex II(1)(g). 
12 Commission Recommendation 2005/162/EC, Annex II(1)(h). 
13 Commission Recommendation 2005/162/EC, Annex II(1)(i). 
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statements, such as that independent directors should not 
have any ‘business or personal relationships’ with the 
company or its management; 
 
OR, if the code contains both a list of criteria and general 
statements, whichever of the above values is higher. 
 
(4) Separation of chairman and 
CEO (SEP) 
Measured on a scale from 0 to 1 and shall be: 
(a) 1 if the CEO and chairman are separated; the roles 
should not be exercised by the same individual; 
(b) 0 if the same individual can be chairman of the board 
and CEO. 
 
(5) Cooling-off period for the 
CEO to become chairman of 
the board (COOL) 
Measured on a scale from 0 to 1 and shall be:14 
(a) 1 if the CEO should not go on to be chairman of the 
board for a period of at least five years after the end of 
his/her tenure as CEO; 
(b) 0.7 if the waiting period is at least three, but less than 
five, years; 
(c) 0.4 if the waiting period is at least one, but less than 
three, years; 
(d) 0 otherwise. 
 
(6) Structures to mitigate 
conflicts of interest (CON)15 
(a) Appointments to the board 
(b) Responsibility for internal 
control and appointment of 
the external auditor 
(c) Remuneration decisions 
 
(a) Appointments to the board: the variable is measured on 
a scale from 0 to 1 and shall be: 
 (i) 1 if the code requires that a nomination 
committee is set up within the board to make the 
appointment decision or prepare the appointment decision 
of the board and that the committee is composed of a 
majority of independent non-executive directors;16 
 (ii) 0.5 if the code requires that a nomination 
committee is set up within the board, but the code does not 
require a majority of the board members to be independent 
non-executive directors; 
 (iii) 0 if neither (i) nor (ii) are satisfied. 
 
(b) Responsibility for internal control and appointment of 
the external auditor: the variable is measures on a scale 
from 0 to 1 and shall be: 
 (i) 1 if the code requires that an audit committee is 
set up within the board to monitor the integrity of the 
financial information provided by the company, review the 
internal control and risk management systems, decide on, 
or make recommendations with respect to, the selection, 
appointment, and removal of the external auditor, and 
                                                     
14 The values are based on the realistic assumption that the first year is more important than the following years in 
addressing potential conflicts of interest. 
15 Commission Recommendation 2005/162/EC identifies three conflicts of interest that are particularly important, see 
Sec. 5. The variable deals with these three conflicts. 
16 This is the benchmark according to Commission Recommendation 2005/162/EC, Annex I(2.1)(2). 
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monitor the external auditor; and further if the code 
requires that the committee is composed of a majority of 
independent non-executive directors;17 
 (ii) 0.5 if the code requires that an audit committee 
is set up within the board, but the code does not require a 
majority of the board members to be independent non-
executive directors; 
 (iii) 0 if neither (i) nor (ii) are satisfied. 
 
(c) Remuneration decisions: the variable is measured on a 
scale from 0 to 1 and shall be: 
 (i) 1 if the code requires that a remuneration 
committee is set up within the board to determine the 
remuneration of the executive directors or make proposals 
for the determination of remuneration and that the 
committee is composed of a majority of independent non-
executive directors;18 
 (ii) 0.5 if the code requires that a remuneration 
committee is set up within the board, but the code does not 
require a majority of the board members to be independent 
non-executive directors; 
 (iii) 0 if neither (i) nor (ii) are satisfied. 
 
The total value for ‘Structures to mitigate conflicts of 
interest’ is the average of the above components, provided 
that they are applicable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
17  Commission Recommendation 2005/162/EC, Annex I(4.1), requires that the committee should be composed 
exclusively of non-executive or supervisory directors and that a majority of its members should be independent. I have 
simplified the recommendation to focus on a criterion that is relevant for both unitary and dual board systems. 
18 Commission Recommendation 2005/162/EC, Annex I(3.1)(2), requires that the committee should be composed 
exclusively of non-executive or supervisory directors and that a majority of its members should be independent. I have 
simplified the recommendation to focus on a criterion that is relevant for both unitary and dual board systems. 
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Table A.2. Dual boards19 
 
Elements Quantification 
(1) Distinction between 
executive and non-executive 
directors (EXD) 
Not applicable, since the distinction between executive and 
non-executive directors is built into the structure of two-
tier boards. 
 
(2) Quantitative measure of 
independence of members of 
the supervisory board 
(NO_IND) 
Measured on a scale from 0 to 1 and shall be: 
(a) 1 if the code requires that a majority of the members of 
the supervisory board should be independent; 
(b) 0.5 if the code does not require a majority of the 
members of the supervisory board to be independent, but 
specifies a number or proportion of members that should 
satisfy the independence requirements (e.g., two members 
or one third); 
(c) 0 if the code contains only general statements, such as 
that a ‘sufficient number’ of members of the supervisory 
board should be independent. 
 
(3) Qualitative measure of 
independence of members of 
the supervisory board 
(DEF_IND) 
As in Panel A, but replace ‘executive director’ by ‘member 
of the management board’ and ‘non-executive director’ by 
‘member of the supervisory board’. 
 
(4) Separation of chairman and 
CEO (SEP) 
Not applicable, since the separation of chairman and CEO 
is built into the structure of two-tier boards. 
 
(5) Cooling-off period for the 
CEO (chairman of the 
management board) to 
become chairman of the 
supervisory board (COOL) 
Measured on a scale from 0 to 1 and shall be:20 
(a) 1 if the CEO should not go on to be chairman of the 
supervisory board for a period of at least five years after 
the end of his/her tenure as CEO; 
(b) 0.7 if the waiting period is at least three, but less than 
five, years; 
(c) 0.4 if the waiting period is at least one, but less than 
three, years; 
(d) 0 otherwise. 
 
                                                     
19 This panel applies to the following countries: Austria, Germany, Hungary, Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia. See below Appendix B, Table B.1. 
20 The values are based on the realistic assumption that the first year is more important than the following years in 
addressing potential conflicts of interest. 
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(6) Structures to mitigate 
conflicts of interest (CON) 
(a) Appointments to the board 
(b) Responsibility for internal 
control and appointment of 
the external auditor 
(c) Remuneration decisions 
 
(a) Appointments to the management board: the variable is 
measured on a scale from 0 to 1 and shall be: 
 (i) 1 if the code requires that a nomination 
committee is set up within the supervisory board to make 
the appointment decision or prepare the appointment 
decision of the supervisory board and that the committee is 
composed of a majority of independent members of the 
supervisory board; 
 (ii) 0.5 if the code requires that a nomination 
committee is set up within the supervisory board, but the 
code does not require a majority of the board members to 
be independent members of the supervisory board; 
 (iii) 0 if neither (i) nor (ii) are satisfied. 
 
(b) Responsibility for internal control and appointment of 
the external auditor: the variable is measures on a scale 
from 0 to 1 and shall be: 
 (i) 1 if the code requires that an audit committee is 
set up within the supervisory board to monitor the integrity 
of the financial information provided by the company, 
review the internal control and risk management systems, 
decide on, or make recommendations with respect to, the 
selection, appointment, and removal of the external 
auditor, and monitor the external auditor; and further if the 
code requires that the committee is composed of a majority 
of independent members of the supervisory board; 
 (ii) 0.5 if the code requires that an audit committee 
is set up within the supervisory board, but the code does 
not require a majority of the board members to be 
independent members of the supervisory board; 
 (iii) 0 if neither (i) nor (ii) are satisfied. 
 
(c) Remuneration decisions: the variable is measured on a 
scale from 0 to 1 and shall be: 
 (i) 1 if the code requires that a remuneration 
committee is set up within the supervisory board to 
determine the remuneration of the members of the 
management board or make proposals for the 
determination of remuneration and that the committee is 
composed of a majority of independent members of the 
supervisory board; 
 (ii) 0.5 if the code requires that a remuneration 
committee is set up within the supervisory board, but the 
code does not require a majority of the board members to 
be independent members of the supervisory board; 
 (iii) 0 if neither (i) nor (ii) are satisfied. 
 
The total value for ‘Structures to mitigate conflicts of 
interest’ is the average of the above components, provided 
that they are applicable. 
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Appendix B: Coding of the board structure variable 
 
Table B.1: Distinction between executive and non-executive directors (EXD) 
 
Country Value Adjustment 
Factor (%) 
Total 
value 
Code provision 
†Austria 
2009 
2002 
 
n/a 
n/a 
   
‡Belgium 
2009 
2004 
1998E21 
1998C22 
 
1 
1 
0 
1 
 
100 
100 
- 
100 
 
1 
1 
0 
1 
 
2.3 
2.2 
1.3, 2.2 
I.B.1.4 
‡Bulgaria 
2007 
 
0 
 
- 
 
0 
 
3.2 
*Cyprus 
2002 
 
0.5 
 
100 
 
0.5 
 
A.2.1 
‡Denmark 
2010 
2003 
 
123 
124 
 
100 
100 
 
1 
1 
 
Companies Act, § 111(1)(a) 
V.4 
‡Finland 
2008 
2003 
 
1 
1 
 
100 
100 
 
1 
1 
 
14, 15 
17, 18 
‡France 
201125 
201026 
200327 
199828 
199529 
 
0.530 
1 
1 
0.531 
0.532 
 
100 
7533 
7534 
100 
100 
 
0.5 
0.75 
0.75 
0.5 
0.5 
 
II.B.1 
6.3, 8.2 
6.3, 8.2 
II.B.1 
II.2 
                                                     
21 Author: Federation of Belgian Enterprises (VBO/FEB). 
22 Cardon Report, prepared by the Belgian Corporate Governance Committee – Commission Bancaire et Financiere. 
23 Danish company law requires the majority of the members of the supervisory board to be non-executive directors, 
see Jesper L. Hansen, The Danish Green Paper on Company Law Reform – Modernising Company Law in the 21st Century, 10 
EBOR 73, 87 (2009); Report on Corporate Governance in Denmark of 2003, p. 16. 
24 See n 23. 
25 Author: Association Française de la Gestion Financière (AFG-ASFFI).  
26 Author: Association Française des Entreprises Privées (AFEP), Mouvement des Entreprises de France (MEDEF). 
27 Author: as the code of 2010 (n 26). 
28 Author: AFG. 
29 Vienot I Report. The Vienot commission was set up by the French Employers’ Association CNPF (Conseil National 
du Patronat Français) and AFEP. 
30 The code does not contain a separate provision regarding the balance between executive and non-executive directors, 
but requires one third of the board to be comprised of independent directors. Since independence encompasses the 
requirement that the director should not be an officer of the corporation, I assign the value of 0.5. Code de Commerce, 
Art. L225-53, provides that the number of executive directors (directeurs généraux délégués) shall not exceed five. 
Given that the number of directors on the board of the public company (société anonyme) shall range between 3 and 
18 (Art. L225-17), the statute does not necessarily require a greater proportion of non-executive directors than the 
code. 
31 See n 30. 
32 The code does not contain a separate provision regarding the balance between executive and non-executive directors, 
but restrictions are derived from statute, see n 30 above. 
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†Germany 
201035 
200236 
2000B37 
200038 
 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
   
*Greece 
201139 
200140 
199941 
 
1 
0 
1 
 
7542 
- 
100 
 
0.75 
0 
1 
 
A.II.2.2 
B.2.1 
5.6 
‡Hungary 
2004 
 
n/a 
   
‡Italy 
2011 
199943 
 
0 
0 
 
- 
- 
 
0 
0 
 
2.P.3 
2.1 
‡Luxemb. 
2006 
 
0 
 
- 
 
0 
 
3.3 
*Malta 
2001 
 
0 
 
- 
 
0 
 
2.3 
‡Netherl. 
2008 
2003 
 
n/a 
n/a 
   
*Norway 
2010 
2004 
 
1 
1 
 
100 
100 
 
1 
1 
 
8 
8 
†Poland 
2010 
2002G44 
2002C45 
 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
   
‡Portugal 
2010 
1999 
 
0.546 
0 
 
100 
- 
 
0.5 
0 
 
II.1.2.1 
14 
†Slovakia 
2008 
 
n/a 
   
                                                                                                                                                        
33 The code does not contain a separate provision regarding the balance between executive and non-executive directors, 
but requires half of the board to be comprised of independent directors in widely held companies without controlling 
shareholders, and one third in other corporations. Accordingly, I assign the value of 1, but adjust by 75 percent to take 
account of the fact that the correct value for companies without dispersed shareholders is 0.5. 
34 See n 33. 
35  German Corporate Governance Code, prepared by the Government Commission on the German Corporate 
Governance Code. 
36 Cromme Code, prepared by the Government Commission (n 35). 
37 German Code of Corporate Governance, prepared by the Berlin Initiative Group (Berliner Initiativkreis). 
38  Corporate Governance Rules for German Quoted Companies, prepared by the German Panel on Corporate 
Governance. 
39 Author: Hellenic Federation of Enterprises (SEV). 
40 Author: same as n 39. 
41 Author: Committee on Corporate Governance in Greece, set up by the Capital Market Commission. 
42 The code allows smaller companies (as defined in Annex I) to have less than half the board comprised of non-
executive directors. 
43 Preda Code. 
44 Gdańsk Code. 
45 Polish Corporate Governance Forum 
46 The code does not specify a minimum number of non-executive directors, but it requires that at least one fourth of 
the board is composed of independent directors. According to the Portuguese Company Act, Art. 414-A(1)(b), 
independence means that the director must not exercise management functions within the company.  
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‡Slovenia 
2009 
2004 
 
n/a 
n/a 
   
*Spain 
2006 
2004 
2003 
 
1 
0.547 
1 
 
100 
100 
100 
 
1 
0.5 
1 
 
II.10 
I.3 
IV.3 
*Sweden 
2010 
2001 
 
1 
1 
 
100 
100 
 
1 
1 
 
III.4.3 
3.1 
‡Switzerl. 
2007 
2002 
 
1 
1 
 
100 
100 
 
1 
1 
 
12 
12 
*UK 
201048 
200349 
199850 
199251 
 
1 
1 
0.5 
0 
 
7552 
7553 
100 
- 
 
0.75 
0.75 
0.5 
0 
 
B.1.2 
A.3.2 
3.14 
1.3 
 
 
*denotes countries with a unitary board system. 
†denotes countries with a dual board system for public companies. 
‡denotes countries that offer a choice between the unitary and dual board systems. In this 
case, the assessment is based on the unitary board system (with the exception of the 
Netherlands, where the dual system is mandatory for large companies (structuur 
vennootschappen), Hungary, where the unitary board system has only recently been introduced 
(2006) and has no tradition in Hungarian company law, and Slovenia, where the majority of 
companies opt for the two-tier system). In Switzerland, board structure is formally based on 
the one-tier model, but corporate law is so flexible that corporations can structure (and many 
corporations have, in fact, structured) the board in a way that resembles the German two-tier 
model.54 We use the definitions of the board structure variable applicable to the one-tier 
board. The Danish model is also a hybrid form that distinguishes between the (supervisory) 
board and the executive board (management). However, the two boards are not as clearly 
separated as, for example, in the German system, and the supervisory board may be 
                                                     
47 The code does not provide for a minimum proportion of non-executive directors, but at least one third of the board 
members must be independent. Independence requires that the director does not perform executive functions (see 
Code Provision I.4). 
48 UK Corporate Governance Code, published by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC). 
49 Combined Code on Corporate Governance, based on the Higgs Report and Smith Report and published by the 
Financial Reporting Council (FRC). 
50 Principles of Corporate Governance based on the Hampel Report. 
51 Code of Best Practice proposed by the Cadbury Report. The coding is not based on the Report itself, but on the 
Code of Best Practice derived from the Report, since the code is the part of the Report to which the comply-or-explain 
principle applies (see para. 3.7 of the Report). It should be noted that the Report is in several respects more 
shareholder-friendly than the code. 
52 The code allows smaller companies (defined as companies below the FTSE 350) to have less than half the board 
comprised of non-executive directors. 
53 See n 52. 
54 Swiss Code of Obligations (Obligationenrecht), Arts. 707-726. 
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composed of both executive and non-executive members.55 We therefore use the definitions 
of the board structure variable applicable to the one-tier board. 
 
 
                                                     
55 On the Danish system see Jesper L. Hansen, The New Danish Companies Act of 2009, 11 EBOR 87 (2010); Hansen, n 23 
above. 
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Table B.2. Quantitative measure of independence of non-executive 
directors/members of the supervisory board (NO_IND) 
 
Country Value Adjustment 
Factor (%) 
Total 
value 
Code provision 
Austria 
2009 
2002 
 
1 
1 
 
100 
5056 
 
1 
0.5 
 
53 
52-55 
Belgium 
2009 
2004 
1998E 
1998C 
 
0.5 
0.5 
0 
0 
 
100 
100 
- 
- 
 
0.5 
0.5 
0 
0 
 
2.3: at least three members 
2.2: at least three members 
2.2 
I.B.2.2 
Bulgaria 
2007 
 
0 
 
- 
 
0 
 
3.2 
Cyprus 
2002 
 
1 
 
100 
 
1 
 
A.2.2 
Denmark 
2010 
2003 
 
157 
158 
 
100 
100 
 
1 
1 
 
5.4.1 
V.4 
Finland 
2008 
2003 
 
1 
1 
 
100 
100 
 
1 
1 
 
14 
17 
France 
2011 
2010 
2003 
1998 
1995 
 
0.5 
1 
1 
0.5 
0.5 
 
100 
7559 
7560 
100 
100 
 
0.5 
0.75 
0.75 
0.5 
0.5 
 
II.B.1 
8.2 
8.2 
II.B.1 
II.2: at least two members 
Germany 
2010 
2002 
2000B 
2000 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
5.4.2: adequate number of ind. 
Directors 
5.4.1 
No mention of independence. 
III.1(b): sufficient number of ind. 
directors 
                                                     
56 Quantitative independence requirements relate only to particular types of relation of the director with the company 
(see, e.g., 52: ‘To ensure the independence of the advisory and monitoring tasks of the supervisory board, not more 
than two former members of the management board or senior management may be appointed to the supervisory 
board.’). 
57 The code requires half of the members elected by the general meeting to be independent. Since independence means 
that the board member is a non-executive director, the requirement of NO_IND(a) is satisfied that a majority of the 
non-executive directors should be independent (members not elected by the general meeting are not considered). 
58 The code requires a majority of the members elected by the general meeting to be independent. Since independence 
means that the board member is a non-executive director, the requirement of NO_IND(a) is satisfied that a majority 
of the non-executive directors should be independent (members not elected by the general meeting are not considered). 
59 The code requires half of the members of the board to be independent in widely held corporations without 
controlling shareholders and one third in other corporations. Since independence means that the board member is a 
non-executive director, the requirement of NO_IND(a) that a majority of the non-executive directors should be 
independent is satisfied for widely held corporations. However, it is not necessarily satisfied for companies with 
controlling shareholders. I therefore adjust by 75 percent. 
60 See n 59. 
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Greece 
2011 
2001 
1999 
 
1 
0 
0 
 
100 
- 
- 
 
1 
0 
0 
 
A.II.2.3 
B.2.3 
6.2 
Hungary 
2004 
 
1 
 
100 
 
1 
 
1.5.5 
Italy 
2011 
1999 
 
0.5 
0 
 
- 
- 
 
0.5 
0 
 
3.C.3: at least two members 
3 
Luxemb. 
2006 
 
0 
 
- 
 
0 
 
3.4 
Malta 
2001 
 
161 
 
100 
 
1 
 
2.5 
Netherl. 
2008 
2003 
 
1 
1 
 
100 
100 
 
1 
1 
 
III.2.1 
III.2.1 
Norway 
2010 
2004 
 
1 
0.5 
 
100 
100 
 
1 
0.5 
 
8 
8: one-half 
Poland 
2010 
2002G 
2002C 
 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
 
100 
100 
100 
 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
 
III.6: at least two members 
II.1: at least two members 
20(a): one-half 
Portugal 
2010 
1999 
 
0.5 
0.5 
 
100 
2562 
 
0.5 
0.125 
 
II.1.2..2: one-fourth 
15: at least one member 
Slovakia 
2008 
 
1 
 
5063 
 
0.5 
 
V.E.1 
Slovenia 
2009 
2004 
 
0.5 
1 
 
100 
100 
 
0.5 
1 
 
6.2 
3.3.1 
Spain 
2006 
2004 
2003 
 
0.5 
1 
0.564 
 
100 
7565 
100 
 
0.5 
0.75 
0.5 
 
II.13 
I.3 
IV.3 
                                                     
61 The code provides that ‘[n]on-executive Directors should be free from any business or other relationship, which 
could interfere materially with the exercise of their independent and impartial judgement.’ See Code Provision 2.5. I 
interpret this provision as meaning that all non-executive directors should satisfy the independence requirements laid 
down in the code. 
62 Independence is understood not in the common sense of independent from management, but only from the 
dominant shareholders (see also DEF_IND) (although it is acknowledged that the dominant shareholders are likely to 
exert control over the company’s operations; independence from them is, therefore, of particular importance in 
jurisdictions characterised by large blockholdings). In addition, the code’s requirement (‘one or more members’) is not 
substantially different from the definition of NO_IND(c) (the code contains only general statements). Therefore, I 
adjust two times by the usual amount (50 percent). 
63 The binding principle only provides that the supervisory board ‘should include independent members’ and that the 
chairman ‘should always be an independent person.’ The requirement that a majority of the members of the 
supervisory board shall be independent is included in the Notes to Code Principle V.E.1. Since the notes are non-
binding (see Corporate Governance Code for Slovakia, p. 4), I apply an adjustment of 50 percent. 
64 The code speaks of ‘a very significant number of independent directors’, which I interpret as being more than merely 
a general statement within the meaning of NO_IND(c). 
65 The code requires only companies without a majority or controlling shareholder to have a majority of independent 
non-executive directors. For other companies, the number should not fall below one third of total board members. 
The provision is, therefore, between NO_IND(a) and (b). 
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Sweden 
2010 
2001 
 
1 
1 
 
100 
100 
 
1 
1 
 
III.4.4 
3.1 
Switzerl. 
2007 
2002 
 
0 
0 
 
- 
- 
 
0 
0 
 
12 
12 
UK 
2010 
2003 
1998 
1992 
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
100 
100 
100 
100 
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
B.1.2 
A.3.2 
2.5, 3.9 
2.2 
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Table B.3. Qualitative measure of independence of non-executive  
directors/members of the supervisory board (DEF_IND) 
 
Country Value Adjustment 
Factor (%) 
Total 
value 
Code provision 
Austria 
2009 
2002 
 
0.366 
0.2 
 
100 
100 
 
0.3 
0.2 
 
53, Annex 1 
52, 53, 5567 
Belgium 
2009 
2004 
1998E 
1998C 
 
1 
0.9 
0 
0.35 
 
100 
100 
- 
5068 
 
1 
0.9 
0 
0.369 
 
Appendix A 
Appendix A 
2.2 
I.B.2.2 
Bulgaria 
2007 
 
0.1 
 
5070 
 
0.05 
4.4: independent directors should not 
receive any additional remuneration 
Cyprus 
2002 
 
0.3 
 
100 
 
0.3 
 
A.2.2 
Denmark 
2010 
2003 
 
1 
0.471 
 
100 
100 
 
1 
0.4 
 
5.4.1 
V.4 
Finland 
2008 
 
2003 
 
0.9 
 
0.6 
 
50 for (i) 
and (j)72 
50 for (j)73 
 
0.8 
 
0.55 
 
15 
 
18 
France 
2011 
2010 
 
0.7 
0.9 
 
50 for (f)74 
5075 
 
0.65 
0.45 
 
II.B.1 
8.3-8.5 
                                                     
66 The code contains the general statement that independent supervisory board members should ‘not have any business 
or personal relations with the company or its management board that constitute a material conflict of interests’. Annex 
1 also contains a list of factors (six of which meet the benchmark of the Commission Recommendation) that indicate 
independence. However, these factors are merely guidelines (see Annex 1). Pursuant to Code Provision 53, the 
supervisory board has to define the criteria that constitute independence on the basis of the general clause and ‘[t]he 
guidelines in Annex 1 shall serve as further orientation.’ Therefore, I only assign the value for the general statement. 
67 Only code provision 52 (‘not more than two former members of the management board or senior management may 
be appointed to the supervisory board’) is binding. Code provisions 53 and 55, which contain additional independence 
requirements (e.g. prohibition of cross-representation), are so-called R-rules, i.e. the rule ‘is a recommendation; non-
compliance . . . requires neither disclosure nor explanation’ (Code of 2002, p. 7). 
68 I apply an adjustment of 50 percent because the independence criteria are only an expression of the view of the 
Belgian Commission on Corporate Governance (see Code Provision B.2.2: ‘The Belgian Commission on Corporate 
Governance takes the view that a director may be considered independent if . . .’). The ultimate decision whether a 
director is independent rests with the board: ‘It is for the board to decide whether an independent director satisfies the 
definition of independence given below.’  
69 Since the score for DEF_IND is below 0.3 after the adjustment applied in n 68, but the code also contains a general 
description of independence which warrants the value 0.3 according to our definition, I assign the latter. 
70 Adjustment factor is 50 because Code Provision 4.4 does not specify a period of time preceding the director’s 
appointment during which he/she must not have received additional remuneration. 
71 Some of the independence criteria listed in the code do not fit well within DEF_IND, particularly that the director 
shall not have any ‘essential strategic interest in the company other than that of a shareholder’. I relate this requirement 
to DEF_IND(f) and quantify the variable accordingly. 
72 According to the Finnish code, criteria (i) and (j) (tenure not longer than 12 years and no close family connection) 
are not fixed requirements, but shall be taken into account by the board when it makes its overall evaluation of the 
director’s independence, see Code Provision 15. 
73 See n 72. 
74 Adjustment factor is 50 because the code does not specify a period of time preceding the director’s appointment 
during which he/she must not have been a business partner of the company. 
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2003 
1998 
1995 
0.9 
0.45 
0.4 
5076 
100 
100 
0.45 
0.45 
0.4 
8.3-8.5 
II.B.1 
II.2, II.4 
Germany 
2010 
2002 
2000B 
2000 
 
0.3 
0.3 
0 
0.3 
 
100 
100 
- 
100 
 
0.3 
0.3 
0 
0.3 
 
5.4.2 
5.4.2 
No mention of independence. 
III.1(b) 
Greece 
2011 
2001 
1999 
 
0.8 
0.177 
0.3 
 
100 
100 
100 
 
0.8 
0.1 
0.3 
 
A.II.2.5 
B.2.3 
6.3 
Hungary 
2004 
 
0.3 
 
100 
 
0.3 
 
1.5.5 
Italy 
2011 
1999 
 
0.8 
0.2 
 
5078 
100 
 
0.4 
0.2 
 
3.C.1 
3 
Luxemb. 
2006 
 
0.379 
 
100 
 
0.3 
 
3.5, Appendix D 
Malta 
2001 
 
0.3 
 
100 
 
0.3 
 
2.6 
Netherl. 
2008 
2003 
 
0.7 
0.7 
 
100 
100 
 
0.7 
0.7 
 
III.2.2 
III.2.2 
Norway 
2010 
2004 
 
0.7 
0.7 
 
100 
100 
 
0.7 
0.7 
 
8 
8 
Poland 
2010 
2002G 
2002C 
 
1 
0.3 
0.3 
 
100 
100 
100 
 
1 
0.3 
0.3 
 
III.6 
II.2 
20(a) 
Portugal 
2010 
 
0.580 
 
100 
 
0.5 
 
II.1.2.3 
                                                                                                                                                        
75 I apply an adjustment of 50 percent because the board, in judging independence, ‘may consider that, although a 
particular director meets all of the above criteria, he or she cannot be held to be independent owing to the specific 
circumstances of the person or the company, due to its ownership structure or for any other reason. Conversely, the 
Board may consider that a director who does not meet the above criteria is nevertheless an independent director.’ See 
Code Provision 8.3. Hence, the board has some discretion that may be used to dilute the independence criteria. 
76 Code Provision 8.3 contains a provision similar to that reproduced in n 75. 
77 Independence is only defined with regard to shareholders. 
78 The list of independence criteria is not binding on the board of directors when it evaluates the independence of the 
board’s non-executive members, but serves merely as an example. Code Provision 3.C.1 provides that the board should 
have ‘regard more to the contents than to the form and [keep] in mind that a director usually does not appear 
independent in the following events [the list of criteria], to be considered merely as an example’. Further, the Comment 
makes it clear that the board ‘may adopt, for the purpose of its evaluations, additional or different, in whole or in part, 
criteria from those mentioned [in Code Provision 3.C.1]. However, the board must also give ‘adequate information to 
the market together with the relevant reasons’ (Comment to Art. 3). Therefore, transparency is at least partly ensured. 
79 The Luxembourg code reproduces the independence criteria of the Commission Recommendation in Appendix D, 
but the appendix is not binding. The code stipulates that ‘the company may make use of the independence criteria 
appearing in Annex II of the European Commission Recommendation of 15 February 2005’ (emphasis by author). 
Only the general formulation in Code Provision 3.5 is binding. 
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1999 0.181 100 0.1 15 
Slovakia 
2008 
 
0.85 
 
50 for all 
and 
another 50 
for (d)82 
 
0.4 
 
V.E.2 
Slovenia 
2009 
2004 
 
1 
0.3 
 
100 
100 
 
1 
0.3 
 
6.2, 8, 17, Appendix C 
3.3.1, 3.5.4 
Spain 
2006 
2004 
2003 
 
0.9 
1 
0.3 
 
100 
100 
100 
 
0.9 
1 
0.3 
 
III.5 
I.4 
IV.2.1(c) 
Sweden 
2010 
 
2001 
 
0.983 
 
084 
 
50 for (d)85 
50 for (e)86 
- 
 
0.8 
 
0 
 
III.4.4, 4.5 
 
3.1 
Switzerl. 
2007 
2002 
 
0.3 
0.3 
 
100 
100 
 
0.3 
0.3 
 
22 (applies only to committee 
composition) 
22 (applies only to committee 
composition) 
UK 
2010 
2003 
 
0.987 
0.988 
 
7589 
7590 
 
0.675 
0.675 
 
B.1.1 
A.3.1 
                                                                                                                                                        
80 Code Provision II.1.2.3 stipulates that, in assessing independence, the board of directors ‘shall take into account the 
legal and regulatory rules in force concerning the independency requirements and the incompatibility framework 
applicable to members of other corporate boards’, which refers to Arts. 414, 414-A of the Portuguese Commercial 
Company Act. The Code Provision continues: ‘An independent executive member shall not be considered as such, if in 
another corporate board and by force of applicable rules, may not be an independent executive member.’ Thus, the 
code incorporates the statutory independence requirements. Our assessment takes this into consideration. 
81 Independence is only defined with regard to the dominant shareholders. 
82 The adjustment of 50 percent for (d) results from the fact that the code does not specify a period of time preceding 
the director’s appointment during which he/she must not have received additional remuneration. The overall 
adjustment of 50 percent is justified because the criteria for independence are contained in the non-binding notes to 
the Code Principle, while the Principle itself advances only general statements. 
83 The code only requires independent directors not to have been CEO of the company within the last five years; it 
does not establish the general rule that former executive directors cannot be considered as independent (as opposed to 
the definition in DEF_IND(a), (b)). However, in Swedish companies no more than one member of the board may be 
an executive director, and this member is generally the CEO, see Swedish Corporate Governance Code, p. 11. 
84 Independence is only defined with regard to the company’s employees, and even in that respect the code does not 
set a minimum time limit, as envisaged in DEF_IND(a)-(c). 
85 Adjustment factor is 50 because Code Provision 4.4 does not specify a period of time preceding the director’s 
appointment during which he/she must not have received additional remuneration. 
86 Code Provision 4.5 requires that at least two members of the board have to be independent of the company’s major 
shareholders, in addition to satisfying the independence requirements of Code Provision 4.4. I therefore adjust the 
value for DEF_IND(e) by 50 percent. 
87 In contrast to the Commission Recommendation, Annex II(1)(a) and (b), the UK Corporate Governance Code does 
not contain separate provisions requiring independent directors not to have been executive directors and not to have 
been employees. The UK Code merely provides that the independent director must not have been an employee of the 
company within the last five years, see Code Provision B.1.1. However, since executive directors are employees, the UK 
Code addresses both factors listed separately by the Commission Recommendation. Therefore, I understand the UK 
provision as satisfying DEF_IND(a)-(c). 
88 Same as n 87. 
89 B.1.1 provides that ‘[t]he board should determine whether the director is independent in character and judgement 
and whether there are relationships or circumstances which are likely to affect, or could appear to affect, the director’s 
judgement. The board should state its reasons if it determines that a director is independent notwithstanding the 
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1998 
1992 
0.3 
0.3 
100 
100 
0.3 
0.3 
3.9 
2.2 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
existence of relationships or circumstances which may appear relevant to its determination, including [the factors 
corresponding to the definition of DEF_IND].’ This means that the board can determine that it acts in compliance 
with the independence requirements even though a director does not satisfy all of the criteria that the code considers to 
be relevant for the determination of independence. As a consequence, the directors would be technically in full 
compliance with the Code and did not have to provide an explanation for non-compliance, see David Kershaw, 
Company Law in Context (2nd ed., OUP 2012), p. 258. However, since the Code Provision itself requires the directors to 
state their reasons and since transparency is, therefore, ensured, I only apply an adjustment of 25 percent. In the case 
of the Italian Code 2011, the adjustment is larger (50 percent, see n 78 above), because the requirement to give reasons 
for not following the list of criteria is not enshrined in the Code Provisions, but only mentioned in the official 
comment to the rule (Comment to Art. 3 Italian Corporate Governance Code 2011). The same applies to France (see n 
75, 76 above). 
90 Same as n 89. 
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Table B.4. Separation of chairman and CEO (SEP) 
 
Country Value Adjustment 
Factor (%) 
Total 
value 
Code provision 
Austria 
2009 
2002 
 
n/a 
n/a 
   
Belgium 
2009 
2004 
1998E 
1998C 
 
1 
1 
0 
0 
 
100 
100 
- 
- 
 
1 
1 
0 
0 
 
1.5 
1.5 
1.2 
I.B.1.3 
Bulgaria 
2007 
 
1 
 
100 
 
1 
 
3.3 
Cyprus 
2002 
 
1 
 
7591 
 
0.75 
 
A.2.4 
Denmark 
2010 
2003 
 
1 
1 
 
10092 
5093 
 
1 
0.5 
 
4.3.4 
- 
Finland 
2008 
2003 
 
1 
1 
 
100 
100 
 
1 
1 
 
36 
40 
France 
2011 
2010 
2003 
1998 
 
1 
0 
0 
1 
 
7594 
- 
- 
5095 
 
0.75 
0 
0 
0.5 
 
II.A.3 
3.1-3.2 
3.1-3.2 
II.A.3 
                                                     
91 The code requires that there ‘should be a clear division of responsibility in the positions of Chairman of the Board of 
Directors and Chief Executive Officer’. The provision continues: ‘In the event that these positions are not separate, 
this should be justified in part two of the report.’ This is comparable to the provision of the UK Corporate 
Governance Code described above in n 89, which allows for deviations from the corporate governance rules but 
ensures transparency. 
92 The Danish Companies Act, § 114, stipulates that the chairman of the board is not entitled to exercise such powers 
on behalf of the company as are not a natural part of the office of chairman of the board, apart from individual tasks 
which the person concerned is requested to perform by and for the board of directors (see Hansen, n 23 above, 87; 
Report on Corporate Governance in Denmark of 2003, p. 16). The corporate governance code further specifies that 
the chairman may, ‘in exceptional cases […] briefly participate in the day-to-day management’ of the corporation. 
However, the performance of management duties requires a board resolution and the disclosure of any agreements 
regarding the chairman’s participation in the company’s management. Arguably, the brief participation in the day-to-
day management does not jeopardise the general separation of CEO and chairman of the board as required by the 
Companies Act. It is therefore justified not to adjust the value of 1. 
93 The rule derives from Danish company legislation, see n 92 above. As opposed to the 2010 Code discussed in n 92, 
the 2003 Code does not contain additional restrictions, disclosure obligations, or procedural requirements to be 
followed when the chairman is entrusted with management powers. In order to take account of the lower level of 
regulation in the 2003 Code, an adjustment of 50 percent is applied. 
94 The code holds that ‘AFG is in favour of the general principle of separation of functions, namely executive and 
control power, through a separation of the function of chairperson of the board from that of the chief executive 
officer, or through a supervisory and management board’s structure’. However, the code also acknowledges that 
companies, ‘as an exception, [may] decide not to implement such a separation of functions’. In spite of this ambiguity 
in the code provision, only an adjustment of 25 percent is applied for the following reasons: First, the Code Provision 
itself requires the company to explain the decision to the shareholders. The transparency envisaged by corporate 
governance codes is, therefore, ensured (see n 89 above for a similar argument). Second, the code requires that if the 
two functions are not separated a lead independent director shall be appointed who has power to monitor the board, 
add items to the board agenda, and convene the board if necessary. 
95 An adjustment factor of 50 percent is used because the code does not require the separation of CEO and chairman 
unambiguously. Code Provision A.3 merely provides that ‘AFG-ASFI invites companies to deliberate on […] the option 
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1995 0 - 0 I.4 
Germany 
2010 
2002 
2000B 
2000 
 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
   
Greece 
2011 
2001 
1999 
 
1 
0 
1 
 
2596 
- 
5097 
 
0.25 
0 
0.5 
 
A.III.3.3 
- 
5.5 
Hungary 
2004 
 
n/a 
   
Italy 
2011 
1999 
 
1 
0 
 
7598 
- 
 
0.75 
0 
 
2.P.4, 2.P.5, 2.C.3, 2.C.4 
2.1, 4.3 (Comment) 
Luxemb. 
2006 
 
1 
 
100 
 
1 
 
1.3 
Malta 
2001 
 
1 
 
7599 
 
0.75 
 
2.3 
Netherl. 
2008 
2003 
 
n/a 
n/a 
   
Norway 
2010 
2004 
 
1 
1 
 
100 
100 
 
1 
1 
 
8 
8 
Poland 
2010 
2002G 
 
n/a 
n/a 
   
                                                                                                                                                        
provided by the law on the separation of the functions of the Chairman of the Board and the Managing Director’ and 
that ‘AFG-ASFI is in favor of this separation in the interest of shareholders.’ (Emphases by author.) 
96 Companies may combine the roles of chairman and CEO, but in that case, or where the former CEO has been 
appointed as chairman within three years of his retirement, the board must appoint an independent vice-chairman. The 
code specifies the competences of the vice-chairman. The vice-chairman has responsibility, inter alia, for the evaluation 
of the executive chairman (Code Provision 3.4). In light of these specific rules, it seems justified to use the value for 
SEP(a), significantly adjusted. See also below n 100 for a comparable provision. 
97 I use an adjustment factor of 50 percent because the code merely provides that ‘[t]he separation of duties and 
responsibilities in the highest levels of the corporation’s governance should be encouraged’ (emphasis by author). 
98 The code does not require unambiguously that CEO and chairman are separated, it merely provides that ‘[i]t is 
appropriate to avoid the concentration of corporate offices in one single individual’ (2.P.4). The code acknowledges 
that ‘the existence of situations of accumulation of the two roles may satisfy, in particular in issuers of smaller size, 
valuable organizational requirements’ (see Comment to Art. 2). However, the code also stipulates that if management 
powers have been delegated to the chairman, the board should disclose the reasons for this organisation choice in the 
corporate governance report (2.P.5). In addition, in this case the board shall designate an independent director as lead 
independent director (2.C.3), who ‘represents a reference and coordination point for the requests and contributions of 
non-executive directors’ (2.C.4). In light of these substitute mechanisms, it is appropriate to assign the Italian Code the 
value of 1 and apply an adjustment of 25 percent. 
99 The code is ambivalent in that it does not prohibit the combination of the roles of CEO and chairman, but merely 
stipulates that ‘[i]deally, the Chairman’s role in leading the Board should be separate from that of the Chief Executive’. 
The provision is comparable to that in the Italian code of 2011 (see n 98 above) because it requires that if the roles of 
CEO and chairman are combined the company must provide an explanation to the market. Hence, the provision 
conforms to the transparency rationale of corporate governance codes. In addition, the code stresses that in such cases 
‘it is important that the nonexecutive Directors are of sufficient calibre to bring an independent judgement to bear on 
the various issues brought before’ the board. Accordingly, the code requires that directors are appointed ‘whose 
independence and standing would offer a balance to the strength of character of such a chairman’. 
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2002C n/a 
Portugal 
2010 
1999 
 
0 
0 
 
- 
- 
 
0 
0 
 
II.2.3 
- 
Slovakia 
2008 
 
n/a 
   
Slovenia 
2009 
2004 
 
n/a 
n/a 
   
Spain 
2006 
2004 
2003 
 
1 
1 
0 
 
25100 
100 
- 
 
0.25 
1 
0 
 
II.17 
I.2 
IV.4 
Sweden 
2010 
2001 
 
1 
1 
 
100 
100 
 
1 
1 
 
II.4, III.6.2 
3.1 
Switzerl. 
2007 
2002 
 
0 
0 
 
- 
- 
 
0 
0 
 
18 
18 
UK 
2010 
2003 
1998 
1992 
 
1 
1 
1 
0 
 
100 
100 
75101 
- 
 
1 
1 
0.75 
0 
 
A.2.1, A.3.1 
A.2.1, A.2.2 
3.17 
1.2 
 
                                                     
100 The code does not require the chairman and CEO to be separated, but where the two roles are exercised by the 
same person, an independent director shall be empowered to request the calling of board meetings and the inclusion of 
new business on the agenda in order to coordinate and give voice to the concerns of external directors, and lead the 
board’s evaluation of the chairman (Code Provision 17). In light of this provision, it does not seem to be justified to 
assign the value of 0 to the Spanish Code. Rather, the value of 1 should be adjusted significantly to take into account 
the lack of formal separation on the one hand, but the introduction of a controlling element in the form of the senior 
lead independent director with specified powers. Consequently, I treat the provision as comparable to Greece 2011, 
discussed above n 96. Note that the adjustment is higher than in the cases of France 1998 (n 95), Greece 1999 (n 97), 
Italy 2011 (n 98), and Malta 2001 (n 99), because, as opposed to these codes, the Spanish rule does not give any 
recommendation at all, not even one that is phrased ambiguously. Compare the other codes with the formulation of 
the Spanish provision: ‘The concentration of powers can provide companies with clear internal and external leadership, 
while avoiding the information and coordination costs that would otherwise be generated. […] [G]iven the divergence 
of international practice and the lack of empirical evidence for a precise recommendation, the Code makes no 
comment on the advisability or otherwise of separating the two positions.’ See Comment before Code Provisions 16 
and 17. 
101 The same considerations as in n 91 above apply. 
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Table B.5. Cooling-off period for the CEO to become chairman of the (supervisory) 
board (COOL) 
 
Country Value Adjustment 
Factor (%) 
Total 
value 
Code provision 
Austria 
2009 
2002 
 
0.4 
0 
 
100 
- 
 
0.4 
0 
 
55: two years 
- 
Belgium 
2009 
2004 
1998E 
1998C 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
1.5 
1.5 
1.2 
I.B.1.3 
Bulgaria 
2007 
 
0 
 
- 
 
0 
 
3.3 
Cyprus 
2002 
 
0 
 
- 
 
0 
 
A.2.4 
Denmark 
2010 
2003 
 
0 
0 
 
- 
- 
 
0 
0 
 
4.3.4 
- 
Finland 
2008 
2003 
 
0 
0 
 
- 
- 
 
0 
0 
 
36 
40 
France 
2011 
2010 
2003 
1998 
1995 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
II.A.3 
3.1-3.2 
3.1-3.2 
II.A.3 
I.4 
Germany 
2010 
2002 
2000B 
2000 
 
0.4 
0 
0 
0 
 
50102 
- 
- 
- 
 
0.2 
0 
0 
0 
 
5.4.4: two years 
5.4 
IV.4.4 
III.1 
Greece 
2011 
2001 
1999 
 
0.7 
0 
0 
 
25103 
- 
- 
 
0.175 
0 
0 
 
A.III.3.3: three years 
- 
5.5 
Hungary 
2004 
 
0 
 
- 
 
0 
 
1.5.4104 
                                                     
102 Adjustment factor is 50 percent because code provision 5.4.4 stipulates that ‘Management Board members may not 
become members of the Supervisory Board of the company within two years after the end of their appointment unless 
they are appointed upon a motion presented by shareholders holding more than 25% of the voting rights in the 
company. In the latter case appointment to the chairmanship of the Supervisory Board shall be an exception to be 
justified to the General Meeting.’ This exception does not preserve transparency to the same extent as the comply-or-
explain principle requires. The company is technically in compliance with the code when the CEO is appointed as 
chairman without waiting for two years. The supervisory board only has to give reasons to the general meeting, but it 
does not have to explain the deviation from the code in the next annual report. Therefore, outside investors cannot 
easily assess whether the cooling-off period was applied consistently or not. 
103 The adjustment is justified for the same reasons as explained above n 96. 
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Italy 
2011 
1999 
 
0 
0 
 
- 
- 
 
0 
0 
 
2.P.4, 2.P.5, 2.C.3, 2.C.4 
2.1, 4.3 (Comment) 
Luxemb. 
2006 
 
0 
 
- 
 
0 
 
1.3 
Malta 
2001 
 
0 
 
- 
 
0 
 
2.3 
Netherl. 
2008 
2003 
 
1 
1 
 
100 
100 
 
1 
1 
 
III.4.2: no former managers 
III.4.2: no former managers 
Norway 
2010 
2004 
 
0 
0 
 
- 
- 
 
0 
0 
 
8 
8 
Poland 
2010 
2002G 
2002C 
 
0 
0 
0 
 
- 
- 
- 
 
0 
0 
0 
 
- 
- 
- 
Portugal 
2010 
1999 
 
0 
0 
 
- 
- 
 
0 
0 
 
II.2.3 
- 
Slovakia 
2008 
 
1 
 
50105 
 
0.5 
 
V.E.1, V.E.2 
Slovenia 
2009 
2004 
 
0.4 
0 
 
100 
- 
 
0.4 
0 
 
10.1 
- 
Spain 
2006 
2004 
2003 
 
0 
0 
0 
 
- 
- 
- 
 
0 
0 
0 
 
II.17 
I.2 
IV.4 
Sweden 
2010 
2001 
 
0106 
1 
 
- 
50107 
 
0 
0.5 
 
II.4, III.2.6, III.6.2 
3.1 
Switzerl. 
2007 
2002 
 
0 
0 
 
- 
- 
 
0 
0 
 
18 
18 
UK 
2010 
2003 
1998 
1992 
 
1 
1 
0 
0 
 
100 
100 
- 
- 
 
1 
1 
0 
0 
 
A.2.1, A.3.1 
A.2.1, A.2.2 
3.17 
1.2 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
104 Referring to the chairman of the board of directors (not the supervisory board) and the CEO. 
105 Code Principle V.E.1 requires that the chairman of the supervisory board must be independent. As part of the 
independence criteria, the code stipulates that the director should not have been a member of the company’s 
management in the last five years. However, the independence criteria are contained in the non-binding notes to Code 
Principle V.E.2, which is why an adjustment of 50 percent is applied. 
106 Code Provision III.2.6 only provides that ‘[i]f the outgoing chief executive officer is nominated for the post of chair, 
reasons for this proposal are […]  to be fully explained.’ 
107 The code does not lay down a waiting period or stipulate that the CEO should never go on to become chairman of 
the board, it merely provides that ‘[a] Managing Director who is leaving that position should normally not be appointed 
as Chairman or remain on the board’. Because of this ambivalence the value is adjusted by 50 percent. 
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Table B.6. Structures to mitigate conflicts of interest (CON) 
 
Country Value Adjustment 
Factor (%) 
Total value Code provision 
Austria 
2009 
 
2002 
 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1108 
(a): 0.5; 
(b): 0.5; 
(c): 0.5 
 
100 
 
100 
 
1 
 
0.5 
 
Nomination: 39, 41; audit: 39-40; 
remuneration: 39, 43 
Nomination: 43; audit: 40-41; 
remuneration: 43 
Belgium 
2009 
 
2004 
 
1998E 
 
1998C 
 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
(a): 0; (b): 
0; (c): 0.5 
(a): 0.5; 
(b): 1; (c): 
0.5 
 
100 
 
100 
 
50 for (c)109 
 
50 for (a) 
and (c)110 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0.25/3=0.08 
 
(0.25+1+ 
0.25)/3=0.5 
 
Nomination: Appendix D; audit: 
Appendix C; remuneration: 
Appendix E 
Nomination: Appendix D; audit: 
Appendix C; remuneration: 
Appendix E 
Nomination:2.3; audit: 4.3; 
remuneration: 3.1 
Nomination:I.B.2.4; audit: I.B.4.3; 
remuneration: I.B.3.2 
Bulgaria 
2007 
 
(a): 0; (b): 
1; (c): 0 
 
50 for 
(b)111 
 
0.5/3=0.17 
 
6.2 
Cyprus 
2002 
 
(a): 0.5;112 
(b): 1; (c): 
1 
 
50 for 
(b)113 
 
(0.5+0.5+1)/3 
=0.67 
 
Nomination: A.4.1; audit: C.3.1; 
remuneration: B.1.1, B1.2 
Denmark 
2010 
 
2003 
 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
0 
 
100 
 
- 
 
1 
 
0 
 
5.10 
 
Nomination: V.10; audit: V.10, 
VIII.7 ; remuneration: V.10 
Finland 
2008 
 
(a): 1; (b):  
 
100 
 
1 
 
Nomination: 28-30; audit: 24-27; 
                                                     
108 (a), (b), and (c) refer to board appointments, responsibility for internal control and appointment of the external 
auditor, and remuneration, respectively. 
109  The code does not require a remuneration committee to be established, but if the company sets up such a 
committee, it must be composed exclusively of non-executive directors. Furthermore, the code provides that, if no 
remuneration committee is established, the remuneration of executive directors should be submitted to the non-
executive directors (3.1). Therefore, it seems justified to give some credit to the code for these provisions. 
110 The code does not require a nomination or remuneration committee to be established, but if the company sets up 
such committees, the code stipulates how they should be composed (similar to n 109). 
111  The code does not specify the responsibilities of the audit committee. Accordingly, it is relatively easy to 
compromise the effectiveness of the provision by defining the audit committee’s duties restrictively. See the flexibility 
granted by Code Provision 6.3. 
112 A majority of the members of the nomination committee should be non-executive directors, but the code does not 
require independence. 
113 The code requires the audit committee to be composed of a majority of independent non-executive directors, but 
the audit committee is only responsible for preparing a decision on the appointment, dismissal and remuneration of the 
external auditor (Code Provision C.3.2). The audit committee’s remit does not include reviewing the company’s 
internal control systems (pursuant to Code Provision C.2.1, this is the responsibility of the board of directors). 
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2003 
 
1; (c): 1 
(a): 0.5; 
(b): 1; (c): 
0.5 
 
100 
 
(0.5+1+0.5)/3 
=0.67 
remuneration: 31-33 
Nomination: 31-33; audit: 27-30; 
remuneration: 34-36 
France 
2011 
 
2010 
 
2003 
 
1998 
 
1995 
 
(a): 0.5; 
(b): 0.5; 
(c): 1 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
(a): 0.5; 
(b): 0.5; 
(c): 1 
(a): 0.5; 
(b): 0.5; 
(c): 0.5 
 
100 
 
100 
 
100 
 
50 for 
(b)114 
 
100 
 
(0.5+0.5+1)/3 
=0.67 
1 
 
1 
 
(0.5+0.25+1) 
/3=0.58 
0.5 
 
II.B.2 
 
Nomination: 15; audit: 14; 
remuneration: 16 
 
Nomination: 16; audit: 14; 
remuneration: 15 
 
II.B.2 
 
Nomination: II.5; audit: III.3; 
remuneration: III.3 
Germany 
2010 
 
2002 
 
2000B 
 
2000 
 
(a): 0.5; 
(b): 0.5; 
(c): 0 
(a): 0; (b): 
0.5; (c): 0 
(a): 0.5; 
(b): 0.5; 
(c): 0.5 
(a): 0.5; 
(b): 0.5; 
(c): 0.5 
 
100 
 
100 
 
50 for 
(b)115 
 
50 for all116 
 
(0.5+0.5) 
/3=0.33 
0.5/3=0.17 
 
(0.5+0.25 
+0.5)/3=0.42 
0.25 
 
5.3 
 
5.1.2, 5.3 
 
IV.3.4 
 
III.3 
Greece 
2011 
 
2001 
 
1999 
 
(a): 0.5; 
(b): 1; (c): 
1 
(a): 0; (b): 
0.5; (c): 
0.5 
(a): 0; (b): 
0.5; (c): 
0.5 
 
100 
 
50 for 
(b)117 
 
50 for 
(b)118 
 
(0.5+1+1)/3 
=0.83 
(0.25+0.5)/3 
=0.25 
(0.25+0.5)/3 
=0.25 
 
Nomination: A.V.5.4, 5.5; audit: 
B.I.1.4; remuneration: C.I.1.6-1.9 
Nomination: -; audit: E.5.2; 
remuneration: E.5.3 
Nomination: -; audit: 4.7; 
remuneration: 7.2 
     
                                                     
114 The code does not specify the responsibilities of the audit committee. 
115 The code does not specify the responsibilities of the audit committee. 
116 The code does not require the establishment of committees of the supervisory board unambiguously; it stipulates 
that ‘[i]ncorproation and duties of committees are subject to the specific circumstances and the size of the Company’ 
and then lists a number of committees (among them the audit committee and personnel committee, responsible for 
succession planning with regard to the management board and compensation of the management board members) that 
‘could be instituted’. 
117 The competences of the audit committee (called ‘Internal Control Committee’), as specified in Code Provision E.5.2, 
are limited. 
118 I use an adjustment factor of 50 percent because the code merely provides that ‘[t]he establishment of an Internal 
Audit Committee should be encouraged’ (emphasis by author). 
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Hungary 
2004 
 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
 
100 
 
1 
 
Nomination: 1.8.3; audit: 1.8.2; 
remuneration: 1.8.4 
Italy 
2011 
 
1999 
 
(a): 1; (b): 
1;119 (c): 1 
(a): 0.5; 
(b): 0.5; 
(c): 0.5 
 
75 for all120 
 
50 for (a)121 
 
0.75 
 
(0.25+0.5+ 
0.5)/3=0.42 
 
Nomination: 5.P.1 ; audit: 7.P.4; 
remuneration: 6.P.3 
Nomination: 7.2 ; audit: 10.1; 
remuneration: 8.1 
Luxemb. 
2006 
 
(a): 0.5;122 
(b): 0.5;123 
(c): 0.5124 
 
100 
 
0.5 
 
Nomination: 4.2-4.6 ; audit: 9.1-9.13; 
remuneration: 8.1-8.7 
Malta 
2001 
 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1125 
 
50 for (a), 
75 for (b) 
and (c)126 
 
(0.5+0.75+ 
0.75)/3=0.67 
 
Nomination: 2.10; audit: 6; 
remuneration: 8 
Netherl. 
2008 
 
(a): 1; (b): 
 
100127 
 
1 
 
III.5 
                                                     
119 This value refers to the control and risk committee because the board of statutory auditors, which performs some 
of the functions of a traditional audit committee, has to be established pursuant to the Civil Code. The external auditor 
is appointed by shareholder resolution upon proposal of the board of auditors (Art. 13 of Legislative Decree 27 
January 2010, no. 39). See also Mads Andenas and Frank Wooldridge, European Comparative Company Law (CUP 2009), 
pp. 324-330. 
120 I apply an adjustment because the committee structure is not binding. However, pursuant to Code Provision 4.C.2, 
the board is only entitled to refrain from establishing one of the three committees if at least half of the board members 
are independent directors and the board describes the reasons for not forming one or more committees in detail in the 
corporate governance report. In light of these restrictions, an adjustment of less than 50 percent seems to be 
appropriate. 
121 The Code does not require the establishment of a nomination committee, but if such a committee is established, it 
should be composed of a majority of non-executive directors. Accordingly, I treat this code provision in the same way 
as those analysed above n 109, 110. 
122 The rule that the nomination committee should be composed of a majority of independent directors is only 
contained in a non-binding guideline, see Code Provision 4.3. The ‘comply or explain’ principle does not apply to 
guidelines (Code of 2006, p. 7). 
123 Same as n 122. 
124 Same as n 122. 
125 The code is ambivalent in that it requires that a majority of the members of the nomination and audit committees 
should be non-executive directors (Code Provisions 2.10, 6.1), whereas the remuneration committee ‘should be 
composed of a majority of independent non-executive Directors with no personal financial interest other than as 
shareholders in the Company’ (Code Provision 8.2). Since all non-executive directors should be independent (Code 
Provision 2.5), I interpret these requirements as meaning that a majority of the members of the nomination and audit 
committees should be independent non-executive directors, and that the members of the remuneration committee are 
subject to higher independence requirements, as stipulated in Code Provision 8.2 (‘no personal financial interest’). 
126 I use an adjustment factor of 50 percent for (a) (nomination) because the code does not require the establishment of 
a nomination committee unambiguously. Code Provision 2.10 merely provides that ‘the use of Nomination 
Committees is encouraged’. The Code is also ambiguous with respect to the other two committees, but it makes it clear 
that the establishment of such committees is expected. See Code Provision 6.1: ‘It is good practice for the Board to 
create and maintain an Audit Committee […]’. Code Provision 8.1 begins with the vague statement that ‘[t]he use of 
Remuneration Committees by Listed Companies is to be positively considered.’ But it continues more strongly by requiring 
that ‘Boards of Directors should establish Remuneration Committees’ (emphases by author). Therefore, I apply an 
adjustment factor of 75 percent regarding the latter two committees. 
127 The requirement to establish the three committees is only mandatory if the supervisory board consists of more than 
four members. Since this is often the case, and the code applies most of the provisions that regulate the best practice 
of committees to the supervisory board if it does not establish one or more committees, it is appropriate not to adjust 
the value of 1. 
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2003 
1; (c): 1 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
 
100128 
 
1 
 
III.5 
Norway 
2010 
 
2004 
 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
 
100129 
 
50 for (b) 
and (c)130 
 
1 
 
(1+0.5+ 
0.5)/3=0.67 
 
Nomination: 7; audit: 9; 
remuneration: 9 
Nomination: 7; audit: 9; 
remuneration: 9 
Poland 
2010 
 
2002G 
 
2002C 
 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
(a): 0; (b): 
0.5; (c): 0 
(a): 0; (b): 
0.5; (c): 
0.5 
 
100 
 
50 for 
(b)131 
 
50 for (b) 
and (c)132 
 
1 
 
0.25/3=0.08 
 
(0.25+0.25)/3 
=0.17 
 
III.8 
 
Audit: VII 
 
Audit and remuneration: 20(c) 
 
Portugal 
2010 
 
1999 
 
(a): 0; (b): 
-133; (c): 1 
(a): 0.5; 
(b): -; (c): 
0.5 
 
100 
 
50 for all134 
 
(0+1)/2=0.5 
 
(0.25+0.25) 
/2=0.25 
 
II.5 
 
17 
     
                                                     
128 See n 127 above. 
129 The Public Companies Act requires large companies to set up an audit committee. In smaller companies, the entire 
board of directors may act as the company’s audit committee. The corporate governance code does not require smaller 
companies to establish an audit committee either, but merely states that such companies ‘should give consideration to 
establishing an audit committee’. Likewise, the code is non-committal with regard to the remuneration committee. It 
provides that the board of directors ‘should also consider appointing a remuneration committee’. On the other hand, 
in Norwegian companies the board of directors often does not contain any executive directors. If it does, the corporate 
governance code is stricter. Code Provision 8 states that the board should employ the use of committees, and the 
commentary to Code Provision 9 requires that ‘[i]f any member of the executive personnel is a member of the board, 
an audit committee and a remuneration committee should be established in order to ensure the greatest possible 
independence for the board’s deliberations’. I therefore do not perform any adjustment. Finally, it should be noted that 
the duties of the audit committee, while not specified in the code, are laid down in the Public Companies Act. 
130 Similar considerations as in n 129 apply. Code Provision 9 stipulates that the board ‘should consider appointing 
board committees’. Code Provision 8 requires the use of board committees where the board includes executive 
directors. However, the 2004 code is more lenient than the one from 2010 in only requiring the establishment of audit 
and remuneration committees where the chief executive is a member of the board (the 2010 code spoke of ‘any member 
of the executive personnel’. Therefore, I adjust by 75 percent for the audit and remuneration committees. 
131 The code does not require the establishment of an audit committee. I did, however, assign the value 0.5, adjusted by 
a factor of 50 percent, in order to take account of the fact that the code provides that the auditor should be appointed 
by the supervisory board and that the relevant resolution of the board should require a yes vote of at least two 
independent board members. This ensures that the independent elements on the board have at least some say in the 
appointment decision. 
132 The code does not require the establishment of an audit or remuneration committee. I did, however, assign the value 
0.5 with regard to these two committees, adjusted by a factor of 50 percent, in order to take account of the fact that the 
code provides that at least one independent member of the supervisory board has to give his/her consent when 
resolutions are adopted concerning ‘performances of any kind by the company […] in favor of members of the 
management board’ (i.e., also the determination of the directors’ remuneration) and the appointment of the external 
auditor (Code Provision 20(c)). 
133 In the unitary board model, the audit committee must be established by law, which also stipulates the composition 
of the committee, see Portuguese Commercial Company Act, Art. 423-B. The audit committee is therefore not 
considered and the total value of CON is computed by dividing by 2. 
134 The code does not require the establishment of committees unambiguously. It merely provides that ‘[t]he board is 
encouraged to create internal control committees with powers conferred for matters in which there are potential 
situations of conflict of interests, such as the nomination of directors and managers, the analysis of the remuneration 
policy and assessment of the corporate structure and governance’. I therefore adjust by 50 percent. 
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Slovakia 
2008 
 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
 
75 for all135 
 
(0.75+0.75+ 
0.75)/3=0.75 
 
Nomination: V.E.4.A; audit: V.E.4.C; 
remuneration: V.E.4.B 
Slovenia 
2009 
 
2004 
 
(a): 0.5; 
(b): 1; (c): 
0.5 
(a): 0.5; 
(b): 1; (c): 
0.5 
 
100 
 
50 for all136 
 
(0.5+1+0.5) 
/3=0.67 
(0.25+0.5+ 
0.25)/3=0.33 
 
Nomination: 13, Appendix B.3; 
audit:13, App. B.1; remuneration: 13, 
App. B.2 
Nomination: 3.2.2, 3.8; audit: 3.7; 
remuneration: 3.8 
Spain 
2006 
 
 
2004 
 
2003 
 
(a): 1; (b): 
0.5;137 (c): 
0.5 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 0.5 
(a): 0.5; 
(b): 0.5; 
(c): 0.5 
 
100 
 
 
100 
 
100 
 
0.67 
 
 
(1+1+0.5)/3 
=0.83 
0.5 
 
II.44-58 
 
 
Nomination: I.8; audit: I.11; 
remuneration: I.9 
Nomination: IV.5.3; audit: IV.5.2; 
remuneration: IV.5.3 
Sweden 
2010 
 
2001 
 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
(a): 0.5; 
(b): 0.5; 
(c): 0.5 
 
50 for (b) 
and (c)138 
100 
 
(1+0.5+0.5)/3 
=0.67 
0.5 
 
Nomination: III.2; audit: III.7.3; 
remuneration: III.9 
Nomination: 3.1.1; audit: 5.1; 
remuneration: 3.1.1,139 4.1.2 
Switzerl. 
2007 
 
2002 
 
(a): 0.5; 
(b): 1; (c): 
1 
 
75 for 
(b)140 
 
 
(0.5+0.75 
+1)/3=0.75 
(0.5+0.75 
 
Nomination: 27; audit: 23; 
remuneration: 25 
 
                                                     
135 I use an adjustment factor of 75 percent because the code provides that the functions of the three committees may, 
in extraordinary cases, be performed by the supervisory board. See Code Principle V.E.4. 
136 I use an adjustment factor of 50 percent because the code merely provides that the supervisory board may appoint 
the respective committee. 
137 Formation of the audit committee is required by the Securities Market Law (Law 44/2002, 22 November 2002), but 
composition and remit are explained in the code. The value is 0.5 because the code does not require a majority of the 
committee’s members to be independent directors (however, they must be non-executive directors). The same 
requirements regarding composition apply to the remuneration committee. 
138 According to the code, only the establishment of the nomination committee is mandatory. The functions of the 
audit and remuneration committees may be performed by the whole board (Code Provisions 7.3 (n. 7), 9.2). But since 
the board consists almost exclusively of non-executive directors (generally only with the exception of the CEO) and 
the majority of the directors elected by the shareholders (i.e., excluding the employee representatives on the board) 
must be independent, the usual conflicts on unitary boards that necessitate the committee structure are muted in the 
case of Swedish companies. Therefore, it is appropriate to assign the value of 1, adjusted by 50 percent to take account 
of the fact that the audit function and remuneration decisions are not separated in an institutionalised way and the 
CEO (should he/she be a member of the board) and/or other members who are not independent can influence the 
board’s decision-making (note that the code also provides that if the whole board decides about remuneration, no 
executive director shall participate in this work, Code Provision 9.2). 
139 The nomination committee is expected to deal with questions of remuneration. In addition, the board is required to 
appoint a remuneration committee responsible for drawing up contracts for the key executives. 
140 The code does not unambiguously require the members of the audit committee to be independent directors. It 
merely stipulates that the committee ‘should consist of non-executive, preferably independent members of the Board of 
Directors’. (Emphasis by author.) This means that the provision is in between the definitions of CON(b)(i) and (ii). 
Applying an adjustment of 50 percent would not be appropriate because then the provision would be effectively coded 
as CON(b)(ii). 
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(a): 0.5; 
(b): 1; (c): 
1 
75 for 
(b)141 
+1)/3=0.75 Nomination: 27; audit: 23; 
remuneration: 25 
UK 
2010 
 
2003 
 
1998 
 
1992 
 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
(a): 0.5; 
(b): 1; (c): 
1 
(a): 0; (b): 
0.5; (c): 
0.5 
 
100 
 
100 
 
100 
 
100 
 
1 
 
1 
 
(0.5+1+1)/3 
=0.83 
(0.5+0.5)/3 
=0.33 
 
Nomination: B.2.1; audit: C.3.1; 
remuneration: D.2.1 
Nomination: A.4.1; audit: C.3.1; 
remuneration: B.2.1 
Nomination: 2.7, 3.19; audit: 2.21, 
6.3; remuneration: 2.12, 4.11 
Nomination: -; audit: 4.3; 
remuneration: 3.3 
 
  
                                                     
141 See n 140. 
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Table B.7. Board structure regulation with binary coding and without adjustment 
 
Country EXD
142 
NO_IND
143 
DEF_IND
144 
SEP145 COOL
146 
CON147 Board 
structure
148 
Austria 
2009 
 
 
2002 
 
n/a 
 
 
n/a 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
n/a 
 
 
n/a 
 
1 
 
 
0 
 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
= 1 in 
total 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
= 1 
 
0.75 
 
 
0.5 
Belgium 
2009 
 
 
2004 
 
 
1998E 
 
 
1998C 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
 
0 
 
 
1 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
= 1 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
= 1 
(a): 0; (b): 
0; (c): 1 
= 0.33 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
= 1 
 
0.67 
 
 
0.67 
 
 
0.055 
 
 
0.33 
Bulgaria 
2007 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
(a): 0; (b): 
1; (c): 0 
= 0.33 
 
0.22 
Cyprus 
2002 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
= 1 
 
0.5 
Denmark 
2010 
 
 
2003 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
 
0 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
= 1 
0 
 
0.83 
 
 
0.5 
                                                     
142 1 if the code requires a minimum proportion of non-executive directors that should be at least one-half and 0 
otherwise. 
143 1 if the code requires that a majority of the non-executive directors or members of the supervisory board should be 
independent and 0 otherwise. 
144 1 if at least half of the independence requirements listed above in Table A.1 have to be satisfied in order to qualify 
as an independent director (i.e. the value of DEF_IND should be at least 0.5 before adjustment) and 0 otherwise. 
145 Coding as above Table A.1, but without adjustments. 
146 1 if the code provides that the CEO/chairman of the management board shall not go on to be chairman of the 
board/supervisory board for a period of at least one year after the end of his/her tenure as CEO. 
147 Coding as above Table A.1, except that cases (i) and (ii) for each committee are conflated and receive the value 1. 
148 The total board structure variable equals the mean of the six or four individual elements, as applicable to systems 
with one-tier and two-tier boards, respectively. 
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Finland 
2008 
 
 
2003 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
= 1 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
= 1 
 
0.83 
 
 
0.83 
France 
2011 
 
 
2010 
 
 
2003 
 
 
1998 
 
 
1995 
 
0 
 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
1 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
1 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
= 1 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
= 1 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
= 1 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
= 1 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
= 1 
 
0.5 
 
 
0.67 
 
 
0.67 
 
 
0.33 
 
 
0.17 
Germany 
2010 
 
 
2002 
 
 
2000B 
 
 
2000 
 
n/a 
 
 
n/a 
 
 
n/a 
 
 
n/a 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
n/a 
 
 
n/a 
 
 
n/a 
 
 
n/a 
 
1 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 0 
= 0.67 
(a): 0; (b): 
1; (c): 0 
= 0.33 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
= 1 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
= 1 
 
0.42 
 
 
0.083 
 
 
0.25 
 
 
0.25 
Greece 
2011 
 
 
2001 
 
 
1999 
 
1 
 
 
0 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
1 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
1 
 
 
0 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
= 1 
(a): 0; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
= 0.67 
(a): 0; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
= 0.67 
 
1 
 
 
0.11 
 
 
0.45 
Hungary 
2004 
 
n/a 
 
1 
 
0 
 
n/a 
 
0 
 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
= 1 
 
0.5 
Italy 
2011 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
(a): 1; (b): 
 
0.5 
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1999 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
1; (c): 1 
= 1 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
= 1 
 
 
0.17 
Luxemb. 
2006 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
= 1 
 
0.33 
Malta 
2001 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
= 1 
 
0.5 
Netherl. 
2008 
 
 
2003 
 
n/a 
 
 
n/a 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
n/a 
 
 
n/a 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
= 1 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
= 1 
 
1 
 
 
1 
Norway 
2010 
 
 
2004 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
 
0 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
= 1 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
= 1 
 
0.83 
 
 
0.67 
Poland 
2010 
 
 
2002G 
 
 
2002C 
 
n/a 
 
 
n/a 
 
 
n/a 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
1 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
n/a 
 
 
n/a 
 
 
n/a 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
= 1 
(a): 0; (b): 
1; (c): 0 
= 0.33 
(a): 0; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
= 0.67 
 
0.5 
 
 
0.083 
 
 
0.17 
Portugal 
2010 
 
 
1999 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
1 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
(a): 0; (b): 
-149; (c): 1 
= 0.5 
(a): 1; (b): 
-; (c): 1 
= 1 
 
0.25 
 
 
0.17 
Slovakia 
2008 
 
n/a 
 
1 
 
1 
 
n/a 
 
1 
 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
 
1 
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= 1 
Slovenia 
2009 
 
 
2004 
 
n/a 
 
 
n/a 
 
0 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
 
0 
 
n/a 
 
 
n/a 
 
1 
 
 
0 
 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
= 1 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
= 1 
 
0.75 
 
 
0.5 
Spain 
2006 
 
 
2004 
 
 
2003 
 
1 
 
 
0 
 
 
1 
 
0 
 
 
1 
 
 
0 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
 
0 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
= 1 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
= 1 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
= 1 
 
0.67 
 
 
0.67 
 
 
0.33 
Sweden 
2010 
 
 
2001 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
 
0 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
0 
 
 
1 
 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
= 1 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
= 1 
 
0.83 
 
 
0.83 
Switzerl. 
2007 
 
 
2002 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
= 1 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
= 1 
 
0.33 
 
 
0.33 
UK 
2010 
 
 
2003 
 
 
1998 
 
 
1992 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
 
0 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
= 1 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
= 1 
(a): 1; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
= 1 
(a): 0; (b): 
1; (c): 1 
= 0.67 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
 
0.5 
 
 
0.28 
 
 
